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Abstract 
 
 
On 7 July 2005, a global call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) was 
declared to people around the world to enact boycott initiatives and pressure their 
respective governments to sanction Israel until it complies with international law and 
respects universal principles of human rights. The call was endorsed by over 170 
Palestinian associations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, charities, and 
other Palestinian groups. The call mentioned how broad BDS campaigns were utilized 
in the South African struggle against apartheid, and how these efforts served as an 
inspiration to those seeking justice for Palestinians. The call stated that boycott 
measures should be carried out until three demands are met – that Israel end the 
occupation of Arab lands, end discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israel, and 
respect the Palestinian right of return.  
This study explores the causes for the BDS movement, its organizational 
dynamics, and the potential outcomes the movement intends to gain through border-
crossing solidarity groups and networks. Research questions guiding this investigation 
have been: What causal conditions have led to the emergence of the movement? How 
is the movement similar and/or dissimilar to other forms of challenging Israel? How is 
the BDS movement organized across borders, and how are local campaigns within the 
movement operationalized? This thesis is comprised of three sections that include a 
historical background, case study chapters on BDS campaigns, and a final section that 
analyzes the movement’s structure and processes, its connection to global justice 
activism, and challenges and limitations of the movement. Thus, this thesis critically 
investigates the BDS movement through its operationalization across borders and 
argues that due to its scope, organizational structure, and collective action frames, the 
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transnational movement represents a new and different approach to challenging Israel 
in the Palestinian struggle for justice. 
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Introduction 
 
 
On 7 July 2005, a global call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) was 
declared “against Israel until it complies with international law and universal 
principles of human rights.”1 Over 170 Palestinian associations, trade unions, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), charities, and other Palestinian groups 
endorsed the call. The call mentioned how broad BDS campaigns were utilized in the 
South African struggle against apartheid, and how these efforts served as an 
inspiration to those seeking justice for Palestinians. The call stated that boycott 
measures should be carried out until the following three demands are met.  
 
1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and 
dismantling the Wall  
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens 
of Israel to full equality; and  
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian 
refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN 
resolution 1942  
 
This study explores the causes for the BDS movement, its organizational dynamics, 
and the potential outcomes the movement intends to gain through border-crossing 
solidarity groups and networks. A backdrop for the movement’s causal emergence is 
set in the first chapter and outcomes are addressed in the final chapter. The 
intervening chapters analyze how the movement is organized and are the main focus 
of this thesis. Thus, this thesis critically investigates the BDS movement through its 
operationalization across borders and in doing so argues that the transnational 
                                                 
1 BDS Movement, “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” www.bdsmovement.net/call. For the full-
text of the document see Appendix I: Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS.    
2 Ibid.   
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movement is a new and different approach to challenging Israel in the Palestinian 
struggle for justice. 
Research Questions  
 
 
I began investigating Palestinian resistance after completing a research project on the 
relationship between international institutions and Palestinian state formation. This 
prior research was heavily based in a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework that 
analyzed structural conditions surrounding the conceptualization of state formation in 
Palestine.3 After completing this work, I felt the need to view Palestine more 
holistically by investigating the “agency” side of Palestinian politics, particularly 
through Palestinian resistance. While conducting preliminary research on Palestinian 
resistance generally, questions increasingly emerged regarding the relatively un-
researched BDS movement. Because these questions remained unanswered and the 
movement has become more prominent in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it became 
clear that the movement not only warranted its own full-scale study, but that this 
research would also deepen and expand my knowledge of Israel/Palestine, social 
movements, and transnational activism.  
 In this process, the following research questions came to the fore and were the 
basis for my investigation into the BDS movement. The primary research question is: 
what are the causal conditions that led to the movement’s emergence, what mobilizing 
dynamics helped the movement develop, and how can the movement strategically 
conceptualize moving toward outcomes? This is examined in detail throughout the 
                                                 
3 Suzanne Morrison, “Configuring Palestine: a Neo-Gramscian Perspective of International Institutions 
in Palestinian State Formation” (MA Thesis, American University in Cairo, 2010); 
http://dar.aucegypt.edu/handle/10526/724.  
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following chapters in the thesis through a series of secondary research questions 
including: Why has the BDS movement emerged at this particular historical juncture? 
What are the motives for establishing the BDS movement? Why do people join the 
transnational movement? What other forms of struggle have preceded and influenced 
the creation of the BDS movement? What political conditions fostered an 
environment ripe for the development of a border-crossing BDS movement?  
How has the failure of other forms of struggle and the peace process led to the 
creation of the BDS movement? How is the movement similar and/or dissimilar to 
other forms of challenging Israel? How did structural conditions and factors of agency 
lead to the creation of the BDS movement? At what time can a movement be 
discerned from initial, seemingly disconnected boycott activities? How is the BDS 
movement organized across borders, and how are local campaigns within the 
movement operationalized? How does the BDS movement fit within a larger global 
justice framework? Finally, what challenges and limitations does the movement 
encounter, and how might these be overcome for the movement to further develop? 
These questions formed a foundation for my investigation into the movement and 
guided me through the research process.  
 
Review of the Literature 
 
 
This thesis builds on and contributes to a range of scholarly literature. In the sections 
that follow, I review literature relating to Palestine-related BDS, South African-
related BDS, Palestinian resistance, boycott literature, social movement theory, and 
transnational activism. In each section, I examine the general thrusts and main 
arguments of the respective literature to situate my research on the BDS movement 
within a broader context.   
14 
 
 
 
BDS Literature 
 
Palestine BDS 
 
 
When I started to survey the literature on the BDS movement as I began my doctoral 
research in 2010, there were few scholarly works at that time to actually review. Since 
that time, the literature has expanded with nearly all works cited here being published 
during the time of my thesis research. The movement is clearly picking up academic 
interest as evidenced by the growing list of works cited below, and will likely increase 
in the coming years due to the prominence of the movement in analyses of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
The bulk of the literature on the BDS movement is written by participants or 
supporters of the movement, and makes the case for the movement’s rationale, tactics, 
and demands. In short, this body of work is a call for mobilization. The movement’s 
first book, Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions: the Global Struggle for Palestinian 
Rights was written by prominent movement activist, Omar Barghouti.4 This was 
followed by The Case for Sanctions against Israel edited by Andrea Lim, an editor at 
the leftist publishing house Verso Books, and Generation Palestine: Voices of the 
BDS Movement edited by long-term Palestine solidarity activist Rich Wiles.5 All three 
books comprise self-contained chapters, sometimes of previously published articles, 
and the latter two are edited books with chapters written by notable activists or 
personalities. Similarly, a chapter on the movement by Hazem Jamjoun in an edited 
book by Julie Norman and Maia Carter Hallward on the second intifada and an article 
                                                 
4 Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).  
5 Andrea Lim, ed., The Case for Sanctions Against Israel (Brooklyn: Verso, 2012) and Rich Wiles, 
Generation Palestine: Voices from the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (London: Pluto 
Press, 2013).  
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by Phil Marfleet and Tom Hickey on the “South Africa moment” in International 
Socialism both analyze the movement and argue for its promotion by activist-
scholars.6 These studies are a useful introduction for studying the BDS movement in 
that they provide some historical context for BDS and illustrate the arguments made 
in favor of the movement, thus providing much of the intellectual and ideological 
justification for the movement’s emergence and development.    
Following from this body of work is again, a small but growing corpus, which 
argues against the movement. These texts for the most part seek to refute arguments 
in favor of the movement proffered in part through the texts discussed in the previous 
paragraph. The Case Against Academic Boycotts of Israel, edited by Cary Nelson and 
Gabriel Noah Brahm, and The BDS War Against Israel: The Orwellian Campaign to 
Destroy Israel Through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement by Jed 
Babbin both seek to rebut claims made by participants in the movement. Both books 
assert that the movement seeks to destroy Israel as a Jewish state. Nelson states that 
BDS supporters “are effectively promoting the dissolution of the Jewish state…” and 
Babbin characterizes the movement as “an ideological assault on the existence of 
Israel as a Jewish nation.”7 While the former text includes “academic boycott” it its 
title, most authors in the book discuss BDS more generally, and many argue that anti-
Semitism plays an underlying role in the movement’s rationale, even if individuals in 
the movement are unaware of this or do not hold anti-Semitic beliefs.  
                                                 
6 Hazem Jamjoum, “The Global Campaign for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions against Israel,” in 
Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy, eds., Maia Carter Hallward and 
Julie Norman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 133-151; Tom Hickey and Philip Marfleet, “The 
‘South Africa Moment’: Palestine, Israel and the Boycott,” International Socialism 128 (13 October 
2010): http://isj.org.uk/the-south-africa-moment-palestine-israel-and-the-boycott/.  
7 Cary Nelson and Gabriel Noah Brahm, ed., The Case Against Academic Boycotts of Israel (Chicago 
and New York: MLA Members for Scholar's Rights, 2014), Kindle ebook, Introduction; Jed Babbin, 
The BDS War Against Israel: The Orwellian Campaign to Destroy Israel Through the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions Movement  (New York: The London Center for Policy Research, 2014), 4.  
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Finally, a third body of work seeks to analyze the movement beyond the 
argumentative dichotomy that is “for” or “against” the movement, and rather seeks to 
investigate the movement from a variety of analytical approaches. In 2009, Abigail 
Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban published an article in Race and Class in which they 
use a Gramscian approach and build on Charles Mills’ concept of the “racial contract” 
to argue that the transnational movement represents a challenge to the ideological 
hegemony of the Zionist narrative of the Israeli state. Similarly, in the same journal 
several years later Sean McMahon argues that the movement’s power lies in its 
“networked contestation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli politics.”8 Lastly, in 
Transnational Activism and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Carter Hallward 
analyzes why the BDS movement is so contentious in the US.9 Carter Hallward’s 
book draws on and extends the analysis that she and Patrick Shaver proffered in 2012 
in their case study of the University of Berkeley’s divestment bill that was published 
in Peace and Change.10 In her book, Carter Hallward argues that “debates about 
identity” and fear mobilized to guard particular identities explicate why positions on 
the movement (in the US particularly) are polarized.  
As noted above, there are few existing scholarly works on the BDS movement. 
The books and articles reviewed in this section provide a good introduction to the 
major topics and debates surrounding the movement, and are useful for knowing the 
current work available in the field. As one of the first in-depth studies of the 
movement, this thesis contributes to this small, but growing area of literature. My 
                                                 
8 Sean McMahon, “The Boycott, Divestment, Sanction Campaign: Contradictions and Challenges,” 
Race and Class 55, no. 4 (2014): 78. 
9 Maia Carter Hallward, Transnational Activism and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
10 Maia Carter Hallward and Patrick Shaver, “ ‘War By Other Means’ or Nonviolent Resistance? 
Examining the Discourses Surrounding Berkeley’s Divestment Bill,” Peace and Change 37, no. 3 (July 
2012): 389-411.  
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research is part of the third body of work cited above in which scholars critically 
analyze the movement beyond explicit arguments that support or oppose the 
movement. Specifically, this thesis provides insight into and analysis of the 
movement’s emergence and operationalization across borders, which adds to the 
modest literature on the movement and introduces new questions for future studies.  
 
South Africa BDS  
 
 
Boycott, divestment, and sanctions activities were part of a larger decades-long 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Because the struggle to bring down 
apartheid in South Africa was multi-faceted, the literature reflects this dynamism. Of 
the literature that deals with BDS as part of the broader anti-apartheid struggle, there 
are generally three strands.  
One body of work analyzes a range of internal and external factors that led to 
the fall of formal apartheid in South Africa. In The UDF: A History of the United 
Democratic Front in South Africa 1983-1991, Jeremy Seekings argues that trade 
unions were a significant part of the UDF, which intensified resistance within South 
Africa and played an important role in ending apartheid.11 Other factors, such as 
changing international conditions following the Cold War are emphasized in Nigel 
Worden’s The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and 
Apartheid.12 While a variety of internal and external factors are stressed in this 
corpus, BDS activities are not seen as primary factor in bringing down apartheid.  
                                                 
11 Jeremy Seekings, The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 2000).  
12 Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).  
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On the other hand, a second strand of literature suggests that international 
solidarity efforts such as BDS were an important component in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Neta Crawford and Audi Klotz’s compilation, How Sanctions Work: Lessons 
From South Africa and Robert Massie’s, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and 
South Africa in the Apartheid Years both argue that concerted pressure from abroad 
through a variety of BDS activities damaged the ruling apartheid regime and 
contributed to its downfall.13 According to Klotz, “Numerous strategic, economic, and 
social sanctions also weakened the regime’s ability to maintain apartheid, even 
undermining its ideological foundations.”14 Thus, in this corpus and unlike the body 
of work previously discussed, BDS activities are seen as a vital part of the larger anti-
apartheid struggle and the eventual fall of the ruling white regime.  
Finally, a number of texts deal with specific aspects of BDS, such as academic 
boycotts, the sports boycott, or the role of divestments and international sanctions on 
South Africa’s economy in the anti-apartheid struggle. Lorraine Haricombe and F.W. 
Lancaster’s Out in the Cold: Academic Boycotts and the Isolation of South Africa is 
the result of two large-scare surveys of South African scholars and argues that 
academic boycotts had more of a symbolic effect than a direct political effect.15 In 
“Academic Boycott – Political Strategy or Moral Imperative? Selective Support as a 
Justifiable Alternative,” Solomon Benatar analyzes the negative effects of academic 
boycotts and advocates “selective support,” which is “unlike total boycott or uncritical 
                                                 
13 Neta Crawford and Audi Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons From South Africa (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); and Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South 
Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Doubleday, 1997). 
14 Audie Klotz, “Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons,” in How Sanctions Work: Lessons 
From South Africa, eds., Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 264.  
15 Lorraine Haricombe and F.W. Lancaster, Out in the Cold: Academic Boycotts and the Isolation of 
South Africa (Arlington, VA: Information Resources Press, 1995).  
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support.”16 In “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports 
Boycott,” Douglas Booth investigates the “shifting objectives” of the sports boycott 
over 30 years, and concludes that interracialized sports weakened racial ideology and 
thus the apartheid regime more than sports boycotts.17 Thus, in this body of work, 
scholars have analyzed specific campaigns to assess if and how they contributed to 
the anti-apartheid struggle and how they may or may not have aided in the downfall 
of the apartheid regime. 
This scholarly work is important because it shows a range of interpretations of 
multiple factors that led to the downfall of apartheid in South Africa. These studies 
illustrate the role that BDS can play in a larger political struggle, and how scholars 
analyzed these activities. The texts above also demonstrate the way scholars can 
approach analyzing such a movement, especially after the activities and effects of the 
movement have occurred. As these studies indicate, this is particularly useful for 
assessing the outcomes and effectiveness of a movement. Considering the current 
BDS movement for Palestinian justice finds the South African example inspiring, 
these works are useful for understanding the dynamics of a similar border-crossing 
movement and the potential for creating social and political change through boycott 
endeavors.  
 
Palestinian Resistance 
 
 
In addition to building on the literature of Palestine and South Africa related BDS, 
this thesis is also situated within the broader literature on Palestinian resistance. Of 
                                                 
16 Solomon Benatar, “Academic Boycott – Political Strategy or Moral Imperative? Selective Support as 
a Justifiable Alternative,” South African Medical Journal 79, no. 11 (June 1991): 661.  
17 Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 3 (July 2003): 477-493.  
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this resistance, the contemporary BDS movement has its most direct historical 
connections to the Arab Revolt, the first intifada, and the second intifada.18   
One corpus of literature relating to Palestinian resistance investigates the Arab 
revolt from 1936-39. In this body of work, scholars have studied the causes and 
outcomes of the revolt, along with strategies and tactics used to resist British 
occupation and increasing Jewish immigration. While scholars may emphasize 
particular tactics in their analyses, most agree that a range of tactics such as strikes 
(including a six-month general strike), boycotts, demonstrations, and guerilla tactics 
(bombings, shootings, etc.) were used to fight the British and Zionists. Speaking of 
the general strike in Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, 
Rashid Khalidi says it was the “longest anti-colonial strike of its kind until that point 
in history.”19 According to Rosemary Sayigh in Palestinians: From Peasants to 
Revolutionaries, armed resistance during the time was the “most sustained phase of 
militant anti-imperialist struggle in the Arab world before the Algerian War of 
Independence.”20 Despite the revolt’s unfavorable outcomes for Palestinians, Mazin 
Qumsiyeh notes that taken together, “Violent and nonviolent resistance was a potent 
mix, making the country almost ungovernable.”21 
Another part of literature that analyzes Palestinian resistance is that of the first 
intifada. Similar to the revolt in the 1930s, numerous tactics were used to challenge 
Israel’s occupation including demonstrations, boycotts, stone throwing, and the use of 
petrol bombs. The first intifada is widely known for its mass mobilization of 
                                                 
18 In this section I survey the literature on Palestinian resistance during these periods as it specifically 
relates to researching the BDS movement. For a general historical background see Chapter 1 on the 
Emergence of the Movement (§1.1 Challenging Israel in a Historical Context).  
19 Rashid Khalidi, Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2006), 106. 
20 Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books. 2007), 43.  
21 Mazin Qumsiyeh, Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment (London: 
Pluto Press, 2011), 86. 
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Palestinian society and many scholars emphasize the “popular” or “nonviolent” 
character of the uprising. This is prevalent in the work of Qumsiyeh, who not only 
focuses on the first intifada, but as indicated in the title, Popular Resistance in 
Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment, traces popular resistance throughout 
Palestinian history. In A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and 
Nonviolent Resistance, Mary King argues that Palestinians strategically chose to use 
nonviolent tactics to resist Israel’s occupation, and similar to Qumsiyeh, argues that 
these tactics have a long history in the Palestinian struggle.22 These themes are also 
evident in two edited volumes on the intifada: Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads 
edited by Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock and Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising 
Against Israeli Occupation edited by Zachery Lockman and Joel Benin.23 According 
to Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, who wrote the introduction to Nassar and Heacock’s book, 
the intifada rendered a military solution to the conflict insufficient through, “the 
creative, militant but nonviolent techniques of organization and pressure it has used, 
and by the concrete daily practices of the people as they struggle to translate 
independence into reality.”24  
In contrast, much literature on the second intifada emphasizes armed 
resistance used during the uprising. While armed resistance is discussed generally, the 
particular tactic of suicide bombing receives the most attention. In “Palestinian 
Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” 
Assaf Moghadam uses a “two-phase model” to explain various factors such as 
                                                 
22 Mary Elizabeth King, A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance 
(New York: Nation Books, 2007). 
23 Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 
1990) and Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, eds., Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli 
Occupation (Boston: South End Press, 1989). 
24 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, “Introduction: On Achieving Independence,” in Intifada: Palestine at the 
Crossroads, eds., Nassar and Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 10.  
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economic, nationalist, and religious reasons that led to the tactic becoming prevalent 
during the intifada.25 However, in his research on Palestinian suicide bombing 
Hisham Ahmed argues that Israel’s repressive occupation is a primary factor in the 
tactic’s rise during the second intifada. He states, “The more military operations the 
Israelis conduct in the occupied territories…the more ‘human bombs’ are mobilized 
in Palestinian society.”26  
A smaller strain of work in the literature on resistance during the second 
intifada seeks to draw attention to unarmed resistance during the uprising. This 
research suggests that armed resistance receives a disproportionate share of attention 
in the literature, thereby downplaying the presence and efficacy of other forms of 
challenging Israel. As mentioned above, Qumsiyeh’s research details continuous 
popular Palestinian resistance to foreign occupation, of which the second intifada is a 
part. Julie Norman’s The Second Palestinian Intifada: Civil Resistance and her edited 
book with Carter Hallward Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism 
and Advocacy both argue that “nonviolent resistance did, and continues to, take place 
throughout Palestine in various forms.”27 Carter Hallward’s other text on the second 
intifada, Struggling for a Just Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second 
Intifada, makes a similar argument, which created a foundation for her later work on 
the BDS movement that was reviewed in the earlier section on Palestine BDS.28  
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The literature reviewed above on Palestinian resistance suggests that a variety 
of strategies and tactics have been used in the Palestinian struggle for justice. Bearing 
in mind that BDS is a contemporary form of resistance, this work is important for 
understanding the historical trajectory of Palestinian resistance and evaluating how 
the BDS movement is similar or dissimilar from other forms of challenging Israel. 
The movement is a current and growing form of Palestine activism, and thus my 
research on it adds to this literature as a preliminary study on the movement. In 
particular, this thesis illustrates how the movement is a new and different approach to 
resisting Israel in the Palestinian struggle for justice, which is explored in detail in the 
chapters following this introduction.  
   
Boycott Literature 
 
 
Although the practice of boycott has been around for centuries, the term became 
known through the effective tactics employed by Irish peasants in 1880 to ostracize 
Captain Charles Boycott.29 Boycott was a retired English officer who worked as an 
agent on an Irish estate, where he collected rents from tenants on behalf of an 
absentee landlord. After a particularly bad harvest in 1879 due to poor weather, the 
peasants working on the estate sought rent reductions. The property owner of the 
estate refused the request and Boycott was instructed to evict the tenants. In response, 
the Irish Land League proposed not doing business with Boycott instead of directly 
attacking him. The tactic was successful, as nobody in the local area would work for 
Boycott, in his fields or in his home. Eventually loyalists in Ireland were brought in to 
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harvest Boycott’s crops, but the cost of protecting them along the way far outweighed 
the worth of the crops.30  
From that time, the term boycott has been used to describe actions by 
individuals and groups that use isolation as a way to protest unfavorable individuals, 
policies, and institutions. Consumer Boycotts by Monroe Friedman is a detailed study 
of boycotts in the US in the twentieth century.31 Friedman argues that boycotts are a 
unique form of protest for two reasons. The first is that they are perceived as an 
effective tactic by targets of boycotts and they have “been used more than any other 
organizational technique to promote and protect the rights of the powerless and 
disenfranchised segments of society.”32 Boycotts, Buses, And Passes: Black Women's 
Resistance in the U.S. South and South Africa is a comparative study by Pamela 
Brooks of women’s resistance and argues that during the 1950s women in both 
countries invoked similar forms of resistance to protest discriminatory policies and 
apartheid.33  
Considering boycott on the state level, From Boycott to Economic 
Cooperation by Gil Feiler argues that the Arab states’ boycott of Israel is a unique 
case of economic sanctions in the twentieth century in duration and objective, in that 
its original goal was not for Israel to reform its policies.34 Rather, the boycott was 
aimed at eliminating Israel or making its existence very difficult. Initiated by the Arab 
League when the state of Israel was established in 1948, the Arab boycott covered 
diplomatic relations, products and business originating in Israel or companies doing 
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 Monroe Friedman, Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change Through the Marketplace and Media (New 
York: Routledge, 1999). 
32 Ibid, 3.  
33 Pamela Brooks, Boycotts, Buses, and Passes: Black Women's Resistance in the U.S. South and South 
Africa (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008).  
34 Gil Feiler, From Boycott to Economic Cooperation: The Political Economy of the Arab Boycott of 
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business with Israel.35 The extent of the boycott and degree of application has varied 
over time, with some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, currently not boycotting Israel 
at all.  
Scholarly research on boycott reveals that usage of the tactic has a long 
history. These studies are especially useful for showing the tactic of boycott is 
familiar and a widespread form of action that is applied in a variety of circumstances. 
Considering the BDS movement is centered on related political tactics of boycott, my 
research contributes to this literature by demonstrating the border-crossing use of the 
tactic as applied to the Palestinian struggle for justice.  
  
Social Movement Theory  
 
 
Theories of collective action are largely concerned with describing and explaining 
when, why, and how individuals join together in attempts to create social and political 
change. Social movement theory in particular comprises a robust literature on 
causality, dynamics, and outcomes. However, the literature on collective action and 
social movements are wrought with much debate, with concepts such as structure and 
agency framing the terrain over which these debates are waged.  
During much of the twentieth century, social scientists focused on structural 
causation that led to collective action. French sociologist Émile Durkheim developed 
a theory of functionalism, which sought to problematize the functions of social 
structures that comprise society. Influenced by Durkheim, Talcott Parsons 
popularized functionalism in US social science. In 1951, Parsons published The 
Social System wherein he argues that through human interaction a social system or 
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society materializes.36  Neil Smelser and Chalmers Johnson were strongly influenced 
by Parsons’ work, and later applied functionalism to collective action. Structural 
functionalism views society as a social system where norms and values are 
institutionalized and reproduced through socialization over time. In the view of these 
theorists, the failure of socialization leads to alienation and is the main impetus for 
individuals joining together to create social change. 37 
A different strain in social science at the time emphasized the psychological 
reasons people have for acting collectively. James Davies theory of rising 
expectations, Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation approach, and Samuel Huntington’s 
modernization theory were the most prominent. These theories utilized computer-
assisted models and largely focused on collective behavior. Davies’ “J-curve” model 
purports that a period of relative prosperity raises people’s expectations so that, when 
followed by a sudden economic downturn, it is likely to create feelings of deprivation 
and frustration.38 In Why Men Rebel, Gurr posits that the discrepancy between what 
people expect and their perceived material conditions can lead to frustration and 
aggression, thereby leading to disorderly collective behavior.39 Huntington, perhaps 
the best-known proponent of modernization theory, integrated these approaches. 
According to modernization theory, social and economic changes associated with 
modernization (industrialization, urbanization, the spread of Western education 
systems, etc.) promote a new political consciousness that in turn leads to increased 
political demands. People may become rebellious if they expect political channels to 
be opened to them, channels through which they can be active participants and make 
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“meaningful” change, but are denied these democratic outlets. According to 
Huntington, the consequence is disorder and sometimes even revolution. 40   
Shortly thereafter, social scientists such as Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and 
Sidney Tarrow developed the political process approach, which identified a 
relationship between institutionalized politics on the one hand and that of collective 
action, social movements, and revolution on the other.41 In general, the theory posits 
that structural changes in institutionalized politics and power relations form a variety 
of “political opportunities” and/or constraints, and can explain why a particular 
movement emerges at a certain time. Utilizing political process theory, US scholars 
mostly pursued case studies of individual movements while European theorists 
applied a comparative version of the approach to “new social movements,” which 
sought to explain cross-national variances of social movements in different national 
political contexts.     
At the same time and in addition to structural causation – the when and why – 
of mobilization, a number of theorists started analyzing how actors are mobilized. 
Theorists such as Tilly, McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald rejected notions 
that collective action was irrational, disorderly, or alienated behavior. Instead, they 
maintained that collective action particularly in the form of social movements were 
rational and goal-oriented.42 The concept of “mobilizing structures” was developed to 
analyze the organizational forms and dynamics of movements. According to 
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McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, mobilizing structures are “…those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective 
action.”43 These theorists argue that while movements emerge through political 
processes of opportunities and constraints, the structures of mobilization determine 
how movements develop. The most important theory of mobilization at the time was 
that of resource mobilization, which maintained that social movements emerge when 
they have access to resources and autonomous organization that enables their activity 
to be meaningful and effective.44  
While political opportunities and mobilizing structures can explain why and 
how certain social movements emerge at particular times, they are insufficient for 
explaining dynamics within movements or non-structural reasons individuals may 
have for joining social movements. Resource mobilization for example cannot explain 
the causes for all social movements as some are created with limited resources 
mobilized. Furthermore, Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper argue in their renowned 
article, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process 
Theory” that concepts such as political opportunity and mobilizing structures ignore 
the roles of culture, ideology, and historical specificity in shaping causation and 
participant mobilization.45 From the mid 1980s onward, scholars starting considering 
these reasons, especially cultural aspects that may inform agency. These scholars said 
that structural theories of social movements overlooked the role of meanings and 
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ideas in mobilization and failed to acknowledge the extent that social movements are 
involved in the production of and struggle over meanings.46 
 The concept of the “frame” was originally borrowed from Erving Goffman, 
who described the notion as a “schemata of interpretation.” 47 Frames are ways of 
thinking of and interpreting events or occurrences in life. Adapting this to social 
movements, David Snow and Robert Benford say that collective action frames are 
“intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander 
support, and to demobilize antagonists.”48 Activists use reoccurring themes and ideas 
to convey messages about their cause, hoping to frame the way people think about 
and understand an issue. Collective action frames are especially used to articulate 
shared grievances and identify responsibility of a target for action. Thus, participants 
in social movements actively construct alternative ways of interpreting and 
comprehending a particular issue, problem, or solution. 
 In an early article titled, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 
and Movement Participation,” Snow et al. argue that “frame alignment” – a 
corresponding linkage between individual and social movement values, beliefs, or 
interests – is necessary for participant mobilization in movements.49 Following this 
article, Snow and Benford wrote an article in International Social Movement 
Research that analyzed the role of ideology in social movements, particularly through 
the potency of framing efforts and the “frame resonance” of the movement’s espoused 
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ideology.50 According to the authors, four factors can determine the resonance of 
social movement frames among individuals. Building on their analysis of frame 
alignment and frame resonance of collective action frames, Snow and Benford went 
on to theorize macro-level mobilization through the development of “master frames.” 
Similar to the role of frames within social movements, master frames “provide the 
interpretive medium through which collective actors associated with different 
movements within a cycle assign blame.”51 They argue that only on rare occasions has 
a frame been broad, inclusive, and resonate enough to develop into a master frame, 
such as rights and injustice frames.52  
In addition to political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and collective 
action frames, two other theoretical concepts – protest cycles or cycles of contention 
and repertoires of contention – have been important in the development of social 
movement theory. Tarrow’s concept of protest cycles is a way to explain the life cycle 
of social movements. In Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics, Tarrow says cycles of contention are “a phase of heightened conflict across 
the social system,” which he argues is useful for analyzing when social movements 
emerge and decline.53 Tilly developed the concept of the repertoire of contention over 
several decades and through numerous publications.54 According to Tilly, a repertoire 
refers to “claim making routines” that activists use for performing opposition that are 
drawn on from previous struggles.55 Repertoires refer to a wide range of actions that 
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activists use in social movements such as strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, 
etc.  
Building on the theoretical development of political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and framing processes, but largely writing against what was now 
characterized as structuralism, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly published Dynamics of 
Contention (DoC), which developed a research framework for “contentious politics” – 
a wide range of social phenomena such as strikes, social movements, revolutions, 
civil war, etc.56 Their “relational approach” argues that analyzing dynamic 
mechanisms and processes of collective action are crucial to understanding 
mobilizations across time and space. Instead of objective, pre-existing structures of 
opportunity, mobilization, and framing, the three authors say that opportunity and/or 
constraints are subject to actor attribution, mobilization contingent on actor 
appropriation, and movement frames actively constructed by movement participants. 
While the authors presented a more nuanced theoretical approach for analyzing 
contentious politics, the book was cumbersome and complex (15 diverse cases 
ranging from Swiss Unification to the US Civil Rights movement), and the concepts, 
particularly the relationship and distinction between processes and mechanisms was 
unclear.  
The literature on social movement theory showcases how scholars have 
studied social movements, including the main debates and advancements in theorizing 
that have shaped these studies. The main approaches highlighted above explicate 
when, why, and how actors mobilize into social movements, with a majority of work 
in the field focusing on the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of movements. In the 
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theoretical framework section below, I detail the theoretical concepts from these texts 
that are most suitable for studying the BDS movement. My research on the BDS 
movement generally contributes to the literature on social movements by synthesizing 
approaches, which is applied to a contemporary case study.  
 
Transnational Activism  
 
 
Particularly since the 1990s, numerous scholars have extended theorization and 
conceptualization of collective action to the transnational level. In their co-edited 
book, Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Tarrow and Donatella Della Porta 
define this as “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of 
activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions.”57 This 
broad conceptualization is utilized throughout this thesis in considering how the BDS 
movement is organized across borders. Similar to research on national social 
movements, literature on border-crossing or transnational movements seeks most 
generally to critically analyze causal conditions, dynamics, and outcomes of these 
movements. As the BDS movements operates across borders, this literature represents 
another body of work in which this thesis is situated.  
Similar to theorizations described in the previous section on the emergence of 
social movements in national contexts, one body of work on transnational activism 
seeks to analyze when and why social movements develop beyond their locale. While 
the study of social movements has always been an interdisciplinary affair, this strain 
in the literature is largely influenced by political science. Theorists are interested in 
the changing role of the state in global politics, especially through processes of 
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neoliberal globalization, and the potential for state sovereignty to be challenged 
through transnational activism. They argue that activists participate is transnational 
social movements to change the behavior of their state and/or an international 
institution. In The New Transnational Activism, Tarrow builds on the DoC research 
program by offering an extensive typology of processes (global framing, 
internalization, diffusion and modularity, scale shift, externalization, and coalition-
building) and mechanisms that he says have increased political opportunities for 
activists to mobilize outside their local contexts.58 In a similar vein, three broad 
processes: diffusion, internalization, and externalization are the focus in his co-edited 
volume with Della Porta mentioned above. In both, the relationship between local and 
global politics is explored through activism across borders. While the authors say that 
contemporary transnational activism represents something new, the state, and its 
domestic political structures and processes, are still the primary site of contentious 
politics.   
Another corpus in the literature analyzes how transnational activism is 
operationalized across borders. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s work on 
“transnational advocacy networks” was one of the early, influential texts relating to 
transnational activism. In Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Keck and Sikkink argue that a number of social and political 
changes in recent decades are attributable to networks of non-state actors engaged in 
advocacy work across borders.59 One way that activists have done this is through what 
they call the “boomerang effect” – where activists in a local context appeal to 
international allies to pressure the state from abroad, with the goal of changing the 
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policies and practices of the state in question. They say that this is particularly 
widespread in human rights activism, where external contacts can “amplify” the 
appeals of local groups. According to Keck and Sikkink, “It is no accident that 
‘rights’ claims may be the prototypical language of advocacy networks.”60  
Other work in the theoretical literature has considered what possible outcomes 
may have arisen from transnational mobilization. In this regard, a number of scholars 
have suggested that transnational activism has sometimes resulted in changes of 
international norms and/or states’ compliance with these norms. Through numerous 
case studies in the compilation, Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social 
Movements, Networks, and Norms, the authors argue that transnational activism has 
played a critical role in transforming international norms and state practices in areas 
such as human rights, the environment and labor.61 In Social Movements for Global 
Democracy, Jackie Smith argues that “social movements have been essential to 
democratizing the global political system…[and are] strengthening possibilities for 
democracy in global institutions.”62 Thus, in this corpus, social movement scholars 
analyze correlations between transnational activism and political and social change, 
analyzing the effects of activism across borders.  
Literature on transnational activism is useful for showing how some forms of 
collective action are organized across borders. The assertion by Tarrow and others 
suggested above that the main target of transnational activism is still the state, despite 
border-crossing structures and processes, is indicative of BDS activism as the state of 
Israel is the primary target. The literature on transnational activism is also helpful for 
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understanding the use and importance in applying a common discourse in the form of 
collective action frames such as human rights, which resonates with activists across 
borders. Similar to other contemporary social movements working on justice related 
issues across borders, the BDS movement frames the Palestinian struggle through 
Israel’s violations of Palestinian human rights and other international laws, corporate 
complicity, etc. While the BDS movement has a specific Palestinian context for its 
emergence, the literature on transnational activism is important for analyzing 
organizational aspects (such as collective action frames) in the movement’s border-
crossing operationalization.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In this thesis, I draw on a range of concepts in the theoretical literature on social 
movements and transnational activism (reviewed in the previous sections) as a tool-kit 
for researching the BDS movement. In many ways, the historical development of 
social movement theory reads like the elaborate scholarly production of typologies for 
explaining causes, dynamics, and outcomes of social movements. While these 
extensive analytical categories explain a range of phenomena associated with social 
movements, and the BDS movement certainly could be explained in terms of its 
diffusion across borders or how many factors of resonance its movement frames meet, 
I have struggled to find great utility in researching the movement in this way. In her 
review of Tarrow’s, The New Transnational Activism, Smith wrote of the expanded 
DoC program, “I, along with earlier critics of DOC, remain unconvinced that efforts 
to elaborate typologies of mechanisms…and processes…will generate intellectual 
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payoffs that justify the effort.”63 Thus, in constructing a theoretical framework for 
researching the BDS movement I have utilized a number of the main concepts 
available in the literature, but have refrained from engaging the extensive 
categorizations that many social movement theorists have formulated.  
  In chapter one on the emergence of the movement I utilize the concept of 
political opportunities and constraints to explicate the structural-historical context in 
which the BDS movement originated. In this regard, the political environment after 
the Oslo process (constraints) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory 
Opinion on Israel’s wall (opportunities) were important in shaping a political context 
for the development of the movement. In the same chapter, I draw on the concept of 
mobilizing structures, though I focus more on dynamics of mobilization to explore the 
rise of the movement through early BDS activities. In doing this, the heavily 
structural conceptualization initially devised in social movement theory has been 
modified to allow for a more agency-influenced analysis of BDS mobilizations. In the 
case of the BDS movement, a number of mobilizing dynamics are important for 
examining the emergence of the movement. This includes The NGO Forum at the 
World Conference against Racism in 2001, early Palestinian calls for boycott and the 
creation of the Palestinian campaign for the academic and cultural boycott of Israel, 
early divestment initiatives, initial calls for a moratorium on research funding and an 
academic boycott of Israel, and a 2004 conference in London on resisting Israeli 
apartheid. Taken together, these introductory efforts by activists illuminate the 
dynamics of mobilization in which the BDS movement developed.     
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Collective action frames are referred to throughout the thesis, and especially 
analyzed in chapter six, where BDS movement frames are considered in a global 
justice framework. BDS activists frame their campaigns around particular themes to 
construct an alternative way of seeing and thinking about Israel/Palestine. In the BDS 
movement, activists frequently highlight Israel’s violations of international law and 
Palestinian human rights, the complicity of multinational corporations in these 
activities, and the importance of justice for Palestinians. These themes are used to 
frame the movement so that it is understood who the target is (Israel) and why it is 
being targeted (violations of international law and human rights). Framing the 
movement though these lenses is important in constructing a way of thinking of 
Israel/Palestine that challenges the status quo while also indicating how the movement 
understands itself. These reoccurring themes and ideas are interwoven with the 
movement’s tactical repertoire of boycott (discussed below), and together form a 
conceptual and tactical program for action in the border-crossing BDS movement.  
In addition to political opportunities/constraints, mobilizing dynamics, and 
collective action frames, I find Tilly’s concept of the repertoire very useful for 
investigating aspects of the movement, specifically the tactical repertoire of boycott. 
It has become a familiar form of action for pressuring a target by withdrawing support 
and many groups and social movements have utilized the tactical repertoire of boycott 
such as labor unions, animal rights groups, environmental organizations, faith-based 
groups, and consumer organizations. Famous boycotts include the Montgomery bus 
boycott that started in 1955 when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a public 
bus for a white person, the grape boycott in the 1960s organized by Cesar Chavez and 
the United Farm Workers union that brought attention to migrant labor, and those 
closest in resembling and influencing the BDS movement were the anti-apartheid 
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boycotts against the white South African regime that began in the 1950s and 
heightened in the 1980s-90s. In chapter six in particular, where I analyze the BDS 
movement in a global justice framework, I argue that the movement’s tactical 
repertoire is one of four points of intersection that the movement has with other 
contemporary transnational social movements that work on justice related causes.    
 
Movement-Relevant Theory  
 
In 2007, Douglas Bevington and Chris Dixon published an article in Social Movement 
Studies titled, “Movement-relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship 
and Activism.”64 Their article was influenced by and builds on a chapter by Richard 
Flacks in the edited book dedicated to Gamson, Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, 
Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship.65 In his chapter, Flacks raises the issue 
of “relevance” of social movement theory and contemplates “whether the substance of 
our systematic theorizing and research connects with the work of activists.”66 In their 
article, Bevington and Dixon note, “the biggest problem with contemporary social 
movement theory is that it is not particularly relevant to the very movements it 
studies.”67 They then make their call for “movement-relevant theory,” which they say 
should be “related directly to the dynamics of the movements themselves.”68 With 
respect to the BDS movement, and Palestine activism more generally, this has been 
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done on at least two occasions. The first is a chapter by Rafeef Ziadah and Adam 
Hanieh in Learning from the Ground Up Global Perspectives on Social Movements 
and Knowledge Production that was edited by Aziz Choudry and Dip Kapoor.69 The 
second is a chapter by Brian Aboud titled, “Organizing and the Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions Strategy: The Turn to BDS in Palestine Solidarity Politics in 
Montreal.”70 In both cases, the authors have sought to investigate questions that are 
directly relevant to organizing Palestine activism, especially BDS.   
The call for movement-relevant theory is particularly important in the case of 
the BDS movement, as many who write about BDS are activists in the movement 
with varying motives and degrees of conviction. Most of the documentation, research, 
and analysis of the movement thus far has been raised and discussed by activists 
themselves. Given that much of the written output of the movement to date has been 
authored by participants, it is important that an academic study of the movement be 
relevant to others that are writing about the movement as well. Many of the dialogues 
and questions raised by the BDS movement directly relate to the dynamics of the 
movement such as strategy, tactics, and effectiveness. Thus, this scholarly 
investigation engages with topics relevant to movement participants and in turn hopes 
to contribute to an analysis of the movement’s structure and processes.   
In addition to this, activists are part of a larger society and constructing 
movement-relevant theory is one way of making academic findings relevant to the 
general public. Theory that is engaged in a way that considers stakeholders can bridge 
                                                 
69 Rafeef Ziadah and Adam Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the 
New Anti-Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” in Learning from the Ground Up: Global Perspectives on 
Social Movements and Knowledge Production, eds., Aziz Choudry and Dip Kapoor (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 85-99. 
70 Brian Aboud, “Organizing and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Strategy: The Turn to BDS in 
Palestine Solidarity Politics in Montreal.,” in Organize!: Building from the Local for Global Justice, 
eds. Aziz Choudry, Jill Hanley, and Eric Shragge (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 202-215.  
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a traditional divide between those inside and outside academia. Regarding the BDS 
movement, this is especially pertinent as mentioned in the previous paragraph that 
much of the writing on the movement is done by those involved. In this thesis, many 
of the topics and issues analyzed are drawn from an extensive reading of the BDS 
movement and therefore have general connections for developing BDS movement-
relevant theory. In particular, in the second part of chapter six I analyze the challenges 
and limitations of the movement. I examine three key obstacles of the movement: 1) 
BDS alone cannot solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 2) the movement’s structure 
and process may be a weakness, and 3) not all movement targets are familiar or 
legitimate to activists not involved in the Palestinian struggle. I suggest how the 
movement might deal with these difficulties to build a stronger movement across 
borders.  
In taking Bevington and Dixon’s call for movement-relevant theory into 
consideration, it is important to note that not all theory (or movement research more 
generally) necessarily needs to be relevant to activists as academics must be able to 
engage and contribute to the theoretical discourse in their field. In addition, academics 
are part of a specific sector that requires particular activities for professional 
advancement such as publishing in peer-reviewed journals. The intended audience of 
these publications is other academics, not activists, and the purpose is to participate in 
scholarly debates and discussions. For these reasons, not all movement research can 
be relevant or can be produced to be relevant for movement participants. Therefore 
this thesis seeks to strike a balance and the task ahead is twofold: to utilize and engage 
with social movement theory where appropriate for analyzing aspects of the BDS 
movement, which has been outlined above, and also produce movement-relevant 
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research where possible, specifically in chapter six on the movement’s challenges and 
limitations. 
 
Methods for Researching the BDS Movement  
 
 
In her 2014 edited book on social movement methods, Della Porta notes that until that 
time only two other texts had been dedicated to the matter of methods for researching 
social movements. While the study of social movements has grown in past decades, 
scholarly attention to relevant methodology has not. Della Porta says that this is in 
part because of the interdisciplinary nature of social movement studies; and 
accordingly scholars have adopted an array of methods from different disciplines to 
conduct research on social movements. While lack of scholarly attention to methods 
may allow for great flexibility, I found the methodological terrain of social movement 
studies unclear. Therefore, to investigate the BDS movement for this thesis I 
employed research methods that are the most suitable for answering the research 
questions and are the most widely-used in studying social movements, including 
documentary research, semi-structured interviews, and organizational surveys.  
I collected an immense amount of information on the movement through 
documentary research. Academic literature, some of which has been reviewed above, 
particularly on Palestinian history, social movements, and transnational activism was 
necessary to investigate my research on the movement in a broader historical context 
of Palestinian resistance and border-crossing activism. Internet research comprised a 
range of sources on the movement and other contemporary movements. This included 
news reports in the major daily newspapers such as the New York Times, Guardian, 
Haaretz, and the Jerusalem Post, in addition to hundreds of articles written in smaller 
publications on the movement or its constituent campaigns. Movement and anti-
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movement websites, blogs, and other social media sites were important sources of 
information as well. Nearly all groups and organizations involved in the movement 
(and against the movement) have websites and are extensively represented on 
Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, etc. I am on several BDS-related mailing lists (e.g. the 
official BDS movement mailing list), and also connected to many BDS campaigns 
through Facebook and Twitter. News, commentary, and other information such as 
upcoming BDS activities are frequently circulated through these networks. Other 
sources, such as leftist publications, where the movement is frequently discussed (e.g. 
Electronic Intifada, Counterpunch, Common Dreams, etc.) and radio programs (e.g. 
Democracy Now!, Pacifica Radio, etc.), were also occasionally utilized.  
Another method I used to investigate my research questions was to conduct 
interviews with BDS supporters and activists. I conducted semi-structured interviews, 
which is a method of collecting data that allows for flexibility and standardization. 
Semi-structured interviews are flexible in that a general set of interview questions are 
tailored to a specific individual. I adapted questions and sought elaboration of points 
directly relevant to the participant being interviewed. Because a general set of 
interview questions were pre-determined, the process of each interview varied 
minimally. For analytical purposes, this provided sufficient standardization to test 
research questions and determine relationships among participant responses. 
I conducted 38 interviews in the West Bank, Israel, and Britain. Of these, 29 
took place in the West Bank of which a majority (26) were with Palestinian groups 
and organizations that were signatories to the 2005 global BDS call. Three interviews 
took place in Israel with Jewish-Israeli members of Boycott from Within, and five 
interviews were conducted in Britain with members of the British Committee for the 
Universities of Palestine (BRICUP). With the exception of one interview that was 
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conducted via skype, all interviews were in-person. A majority of the interviews in 
the West Bank occurred in the offices of the organizations I was interviewing. Several 
took place in public cafes. In Israel, I met one interviewee at the Israel Museum and 
the other two took place in a café in Tel Aviv. In Britain, two interviews were 
conducted in the homes of those I was interviewing, two took place at universities, 
and one occurred at the British Museum.   
  All interviews in the West Bank, Israel, and the one interview via Skype 
occurred between February and November 2012. Interviews in Britain were in July 
2013. All interviews were between one and two and a half hours in duration, and were 
recorded on a digital voice recorder. All interviews were transcribed shortly after they 
took place, with key points and themes transcribed verbatim.  
For interviews in the West Bank, I first emailed groups and organizations I 
hoped to interview and received very few responses. I then called the organizations, 
often through individuals’ direct mobile numbers, which I obtained from the 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) 
directory. I briefly introduced myself and my research project on the BDS movement. 
I then requested an interview with the person at a time and place of their choosing. In 
nearly all cases, I was granted an interview. When I arrived at the interviews I again 
briefly introduced my research project and asked the interviewee if they had any 
questions about me or my research. Often, the person I interviewed would be 
interested in my background, specifically how I came to research BDS and Palestine 
more generally. I explained that the death of my friend, Rachel Corrie, in Rafah, Gaza 
in 2003 by the Israeli military had a profound effect on me, and that I subsequently 
lived in Gaza in 2005. I also explained that after that time, I did a MA degree at the 
American University in Cairo for which I researched Palestinian state formation (and 
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briefly lived in Beit Sahour in 2009 to conduct fieldwork). This discussion of my 
background was important for setting a foundation of trust so that the people I 
interviewed could see my long-term engagement with the region and were 
comfortable in the interviews.  
I also interviewed Jewish-Israelis that are part of the group Boycott from 
Within, the only group in Israel dedicated solely to the BDS movement. I first emailed 
individuals in the group and of those that agreed to an interview, the follow-up 
occurred through email and phone. In the interviews, I recapped my background and 
research. As members of this group have far-left political beliefs and often work 
directly with the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC), it was important to not 
only emphasize my personal and academic background, but also that I had already 
conducted numerous interviews with Palestinian groups that had endorsed the 2005 
global call. This was important for showing them that my interest in their group was 
part of a larger research project on the movement.  
For interviews that were conducted in Britain, I first emailed those I hoped to 
interview and received all responses via email. One person was out of the country and 
unavailable for an interview. In all other cases, the time and place of the interview 
was agreed through email. In each email, I briefly introduced my research project and 
myself. For these interviews, I emphasized that my research was for a doctoral thesis, 
that I was a student at the LSE, and that my research was being supervised by Dr. 
John Chalcraft. Similar to my interviews in the West Bank and Israel, this background 
was important for building trust first for the interview to take place, and once in the 
interview for the person being interviewed to feel comfortable speaking freely.  
In the interviews, I first asked basic information, such as the history and 
objectives of the organization, and the interviewee’s role in that group. I then asked 
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more substantive questions, e.g. “Why did your group endorse the 2005 BDS call?” 
After each interview, initial observations and trends were noted. Responses to 
questions were further analyzed through coding to determine themes and relationships 
between interviews. Coded responses were then organized into categories to analyze 
prevalent themes and relationships.  
In addition to interviews, I also conducted a survey of Palestine solidarity 
groups involved in the BDS movement. The survey was “organizational” in that it 
was of groups and organizations in the movement, and the statistical data obtained 
from responses to the survey were analyzed mainly to determine the dynamics of 
border-crossing solidarity in the BDS movement and the relationships between 
external groups that participate in BDS.  
The survey was conducted online via Survey Monkey.71 I first conducted a 
pilot of the survey for one month in August 2012, in which I emailed 20 Palestine 
solidarity organizations across Europe, whose contact details I found on the groups’ 
websites. I received four responses, and felt I needed a better strategy for reaching 
groups. After I interviewed the European Coordinator for the BNC on 7 September 
2012, I asked for his assistance in distributing the survey to Palestine solidarity 
organizations. He, and two other contacts that he provided, sent the survey to groups 
mainly in the UK, US, and Australia.72 I received 88 responses by the time the survey 
period ended in February 2013.  
The survey consisted of 22 questions. All questions were optional and could 
be skipped. All responses to each question were recorded, along with the number of 
                                                 
71 Though the link to the survey is no longer available as the survey period has ended, Palestine 
solidarity groups clicked on the following link to access the survey during the survey period: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SurveyBDS. 
72 For the full-text of the survey, see Appendix II: BDS Survey.  
46 
 
 
responses and number of questions skipped. The first four questions asked basic 
information, e.g. “Where is your group located?” Questions 5 through 21 were the 
substantive questions of the survey, and the final question was open-ended, “Please 
feel free to add any additional information to this survey in the space below.” Six 
questions in the survey were open-ended. 13 questions were closed, e.g. “My group 
coordinates with the Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC)” with potential 
responses: Frequently, As Needed, Never. Three questions were a mix, such as, “My 
group primarily works on BDS campaigns” with potential responses: Yes, No, Other 
(please specify).  
Survey Monkey automatically compiles data collected from the survey. After 
the survey period ended, I downloaded all survey data in Excel and PDF formats. I 
chose options within the online program for creating graphs and charts based on the 
data collected, and printed hard copies for my records. I then analyzed all the data 
from the organizational surveys, specifically looking for overt responses (e.g. of the 
83 responses to Question 5, nearly 75 percent of respondents “strongly agree” that it 
is important to support the BDS movement because the principles and ideas are 
Palestinian-led). I also looked for relationships between questions and responses (e.g. 
Questions 18 and 19 regarding coordination with other Palestine solidarity groups and 
coordination with the BNC). After this, I drew conclusions based on my analysis and 
interpretation of the data, and created a document based on survey conclusions.  
 In addition to documentary research, semi-structured interviews, and 
organizational surveys, I also used two other methods – historical contextualization 
and content analysis – to investigate the BDS movement. Historical contextualization 
was necessary to situate the movement within a broader historical and political 
trajectory of the Palestinian struggle, and content analysis was required for 
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deconstructing the written output of the movement in order to answer the research 
questions relating to causes, dynamics, and outcomes of the border-crossing 
movement.   
 Historical contextualization is an analytical lens for situating a particular 
person, event, or phenomena in a larger background and setting. This gives a broader 
perspective for evaluating and explaining the relevance and/or significance of the 
object of study. With respect to the BDS movement, this was particularly important 
for comparing the BDS movement with other forms of challenging Israel such as the 
historical use of boycott (and related practices), border-crossing solidarity activism, 
armed resistance, and the state-based Arab League boycott of Israel. Historical 
contextualization was important for determining not only how the movement is 
similar and dissimilar to other tactics and strategies, but also to ascertain where the 
movement fits in the larger Palestinian struggle for justice. Likewise, the method was 
useful for analyzing the political environment in which the movement emerged such 
as the failure of the Oslo peace process and the International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion on Israel’s wall, and situating the origins of the movement in the 
theoretical framework of political constraints and opportunities. This analysis is 
specifically presented in chapter one on the emergence of the BDS movement (§ 1.1 
Challenging Israel in a Historical Context and § 1.2 The Rise of BDS I: Political 
Constraints and Opportunities).  
 Content analysis is a process of analyzing patterns of concepts and ideas to 
investigate meanings in a study. Words and phrases are analyzed in texts, and coding 
is used to identify patterns such as frequency. With respect to the BDS movement, 
this was effective for understanding how the movement understands and portrays 
itself. This was particularly important for researching two parts of this thesis – the 
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case study chapters and the collective action frames of the movement. Content 
analysis was useful for taking an in-depth look at how the movement operates across 
borders through its localized constituent campaigns, which is presented in the case 
study chapters (chapters two, three, and four). The method was also specifically 
useful for identifying and analyzing the collective action frames of the movement. 
Analyzing reoccurring themes such as human rights, corporate complicity in Israel’s 
violations of international laws, and justice for Palestinians is important for 
understanding the motivations of participants in the movement and recognizing how 
the BDS movement links with other contemporary transnational social movements. 
Taken together, all of these research methods helped me answer the research 
questions on causes, dynamics, and outcomes of the movement.  
 
Thesis Outline 
  
 
The first part of this thesis sets a historical background for the emergence of the BDS 
movement. In chapter one, I first consider how BDS is similar or dissimilar from 
other forms of challenging Israel to situate the movement in a larger historical 
trajectory of Palestinian resistance. Next, I consider the rise of BDS in two sections. 
The first explores the structural constraints and opportunities that set a political 
context for the movement’s emergence, while the second section details early BDS 
mobilizations. The chapter ends with the global call for BDS in 2005, and flags 
important aspects of the call.  
The second part comprises three case study chapters in which I analyze a BDS 
campaign in each chapter. Chapter two explores the academic boycott in Britain, 
chapter three investigates the We Divest campaign, and chapter four examines 
product boycotts of the Ahava skincare company. In each chapter, I provide a 
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background of the target and BDS campaign, groups involved in the campaign, 
organizational dynamics of the campaign, significance of the case, dynamics between 
BDS campaigners and opponents, and analysis of each case.  
The third part of this thesis explores organizing dynamics of the BDS 
movement. In chapter five, I first consider the Palestinian Boycott National 
Committee and the question of leadership in the movement; specifically addressing 
the notion of a Palestinian-led movement across borders. Then, I outline the concept 
of “context-sensitivity” and the role of local organizing in the movement. Finally, I 
illustrate the extensive networks that comprise the movement’s structure and how the 
movement coordinates across borders. Chapter six strategizes movement outcomes in 
two sections. The fist considers BDS in a global justice framework; situating the 
movement in a larger dynamic of transnational contention and activism. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the movement’s challenges and limitations, and 
proffers recommendations for attending to these impediments for the movement’s 
further development.      
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Chapter 1 – Emergence of the Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions Movement 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
This chapter is an overview of the emergence of the BDS movement and is a 
background to the subsequent chapters that analyze the organizing and 
operationalization of the movement across borders. As a central argument of this 
thesis is that the movement represents a new and different approach to challenging 
Israel, I first outline the main ways the BDS movement is similar or dissimilar from 
other forms of resisting Israel in a historical context. In this regard, there is a specific 
Palestinian background for the BDS movement as boycott has been used throughout 
the Palestinian struggle and border-crossing solidarity activism, especially as 
developed during the second intifada, created willing participants across borders for 
BDS activism. However, the current BDS movement differs dramatically from other 
tactics and strategies such as armed resistance and the state-based Arab boycott. The 
former differs tactically as no arms are taken up as part of the BDS movement and the 
latter is a state-based initiative that is different from the present movement that is 
organized by non-state actors.  
In the next two sections I identify a number of political 
constraints/opportunities and mobilizing dynamics that existed prior to the 
establishment of the current BDS movement to discern why and how the movement 
originated. Drawing on the political process approach in social movement theory 
discussed in the review of social movement literature in the introduction to this thesis, 
I outline how the counterproductive Oslo process and its fallout created a constraint in 
the Palestinian political system. The process was a political constraint because it 
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failed to deliver meaningful change to Palestinians, and thus indicated a new strategy 
was necessary for achieving Palestinian justice. Another structural factor that led to 
the movement’s emergence was the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), which activists interpreted as a political opportunity for validating 
claims of Israel’s violation of international law. Though activists referred to 
international law before the Opinion, it proved to be decisive is solidifying 
international law as a collective action frame in the budding BDS movement as 
activists frequently thereafter cited it in their BDS activities and was specifically 
acknowledged as a reason to act in the global Palestinian call for BDS in 2005.  
After the section on the constraints and opportunities that created a political 
environment ripe for the emergence of the BDS movement, I explore the specific 
early BDS activities that established mobilizing dynamics and set a foundation for the 
movement to take off after the official Palestinian call was made. This includes 
numerous initial activities such as the NGO Forum at the World Conference against 
Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001, the establishment of the academic and 
cultural boycott in Palestine, and divestment initiatives across US university 
campuses and in Christian churches. The movement began with small initiatives from 
seemingly disparate individuals and groups, although within a few years, boycott and 
divestment campaigns were multiplying in different countries and becoming more 
connected to each other. Thus, these early BDS activities created mobilizing 
dynamics for the development of a border-crossing movement after the official call 
was made in 2005. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the call, highlighting 
the ways the call was a culmination of BDS activities until that time and noting other 
significant aspects of the text.   
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1.1  Challenging Israel in a Historical Context  
 
 
In this section, I provide a historical context to situate the BDS movement within a 
larger trajectory of Palestinian and solidarity resistance. Throughout the Palestinian 
struggle, a variety of methods has been utilized for confronting colonial takeover and 
occupation. This section is not a comprehensive overview of all the strategies and 
tactics utilized in the Palestinian struggle for justice, rather the purpose is to show the 
main ways that the BDS movement is similar to or different from other forms of 
challenging Israel. In this regard, the movement draws on its historical connections to 
a long lineage of boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-normalization, in addition to 
border-crossing solidarity activism. At the same time, it is important to identify the 
ways the BDS movement is distinctive from other ways of confronting Israel, and 
how so. In this regard, the movement differs from the Arab boycott and armed 
resistance in that it contrasts with both these methods in terms of those directing, 
organizing, and conducting the resistance. It is also distinct from the Arab boycott in 
terms of goals and operationalization, and tactically different from armed resistance. 
While the movement has connections to other forms of challenging Israel (e.g. a 
history of boycott in the Palestinian struggle), the movement is innovative and unique 
in its approach given its border-crossing scope and organizational structure, which is 
illustrated in the chapters that follow.    
 
Palestinian Boycotts, Non-Cooperation, and Anti-Normalization  
 
 
While boycott is a widely known form of protest (i.e. tactical repertoire) that has been 
deployed in a wide range of circumstances, as indicated in the review of the boycott 
literature in the introduction to this thesis, there is a specific Palestinian historical 
context for the current BDS movement. The movement draws on an enduring history 
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of boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-normalization, which are related practices of 
protest that form a broad conceptualization of the refusal to engage with or oblige 
colonial authorities. This underlying repertoire has been instrumental in shaping the 
framework of the current BDS movement, with its wide-range of campaigns including 
product boycotts, cultural boycotts, academic boycotts, divestment initiatives, etc.   
To clarify the terms, boycott is the act of withdrawing support, non-
cooperation is the refusal to comply or coordinate with, and anti-normalization is to 
refrain from engaging in regular or typical relationships (culturally, diplomatically, 
etc.). In the Palestinian context, these practices have taken on a myriad of 
interpretations. For example, refusing to apply to the Israeli authorities for permission 
to travel, taking long routes around checkpoints, or continuing to work or go to school 
in difficult conditions. Often these forms of refusal are individual acts of “everyday 
resistance” and are largely undocumented, making the tracing of their trajectory in 
Palestinian history difficult. However, when utilized collectively, the episodes in 
which these tactics have been used and recorded illuminate sustained efforts of non-
cooperation and related forms of protest against foreign colonization and occupation.    
Boycott and non-cooperation in particular have been used throughout the 
Palestinian struggle, while anti-normalization is more recent. In late February and 
early March of 1920, a small uprising took place, in which Palestinians resisted 
British occupation and Britain’s endorsement of Zionist settlement in Palestine 
through a series of actions. Palestinians demonstrated in all major cities, in addition to 
widespread strikes, petitions, and resignations to prevent the implementation of the 
Balfour Declaration.73      
                                                 
73 Qumsiyeh, Popular Resistance in Palestine, 54; King, A Quiet Revolution, 30-31, 35.  
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Tensions rose as Jewish immigration persisted and British Mandate authorities 
often violently responded to Arab concerns and demands. In Jaffa, a demonstration in 
1933 turned violent and ended fatally for several Palestinians and one British soldier, 
which led to a general strike, protests, and riots across the country.74 Retaliatory 
violence between Jews and Arabs intensified as Jewish immigration persisted, as well 
as Arab attacks against the British. In April 1936, an Arab National Committee was 
formed in Nablus and called for a general strike. National committees were then 
created in the towns and villages, which led to the strike and nonpayment of taxes 
quickly spreading across the country. The five main political parties endorsed the 
strike, and under the leadership of the Grand Mufti formed the Arab Higher 
Committee (AHC). The AHC approved a resolution that called for the general strike 
until the British substantially changed their policies.75   
A conference of the national committees was held and encouraged non-
cooperation to continue in many forms such as resignations, petitions, tax revolts, and 
boycotts. The conference also reaffirmed that the strike should continue until the 
demands of the Arab population were met. By that time, the general strike had been 
effectively implemented throughout the country, as nearly all trade had been halted 
and the Jaffa port closed. Students, religious leaders, and mayors joined the strike. 
Intermittent local demonstrations, especially after Friday prayers, accompanied the 
massive civil disobedience and the national committees that had been set up in the 
towns and villages provided local support and services while businesses remained 
closed.76   
                                                 
74 King, 44.  
75 Palestine Royal Commission Report (London, July 1937), 96; 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/88A6BF6F1BD82405852574CD006C457F.  
76 Qumsiyeh, 80; Palestine Royal Commission Report, 97. 
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In October 1936, Palestinians ended the general strike at the request of Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, and Transjordan.77 Palestinian towns and villages remained relatively 
calm until mid-1937 when the Peel Commission’s plans for partition were leaked.78 
Resistance against the British and Zionists resumed, often taking on more violent 
forms, as civil resistance proved ineffective throughout the general strike.79 In 1937, 
British Mandate authorities declared the AHC and the national committees illegal and 
increased repression on members.80 Furthermore, the unity that existed among Arabs 
in the general strike broke down over differences in strategies and tactics in the 
subsequent years. By 1939, the lacking unity of Palestinian resistance, continued 
British military repression, and proposed policy changes by the British ended the 
revolt.81 
Boycotts and non-cooperation continued throughout the following decades 
largely on an individual basis, although the next significant, highly organized, and 
widely spread collective form of these tactics took place in the first Palestinian 
intifada that started in 1987. Anti-normalization, or the rejection of Israel as a normal 
state in the region, also started to develop among Palestinians at that time. Egyptian 
leftists had always criticized the signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords, seeing it 
as a tool to normalize the existence of the state of Israel in the region through official 
relations while simultaneously enhancing US power in the region.82  Inspired by the 
Egyptian left, Palestinians integrated the concept of anti-normalization into a wider 
                                                 
77 King, 53.  
78 Ibid, 54.  
79 Qumsiyeh, 83. 
80 King, 54.  
81 Ibid, 55.  
82 Elliott Colla, “Solidarity in the Time of Anti-Normalization,” Middle East Report 224 (Autumn 
2002): 11. 
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resistance framework in which boycotts and non-cooperation were already a part. 
According to Palestinian scholar Adel Samara, 
 
“Anti-normalization started in Egypt from 1978-79 by Egyptian leftists. 
We were trying to boycott Israeli products here, but it wasn’t in a critical 
context. The first time we challenged ourselves with normalization was 
the first intifada…it was ignited by the people – ‘internal withdrawal’ – 
the people withdrew to themselves. This was the beginning of 
boycotting by the people.”83  
 
 
In 1987, Israeli repression dramatically increased with mass arrests, deportations, and 
the closing of universities. Palestinian political prisoners went on a hunger strike and 
large demonstrations followed in solidarity. In December of that year, several workers 
from Gaza were killed by an Israeli truck at a checkpoint as they were returning home 
from work in Israel. In the following days, thousands of Gazans attended the funerals 
of the workers and demonstrations that began in Jabalyia refugee camp in the northern 
Gaza Strip soon spread across the occupied Palestinian territories.84  
Initially the uprising was directed through local support committees in 
Palestinian cities and villages. Shortly thereafter, the four main Palestinian political 
factions created the United National Leadership Command of the Uprising (UNLCU). 
The UNLCU acted as a coordinating body for the intifada, although in the first several 
years power was largely decentralized and was shared with the local committees. 
Information was disseminated to the broader Palestinian society through leaflets or 
communiques. The leaflets encouraged boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, resignations, tax 
resistance, and other forms of non-cooperation with Israel’s occupation authorities.85  
                                                 
83 Adel Samara interview, 5 April 2012.  
84 King, 203-204.  
85 Ibid, 205, 237.  
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In 1988, the mostly Christian town of Beit Sahour, adjacent to Bethlehem in 
the West Bank, implemented a tax revolt against Israel. Some residents had stopped 
paying taxes to the occupation authorities years prior, although not until the intifada 
did the entire town collectively stop cooperating with Israel’s tax collection system. 
Individuals and families stopped paying taxes and filing tax returns, while businesses 
refused to pay value-added tax (VAT). Israel responded severely by bringing military 
tax collectors and the IDF to the village to stop and search people in the street and 
confiscate cars.86 Elias Rishmawi, a pharmacist from the village recalls, 
  
“The people in Beit Sahour responded by gathering in the municipality 
[i.e. municipal government offices] the next morning and ‘throwing 
back’ their I.D.s in the famous incident where the deputy mayor of Beit 
Sahour, who was then the acting mayor, took the I.D.s and sent them to 
the military governor of Bethlehem…”87 
 
 
The following year, Israel put the town under siege, performing house-to-house 
searches, placing the residents under a 24-hour curfew, cutting the phone lines, and 
declaring the town a closed military zone.88 Tax authorities seized property, arrested 
residents, and prevented consular generals from several Western countries and the 
media from entering the town. The siege on Beit Sahour lasted for over a month, 
although Israel continued sporadic tax raids in the town into the early 1990s.89  
The second intifada did not materialize into the mass uprising that the first 
had, and as indicated in the review of literature relating to Palestinian resistance in the 
introduction to this thesis, many scholars analyze the armed elements of the intifada. 
                                                 
86 Elias Rishmawi quoted in Maxine Kaufman-Lacosta, Refusing to be Enemies: Palestinian and Israeli 
Nonviolent Resistance to the Israeli Occupation (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011), Kindle edition, location 
3743.  
87 Ibid, location 3745.  
88 King, 232; Anne Grace, “The Tax Resistance at Bayt Sahur,” Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 2 
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Nevertheless, many Palestinians still engaged a variety of unarmed tactics that have a 
long lineage in the Palestinian struggle. A number of popular committees, for 
example, were formed in Palestinian villages and organized weekly demonstrations 
against the wall and urged boycotting Israeli products.90 As discussed below, border-
crossing solidarity activists often participated in the demonstrations organized by 
popular committees during the second intifada. This activism combined with the 
Palestinian experience of non-cooperation, boycotts, and anti-normalization are 
historical ways of challenging Israel that the BDS movement has drawn on in 
developing a transnational movement for Palestinian justice.  
 
Border-Crossing Palestine Solidarity 
  
 
Similar to Palestinian resistance, solidarity activism with Palestinians has taken on 
various forms and has changed throughout the struggle for Palestinian justice. After 
Israel’s annexation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, the PLO, with its strategy of 
guerrilla insurgency to liberate the homeland connected ideas and tactics from various 
places such as Algeria, Vietnam, and Cuba, and stressed that their liberation was one 
front in the global anti-imperialist struggle.91 During the first intifada, many solidarity 
activists tried to raise awareness of the situation of the Palestinians and their plight for 
self-determination. In the following decade of the Oslo process, activists participated 
in many programs and projects that brought Israelis and Palestinians together to forge 
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“people-to-people” relationships. During the second intifada, foreign activists started 
travelling to Palestine to directly support Palestinians.  
Although some foreigners began travelling to Palestine in the late 1980s as 
part of grassroots solidarity initiatives, this approach increased in the second intifada 
and became an identifiable strategy. Sometimes referred to as “travel activism,” the 
main objective was to be “on the ground” as a form of solidarity.92 This place-based 
strategy allowed activists to experience the conditions under which Palestinians lived 
and attempted to use “Western-privilege” in acts of direct intervention between the 
Israeli military and Palestinians in an effort to decrease Palestinian suffering.  
Numerous groups took part in the strategy of bringing foreigners to Palestine 
such as the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), 
Campagne Inernationale de Protection du Peuple Palestinien (CIPPP), International 
Women’s Peace Service (IWPS), Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), and the 
International Solidarity Movement (ISM) among others. Most of these groups had 
connections with long-standing organizations. EAPPI for example is a project of the 
World Council of Churches and the establishment of the ISM was assisted by George 
Rishmawi and Ghassan Andoni of the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between 
People (PCR). Both Rishmawi and Andoni are from Beit Sahour and were active in 
the boycott and non-cooperation activities of the first intifada, and PCR took part in 
organizing the village-wide tax revolt during that time.93 
Many of the activities that participants engaged in were “direct actions.” This 
included removing roadblocks, intervening at checkpoints, tearing down sections of 
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the wall, harvesting olives, delivering food and medicine, or rebuilding homes that 
had been demolished by Israel. Direct action also included accompaniment, or the act 
of escorting those in need of protection. For example, activists would accompany 
children to school in Hebron, where they were under constant physical threat from 
Israeli settlers. The olive harvest in autumn of each year also required 
accompaniment, as villagers frequently came under attack from Israelis in nearby 
settlements. Other activists such as health professionals took part in ambulance 
accompaniment to escort injured Palestinians in need of medical care through Israeli 
military checkpoints.94  
As noted above, Palestinian popular committees have organized weekly 
demonstrations in the West Bank areas of Budrous, Biddu, Bil’in, South Bethlehem, 
and the South Hebron Hills, against Israel’s construction of the wall that often detracts 
from the Green Line and confiscates huge swaths of Palestinian land to make way for 
its path. Popular committees were organised in the villages during the first intifada to 
coordinate resistance against Israel and played an important role in organising the 
uprising locally. Though largely dormant during the Oslo process, the popular 
committees re-emerged during the second intifada. Groups such as the ISM and CPT, 
along with Israeli groups such as Ta’ayush, Gush Shalom, Anarchists against the 
Wall, and Peace Now participated in the weekly demonstrations in solidarity with the 
Palestinians.95    
In addition to a variety of direct actions and weekly demonstrations at the 
wall, numerous other border-crossing solidarity activities took place. This included 
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nonviolence training programs, political tourism and “alterative tours,” research and 
documentation on the occupation, and the production of alternative and documentary 
media.96 Most groups had designated activists in charge of media and separate media 
sections. Other alternative media sources such as the Electronic Intifada were also 
launched at this time. All these activities worked together as activists attempted to 
prevent human rights abuses of Palestinians, documenting anything that occurred, and 
then releasing that information to the rest of the world via independent news and 
video.  
The strategy of bringing foreigners to Palestine to participate in direct action 
encountered numerous difficulties, and as such could only play a limited role in the 
broader Palestinian struggle for justice. To begin with, the strategy depended on 
foreigners to some degree, as they took part in activities that Palestinians could not or 
would have been harshly punished for. The strategy also required foreigners being 
physically present in the occupied Palestinian territories. Given that activists in 
foreign countries have other responsibilities at home such as family and work, it is 
impossible for a large amount of foreigners to be on the ground the entire year. 97 
Consequently, there were peak phases for mobilization such as summer and Christmas 
holidays, when foreigners had time to travel abroad. In addition, the strategy was 
susceptible to the larger dynamics of the colonial occupation in that Israel ultimately 
controlled the situation. As Israel guarded all borders to the occupied Palestinian 
territories, the state determined who was allowed entry by Israel’s border control. 
During this time, denial of entry to suspected Palestine solidarity activists and 
deportation of participants was common.  
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While the strategy’s main priority was to get foreigners to Palestine to 
experience the conditions under Israeli occupation, witness the suffering of the 
Palestinian people, document human rights abuses, intercede with direct action, and 
let the world know about the situation through independent media; the activists also 
played important roles when they returned home. Because many activists had gone to 
Palestine, they came back with stories of real experiences. Seeing and experiencing 
life under Israeli military occupation provided a new way of talking to people upon 
return. Often activists that had volunteered in Palestine created support groups and 
local chapters back home. They established media contacts, organized “report backs” 
and speaking tours, sold fair trade items such as Palestinian embroidery and olive oil, 
and did fundraising for future volunteers. These efforts helped raise awareness of the 
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories and mobilize participants into Palestine 
solidarity activities.  
Many of the groups that brought foreigners to Palestine would go on to 
support the BDS movement or activists that had participated in the groups would go 
on to participate in boycott activities. For instance, the World Council of Churches, 
which sponsors the EAPPI project, has been active in calling for divestment initiatives 
and the ISM supports BDS. According to Huwaida Arraf, one of the co-founders of 
the ISM,  
 
“…the promotion of ‘boycott, divestments and sanctions’ (BDS), called 
for by many Palestinian civil society groups, is in fact one of [the] main 
current strategies of intervention….”98 
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In this way, the border-crossing solidarity activism that took place during the second 
intifada played a significant role in the development of the BDS movement. 
According to the Khalid Himdi, Director of the Union of Agricultural Work 
Committees, 
 
“Boycott is because people take home what they have seen here. BDS is 
working because people see real experiences. This contradicts what 
Israel is saying. In 2005, the idea [for boycott] could be successful 
because many people had seen by then. I wish it could have happened 
in the 1950’s, but it couldn’t have happened then.”99 
 
 
The border-crossing solidarity activism of the second intifada helped establish 
dynamics of mobilization in the BDS movement as it created willing participants in 
solidarity with Palestinians and the Palestinian cause. The activists that took part in 
these activities were keen to support Palestinians on the ground in the region and back 
home, thereby making BDS campaigns an outlet for Palestine solidarity activism in 
their own locales. Thus, historically the BDS movement has connections with other 
forms of challenging Israel as the movement builds on border-crossing solidarity 
activism together with the continued use of boycott in the Palestinian struggle.  
 
Armed Resistance  
 
 
In addition to unarmed tactics such as boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-
normalization, armed resistance has always played a role in the Palestinian struggle. 
Even prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, armed tactics were 
utilized to fight colonial British authorities and Jewish immigrants. While armed 
struggle has waxed and waned over the past century, it has been a consistent part of 
resistance against Israel (and prior to the state’s creation against imperial control 
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through the British Mandate as well). Armed tactics are numerous and can include but 
are not limited to bombings, shootings, stabbings, hijackings, throwing petrol bombs, 
and beginning in 1993 (the first year of the Oslo Accords), the use of suicide 
bombings.    
As discussed above, a number of unarmed tactics were used in the Arab 
Revolt that began in 1936, with the six-month general strike as the most notable in 
terms of scope and duration. While the use of these tactics plays an important part of a 
historical trajectory contributing to the development of the current BDS movement, in 
general, the period after the fall of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by mass 
uncertainty and turbulence. Clashes between native Arabs and Zionist immigrants 
were frequent, as well as resistance against British colonial authorities allowing the 
immigration. A number of official British inquiries at the time all indicated that 
disturbances were an expression of Arab opposition to the establishment of a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine.100 While 1936 is characterized for the general strike, after the 
report of the Peel Commission was revealed the following year, armed resistance 
increased over rising insecurity as the British recommended the creation of a Jewish 
state in addition to an Arab state. By 1938, armed rebels took control of large portions 
of the country making travel unsafe. 101  British forces escalated repression of the 
armed resistance, and the revolt ended in 1939 with deepening divisions among 
Palestinian Arabs.  
In the following years, the situation for Palestinians worsened as Britain left 
the Mandate system, the state of Israel was subsequently created in 1948, and 
independent Arab states were established with disparate interests, especially relating 
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to the Palestinians. According to Yezid Sayigh, in the first decade after Israel was 
created, armed Palestinian resistance was “channeled through existing political parties 
in Arab host states and their extensions in the West Bank and Gaza, or else took the 
form of localized and short-lived groups of infiltrators and students.”102 Palestinian 
guerillas – fedayeen – increased in numbers and became more organized. The PLO 
was established in May 1964, and the following year Fatah commenced guerilla 
attacks against Israel. According to Wendy Pearlman, 
 
“From Feteh’s launching of the Palestinian revolution in 1965 until the 
late 1980s, the national movement was generally committed to armed 
struggle against Israel. Like other movements, the PLO regarded armed 
force as an appropriate response to injustice and a necessary strategy for 
coercing a powerful adversary to make concessions. It also believed 
arms to be essential to protect its institutions and civilian constituents 
against violent threats…For Palestinians residing outside Israel’s 
borders, civil disobedience and noncooperation hardly appeared a viable 
means to pressure the Jewish state.”103  
 
 
During the 1950s-60s, much of the armed resistance was through cross-border attacks 
by Palestinian fedayeen, and in the 1970s, these assaults started to occur outside 
Israel/Palestine, and the Middle East more generally. The international attacks 
included tactics such as shootings, bombings (car bombs, letter bombs), hijacking of 
airplanes, and taking of hostages. Notable events during the time were the taking 
hostage of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic summer games in 1972 and the 
Dawson Field hijackings, when members from the Palestinian Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) attempted to hijack four aircrafts and land them at an airfield 
outside Amman, Jordan.   
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  As mentioned in the previous section, although some armed resistance was 
used in the first intifada it was insignificant (e.g. occasionally throwing petrol bombs 
during demonstrations). In the decade following the first intifada, during the Oslo 
process armed resistance against Israel resumed as this served a dual purpose of 
attacking the occupier and demonstrating opposition to the Oslo process within 
internal Palestinian politics. During the Oslo period, the tactic of suicide operations, 
mostly in the form of bombings, began to occur. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility for most attacks during the time, and among other groups increasingly 
deployed the tactic in the second intifada.   
 As indicated in the review of literature on Palestinian resistance in the 
introduction to this thesis, there is much scholarly and media attention paid to the 
armed resistance of the second intifada. In particular, the tactic of suicide operations 
during the period. Pearlman estimates that between 2000-05, there were 123 
Palestinian suicide bombings.104 For several years, it was the primary form of armed 
resistance taken up by Palestinian fighters. During this time, numerous factions took 
part in the armed resistance as most factions had armed wings, and numerous other 
splinter groups and independent militias were formed. Another tactic developed 
during the second intifada, particularly during the latter years as suicide bombings 
declined, was that of firing homemade rockets and missiles, mostly from Gaza into 
Israel. Currently, the use of this tactic is the dominant form of armed resistance in the 
Palestinian struggle.  
 Much of the armed resistance has been organized through Palestinian 
political groups and factions, though not all. Factions associated with the PLO and 
those outside its structure (e.g. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc.) have been organizationally 
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integral to directing and executing armed resistance against Israel. Some of this 
resistance has been through designated military wings or militias of the Palestinian 
political factions, while other activities such as some of the international attacks 
during the 1970s occurred through splinter or unaffiliated groups such as the Black 
September Organization or the Abu Nidal Organization. Each political faction, and 
the PLO as a broader umbrella organization for many of the factions, has their own 
organizational structure and processes, though most factions and armed groups have 
favored hierarchical and “charismatic” leadership.105   
 The current BDS movement differs significantly from armed Palestinian 
resistance. Tactically, the forms of challenging Israel are radically different as no 
physical arms are taken up as part of the BDS call or the wider movement across 
borders. Strategically, the tactics are used in different ways as well in that armed 
attacks are often intended to wear down Israel to the point where concessions are 
made from an inability to continue with the status quo. Boycotts, divestment, and 
sanctions on the other hand, are political tactics used for the broader strategy of 
pressuring and persuading Israel to comply with international law and respect 
universal principles of human rights. In addition, armed resistance is sometimes 
random, though in the Palestinian struggle it has often been operationalized through 
organized political channels such as the factions or armed splinter groups. As 
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discussed below and demonstrated in the following case study chapters, the current 
BDS movement is comprised of activists across borders that largely decide for 
themselves how to operationalize the movement in their local context. Thus, the BDS 
movement tactically aims to confront Israel through a variety of targets in a wide-
range of venues, and in doing so renders a new and different approach to challenging 
Israel.   
 
Arab League Boycott  
 
 
In addition to the use of the above-mentioned tactics and strategies by Palestinians 
and solidarity activists, Arab states initiated boycotts before the state of Israel was 
created, and formalized an Arab League boycott after 1948. Prior to that time, Arab 
states boycotted Jewish products and services as Jewish immigration increased in 
Palestine in the early twentieth century. This was done to prevent the economic 
development of an economy that was based on Zionist funds for the establishment of 
a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The first formal declaration of the boycott was made 
by the Arab League Council in 1945, and the following year the League created the 
Permanent Boycott Committee, which was established to monitor and evaluate the 
implantation of the boycott in member states.106 The boycott consists of three tiers – 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary boycotts. The primary boycott forbids citizens of 
Arab League states from entering into a business relationship with an Israeli citizen or 
the government, and the secondary prohibits business contracts with companies 
outside League countries that do business with Israel. The tertiary boycott is extended 
to companies that do business with those blacklisted for violating the secondary 
boycott.  
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In 1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which called for 
the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. Arab states did not 
accept the Resolution and intensified application of the boycott. Several years later in 
1951, the Arab League established the position of Boycott Commissioner and set up 
the Central Boycott Office (CBO) in Damascus. Similar to the earlier Permanent 
Boycott Committee, the role of the Commissioner and the CBO was to ensure the 
boycott was being enforced and coordinate with boycott offices in member countries. 
In addition, the CBO established blacklists of companies violating the boycott. A year 
after the Boycott Commissioner and the CBO were established, the Palestine 
Department was created in the League Secretariat to oversee the CBO. In 1954, the 
Unified Law on the Boycott of Israel was passed by the Arab League Council, which 
attempted to simplify the consistent application of the boycott. The text of resolution 
was passed by the League and incorporated into the national laws of most member 
states.107  
   The current status of the Arab League boycott is insignificant as its regulations 
are nonbinding on member states, and each state decides for itself how much to 
implement the boycott. Numerous countries and entities have economic or diplomatic 
relations with Israel such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. In addition, 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries announced in 1994 that the secondary and tertiary 
boycotts would be lifted, and only the primary boycott would be enforced in those 
countries.  
Importantly, the current BDS movement varies considerably from the Arab 
League boycott of Israel. The most significant difference being the source of the 
boycott. The Arab League boycott is a state-based boycott whereas the contemporary 
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BDS movement is based in grassroots organizing efforts. While the League has 
sought to apply the boycott to companies beyond its borders, it originates from those 
countries belonging to the League, in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of 
Africa. In the present BDS movement, a campaign can be created anywhere in the 
world by anyone that chooses to do so. In addition, the boycott of League member 
states applies to goods and services, however, the grassroots BDS movement applies 
to a wide range of companies (through divestment initiatives and consumer boycotts), 
cultural workers and events (through the cultural boycott), academic institutions and 
related events (through the academic boycott), and sporting events (through the sports 
boycott). The current BDS movement is comprised of these broad-based border-
crossing constituent campaigns and is completely different in terms of the 
organizational structure and processes of the League’s state-based boycott.  
 
BDS in a Historical Context 
 
 
In the preceding sections, I laid out ways that the BDS movement is similar and 
dissimilar to other forms of challenging Israel. In these regards, the contemporary 
transnational activism makes use of a long historical tactical repertoire of boycott-
related activities in the Palestinian struggle and border-crossing solidarity activism. 
On the other hand, the tactics and objectives of the contemporary BDS movement 
differ from those of armed resistance and from the state-based Arab League boycott 
of Israel. That said, it is important to analytically clarify where unarmed tactics such 
as BDS, and the movement as a whole, fits within the broader Palestinian struggle.  
The BDS movement is part and parcel of larger Palestinian struggle for 
justice. The movement exists alongside other forms of resistance, including the use of 
other unarmed and armed tactics. While the movement takes no official political 
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position on the use or non-use of armed resistance in the Palestinian struggle, the 
movement is inherently unarmed and nonviolent. This is the case on the tactical level, 
as boycott, divestment, and sanctions are political tactics that do not require arms. It is 
also the case on strategic and practical levels as well. The border-crossing BDS 
movement is comprised of its localized constituent campaigns that exist where 
activists have decided to act collectively in support of BDS. The tactical repertoire 
(and collective action frames) of BDS are accessible to activists across borders and 
appeal to the nonviolent character of contemporary Palestine solidarity activism. As 
noted above, many of the activists involved in the BDS movement have taken part in 
Palestine solidarity activities in other nonviolent groups or campaigns such as the ISM 
or PSC. Thus, the movement is part of the larger Palestinian struggle for justice, 
though it has clear roots in historical nonviolent strategies and the tactical repertoire 
of boycott in Palestinian resistance.  
In addition to the accessibility of BDS tactics across borders and its appeal 
among nonviolent activists, the transnational movement has partly developed due to 
the failure of other forms of challenging Israel (e.g. armed resistance and the Arab 
League boycott) in producing constructive change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
While the BDS movement exists alongside these other tactics, it is important to note 
that to a certain extent it originated because of the inability of other forms of struggle 
to bring justice to Palestinians thus far. According to Barghouti,  
 
“…the largest Palestinian political factions, with their predominant 
 focus on armed struggle, seem unable to recognize the indispensable 
 role of civil resistance. Either by inertia or reluctance to evaluate 
 critically their programs in light of a changed international situation, 
 these forces became addicted to the military model of fighting the 
 occupation, ignoring the troubling moral questions raised by certain 
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 indiscriminate forms of that resistance and its failure to achieve positive 
 ends.”108 (my emphasis) 
 
 
As I noted in the review of literature on Palestinian resistance in the Introduction to 
this thesis and in introductory paragraphs to this subsection on Challenging Israel in a 
Historical Context, a variety of armed and unarmed tactics have regularly been used 
throughout the Palestinian struggle. However to date, there has not been a single 
strategy or tactic that has been able to improve the political conditions for 
Palestinians. Thus, the BDS movement has origins in a long historical tactical 
repertoire of boycott, noncooperation, and anti-normalization in the Palestinian 
struggle, and it is accessible across borders to activists. It also stems from a political 
vacuum, in which other forms of struggle and the Oslo process, which is analyzed in 
the following section, fostered an environment for the establishment of a transnational 
movement based on BDS.  
  
1.2  The Rise of BDS I: Political Constraints and Opportunities  
 
 
As discussed in the review of the social movement literature in the introduction to this 
thesis, the political process approach considers the political opportunities and 
constraints – the political context – in which a social movement arises and develops. 
In the case of the BDS movement, this context includes the Oslo process and its 
fallout (constraints), along with Israel’s construction of a wall and the subsequent ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the issue (opportunities), which taken together contributed to a 
political environment for the emergence of the BDS movement.   
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The Oslo Process  
 
  
The Oslo process that was ushered in during the 1990s followed the first Palestinian 
intifada (1987-1993), which as indicated in the review of Palestinian resistance 
literature, numerous scholars note was a period in Palestinian history that witnessed 
remarkable political unity and mass mobilization against Israeli military occupation. 
The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 created a new set of circumstances, with 
differing ideas and opinions about the agreements, and conditions of the process.  
In general, there were those who supported the signing of the Accords, the 
new emphasis on state building by the Palestinian leadership, and the establishment of 
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA). This included Yasser Arafat, the 
Fatah party to which he belonged, and a number of other supporting factions in the 
PLO.109 Other factions in the PLO, such as the PFLP and the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), along with Islamist factions not part of the PLO such 
as Hamas and Islamic Jihad opposed the Accords.110 These factions saw the Accords 
as a betrayal to the Palestinian struggle to liberate the historic homeland, and was seen 
by PFLP and the DFLP as a way for Arafat and the Fatah party to consolidate power 
over Palestinian politics.111 
During the Oslo process, dramatic transformations took place in Palestinian 
political, economic, and social spheres. One of the most important political changes, 
as suggested above, was the creation of the PA, which was set up as a Palestinian 
governing body with limited control over some areas of the occupied Palestinian 
territories. The establishment of the PA was problematic for a number of reasons, of 
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which one was the Palestinian leadership’s shift in emphasis of the historic Palestinian 
struggle from a movement to liberate Palestine to a minimal state building project in 
the occupied Palestinian territories. The newly established PA only had marginal 
“self-rule” over a small amount of territory, which amounted to little more than 
restricted administrative functions.  
In addition, the PA in effect, only represented one group of Palestinians – 
those living in the occupied Palestinian territories. The PA was an internationally 
established structure and as such depended on international assistance for its 
formation and maintenance. The early years of the PA proved to be very corrupt and 
repressive as Arafat sought to entrench his rule and that of Fatah party over and 
within the structure of the Authority. The authoritarian-like rule over institutions and 
the daily lives of Palestinians facilitated brewing political contention within 
Palestinian politics and society.   
As Palestinian politics fragmented, Israel’s control over Palestinians became 
more institutionalized through various structures and processes during the Oslo 
period. Movement and access restrictions along with social separation of Israelis and 
Palestinians intensified through the issuing of different ID cards, license plates, and 
dividing the occupied Palestinian territories for security and political control into 
Areas A, B, and C.112 Israel’s illegal settlement population throughout the territories 
doubled during the Oslo process, thereby further obstructing the possibility of a 
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territorially contiguous Palestinian state in the future.113 In addition, there was a lack 
of movement on any final status issues (borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees) 
during the Oslo process, which have been paramount throughout the Palestinian 
struggle.  
Although not limited to these factors alone, in many ways, the Oslo process 
further fragmented Palestinians politically, economically, and socially, especially by 
establishing the PA and institutionalizing a system of disconnected enclaves in the 
occupied Palestinian territories. As Palestinians saw Israel expanded its illegal 
settlements, Israeli-only road system, checkpoints, closures, etc., many came to 
pessimistically view the Oslo process and the strategy of negotiations more generally.  
In late 2000, the second intifada erupted after continued clashes between the 
Israeli military and Palestinians. The al-Aqsa intifada embodied Palestinian 
frustrations about the on-going Israeli occupation and counterproductive Oslo process. 
The process failed to deliver a foreseeable state in the future or even a decline in 
Israel’s dominance, as it continued with its colonial expansion of settlements in the 
occupied Palestinian territories and control over Palestinians, particularly in Areas B 
and C. The uprising exposed Palestinian political fragmentation, especially among 
Palestinian factions, that had been intensifying during the 1990s and revealed the 
structural flaws imbedded in the Oslo process. The intifada was both a rejection of 
Israel’s colonial control over Palestinians and their land, and the corrupt Fatah-led PA 
apparatus that had failed to gain legitimacy among many Palestinians. The intifada 
illuminated the harsh realities of continued Israeli occupation, the increasingly 
illegitimate PA, and international indifference to Palestinian self-determination. 
                                                 
113 Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: The Issue of Settlements must be 
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September 2003); www.amnesty.org.  
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The immense changes that occurred during the Oslo process and political 
fragmentation of Palestinians created a political constraint within internal Palestinian 
politics. The limited political environment led some actors to pursue political 
participation and seek change through other avenues. Birzeit University researcher 
and member of the Palestinian academic and cultural boycott, Samia al-Botmeh notes,  
 
“The role of the Oslo Accords in giving rise to the BDS movement is 
very important…It has become clear since the Oslo Accords that the 
international community is not really interested in human rights, justice, 
etc…Dialogue and peace talks are totally the wrong way and relying on 
international governments is highly problematic because Israel has been 
in violation of the Oslo Accords on many occasions, with the recognition 
of the parties endorsing the Accords…Learning from this experience – 
the Palestinians try to reach out to people in the world – the popular 
level. ”114 
 
 
In this way, the Oslo process and its fallout created a political environment that 
facilitated the development of the BDS movement. The process failed to produce 
meaningful change for Palestinians, and in many instances worsened the situation on 
the ground in the occupied Palestinian territories. While some took part in the armed 
resistance of the second intifada, numerous other resistance activities were taking 
place, as illustrated in the review of Palestinian resistance literature in the introduction 
to this thesis, and specific BDS activities during this time are discussed in detail in the 
section below on early BDS mobilizing dynamics. The Oslo process was a structural 
constraint in Palestinian politics that resulted in some seeking an alternative strategy 
for achieving Palestinian justice through boycott and divestment campaigns. Another 
structural factor, discussed below, that assisted these developments was the Advisory 
Opinion on Israel’s wall by the International Court of Justice. Activists interpreted the 
                                                 
114 Samia al-Botmeh interview, Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, 
28 February 2012. 
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Opinion as a political opportunity that assisted in demonstrating their claims about 
Israel’s violations of international law, and helped international law more generally 
become a collective action frame of the movement. 
 
The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Wall  
 
 
In 2002, Israel began construction of a wall along the 1949 Armistice Line (Green 
Line), with portions extending into the occupied West Bank. At the request of the 
Chairman of the Arab Group (Syria), which was supported by the Non-Aligned 
Movement through the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau (Permanent 
Representative of Malaysia) and the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference Group (OIC) at the United Nations (Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran), the UN General Assembly resumed its Tenth Emergency Special 
Session in October 2003 to discuss Israel’s construction of the wall.115  
Immediately following the resumption of the Emergency Session a resolution 
was passed that demanded Israel discontinue building and deconstruct the wall built in 
occupied Palestinian territory, and called on Secretary-General Kofi Annan to report 
on Israel’s compliance with the resolution. In November 2003, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan submitted his report stating that Israel had not complied with the 
resolution. Following the Secretary General’s report on Israel’s non-compliance with 
the Assembly’s resolution in October, the General Assembly then passed another 
resolution in December. In this resolution, the Assembly noted that Israel refused to 
                                                 
115 UNGA, A/ES-10/242, “Letter dated 15 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 15 
October 2003; A/ES-10/243, “Letter dated 15 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of 
Malaysia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 15 October 
2003; A/ES-10/244, “Letter dated 16 October 2003 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General 
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comply with international law and that the situation on the ground had worsened.116 
Due to these factors, the Assembly then requested an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ 
on the wall.  
While Advisory Opinions by the ICJ are non-binding, this does not mean they 
are without legal effect. The party requesting the Opinion determines the weight of 
such opinions; however, the Court notes,   
 
“It remains nevertheless that the authority and prestige of the Court 
attach to its advisory opinions and that where the organ or agency 
concerned endorses that opinion, that decision is as it were sanctioned 
by international law.”117 
 
  
In this particular case, the Court noted that the route of the wall often traced that of 
Israeli settlements, which the Court reiterated were illegal under international law and 
inhibited the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.118 The ICJ also stated that the 
wall created a “fait accompli” on the ground and was “tantamount to de facto 
annexation.”119 With respect to violations of international law, the Court concluded 
that Israel’s construction of the wall contravened the Hague Regulations of 1907, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.120  
Although the UN Security Council holds chief responsibility for the 
organization and the power of the UNGA is largely limited to discussing issues, 
conducting studies, and making recommendations through resolutions, the actions by 
                                                 
116 UNGA, Resolution ES-10/14, “Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 8 December 2003, 3; http://unispal.un.org/. 
117 ICJ, “How the Court Works,” http://www.icj-cij.org.  
118 ICJ, Reports 2004, Advisory Opinion, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 9 July 2004, 184 paragraph 120; www.icj-cij.org.   
119 Ibid, paragraph 121.  
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the Assembly were noteworthy with respect to Israel’s construction of the wall.121 To 
this effect, the Assembly resumed an Emergency Session to take up the issue and then 
passed several resolutions that not only called for the cessation and dismantling of the 
wall, but also made the request for the ICJ Advisory Opinion. This indicated strong 
support among many states throughout the world especially those in the Arab and 
Muslim world, and in the Non-Aligned movement, in proving Israel was in violation 
of international law in constructing a wall in internationally recognized occupied 
Palestinian territory.122  
The ICJ Advisory Opinion was significant for Palestinian organizations that 
saw it as a major political opportunity to use as a tool to further the cause of the 
Palestinian struggle. Following the Opinion, the editors of al-Majdal, the quarterly 
magazine of Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, a 
prominent Palestinian organization, wrote: 
  
“The long-range impact of the ICJ opinion will similarly depend on the 
ability of civil society actors, Palestinian, Israeli, and others, to 
effectively use it as a tool for mobilization, advocacy, and action. 
Academic, consumer, cultural, and sports boycotts, divestment and a 
campaign for sanctions by states must all be considered.”123 
 
 
                                                 
121 UN, Charter of the United Nations, “Chapter V: The Security Council,” Article 24 and “Chapter IV: 
The General Assembly” Articles 10, 11, 13, and 14; www.un.org.  
122 The tenth emergency session of the UNGA was resumed at the request of Arab states, who then 
submitted two resolutions for the UNGA to consider and vote on with respect to Israel’s wall. Of the 18 
speakers that made statements prior to the passing of the UNGA resolutions nearly all condemned 
Israel’s building of a wall in occupied territory. This included the representatives of the Arab League, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the OIC, as well as Afghanistan (as Vice-Chairman of the Committee on 
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People), South Africa, Indonesia, Cuba, Senegal, and Pakistan. 
The following resolution in October demanding Israel stop and reverse construction of the wall was 
approved with 144 votes in favor to 4 against (Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, 
United States), with 12 abstentions. The resolution in December requesting as Advisory Opinion on the 
wall from the ICJ passed with 90 in favor to 8 against (Australia, Ethiopia, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, United States), with 74 abstentions.  
123 Madjdal Editorial Team, “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall – An Alternative Road Map,” al-
Majdal Autumn 2004; www.badil.org.  
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For many Palestinian organizations and Palestine solidarity groups around the world, 
the Advisory Opinion was a landmark. It was a substantial piece of legal 
documentation that legitimized Palestinian claims about the wall and indicated 
significant support from many states in the UN General Assembly. Because activists 
viewed the Opinion as a political opportunity to showcase Israel’s violations of 
international law, it would be cited and strategically deployed as a collective action 
frame used to mobilize participants and garner support for the movement. As many 
previous initiatives had referred to international law as a reason to support boycott of 
Israel, the Advisory Opinion only reinforced these already existing frames of 
reference to those involved in boycott initiatives. The Advisory Opinion and 
international law more generally have proven to be important in the discourse and 
framing of the BDS movement given the increased utilization of such references in 
future calls for BDS. Bolstered by the Advisory Opinion and following the framing of 
already existing boycott initiatives (discussed below), the official call for BDS in 
2005 cited the ICJ opinion and emphasized Israel’s violations of international law as a 
justification for mobilization.   
 
1.3  The Rise of BDS II: Mobilizing Dynamics  
  
 
In the previous section, I outlined the main structural factors that created a political 
context for the emergence of the BDS movement. It is important to identify these 
constraints and opportunities in the form of the Oslo process and its fallout along with 
the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the wall, as important contributing conditions to the 
development of the movement. As critiques of the political process approach have 
shown in the social movement literature, political constraints and opportunities are 
important, yet insufficient, for entirely explicating the origins of a movement. As with 
81 
 
 
other movements, the BDS movement clearly indicates other factors in the form of 
mobilizing dynamics that have played an important role in the movement’s 
development. This was collectively manifested on a number of occasions, such as the 
NGO Forum of the World Conference Against Racism in 2001, the establishment of 
the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), 
early calls for a moratorium on research funding between Europe and Israel, initial 
divestment initiatives, a 2004 conference in London on resisting Israeli apartheid, and 
finally in 2005 the culmination of all these efforts in the form of the 2005 Palestinian 
global call for BDS.  
 
The NGO Forum at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001 
 
 
A year after the second intifada began, the UN held the World Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR). In 
addition to the official diplomatic forum held in Durban, a Youth Summit and an 
NGO Forum were also held, although they were held in separate locations and were 
not part of the formal WCAR proceedings.124 While the NGO Forum had no official 
bearing on the events of the WCAR and its subsequent Declaration and Programme of 
Action, the text of the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action were to be 
submitted to Mary Robinson, then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
Secretary-General of the conference. The comprehensive 65-page document was the 
result of the Forum’s meetings, workshops, and preparatory sessions. While the 
                                                 
124 Modeled off the preparatory process of the WCAR, regional planning meetings for the WCAR NGO 
Forum were held in France, Chile, Senegal, and Iran along with sub-regional NGO meeting held in 
Poland, Nepal, Egypt, and Ecuador. The NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action were 
presented on the final day of the forum. 
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document covered a plethora of ethnicities and issues around the world, the 
Palestinian problem was mentioned several times throughout.  
One of 62-paragraphs in the Introduction affirmed the right of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. In the Declaration, 
Israel was proclaimed a racist, apartheid state, engaging in systematic human rights 
violations, specifically through Israel’s denial of Palestinian refugees’ right of return, 
its colonial-military occupation of Palestinian territories, and discriminatory practices 
against Palestinian citizens of Israel.125 Among a host of recommendations outlined in 
the Programme of Action was the enforcement of international law, the 
implementation of relevant UN resolutions, withdrawal from occupied Palestinian 
territories, the commencement of an anti-Israeli Apartheid movement, and the 
enactment of comprehensive sanctions and embargos by all states against Israel.126 
The text of the NGO Forum’s Declaration and Programme of Action relating 
to Palestinians reflects a strong contingent of Palestinian participants and NGO 
support around the world for Palestinian justice. Palestinian participants in the Forum 
pushed for and gained international recognition of Israel’s racially motivated offenses 
against Palestinians, thereby showing the strength of Palestinian organizations and 
their capacity to network across borders to mobilize support.  
The text at the NGO Forum in Durban strategically referenced South Africa’s 
struggle against apartheid, and provided many examples of Israel’s violations of 
international law and human rights, illustrating Israel’s “brand of apartheid.”127 The 
importance of the South African apartheid analogy, along with Israel’s violations of 
                                                 
125 “WCAR NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action,” (Durban, South Africa, 28 August – 
3 September 2001) 15-16, 24-25.  
126 Ibid, 57-59.  
127 Ibid, 15, 25.  
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international law and human rights, would feature prominently in future calls for 
boycott of Israel. In addition, the main issues affecting Palestinians – Palestinian 
refugees’ right of return, Israel’s prolonged military occupation of Palestinian 
territories, and discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israel – would reappear 
throughout early boycott and divestment initiatives, and would eventually be a 
centerpiece of the official call in 2005 for BDS made by Palestinian groups and 
organizations.  
 
Early Palestinian Calls for Boycott and the Creation of the Palestinian Campaign for 
the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel   
 
 
On 29 March 2002, Israel launched “Operation Defensive Shield” in the West Bank, 
the largest military invasion into the territory since the 1967 war. All major 
Palestinian cities and surrounding towns were re-occupied by the IDF during the 
operation with curfews imposed, movement restricted, and international journalists, 
human rights monitors, and medical personnel frequently denied entry to assess 
conditions and provide humanitarian assistance.  
In the midst of Israel’s widespread invasion in 2002, prominent Palestinian 
intellectuals published a letter online. The letter called on “global civil society to use 
the momentum it has generated and the ethical integrity it has demonstrated” to 
immediately act to end Israel’s unprecedented invasion by intensify efforts to stop 
Israel’s sustained campaign of apartheid, occupation, and ethnic cleansing.128 The call 
specifically asked activists to demand governments end military assistance to Israel 
and suspend economic relations.  
                                                 
128 Heydar Abdel-Shafi, Hanan Ashrawi, Mustafa Barghouti et al. “Urgent Call to World Civil Society: 
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A few months later, Palestinian organizations published a more 
comprehensive call. The majority of the statements recalled the declarations made the 
previous year at the NGO Forum of the WCAR in Durban. In particular, the call by 
Palestinian groups directly quoted the article on establishing a global anti-apartheid 
movement and the article calling on the complete isolation of Israel through sanctions 
and embargos. The call states: 
 
“…we as members of Palestinian civil society welcome all recent 
initiatives to boycott Israel which have been launched in many parts of 
the world. For the sake of freedom and justice in Palestine and the world, 
we call upon the solidarity movement, NGOs, academic and cultural 
institutions, business companies, political parties and unions, as well as 
concerned individuals to strengthen and broaden the global Israel 
Boycott Campaign.”129  
 
 
In the following year (2003), a group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals in the 
occupied Palestinian territories and in the diaspora issued another call for boycott.130 
This was built on in the following year when in April 2004, Palestinian academics and 
intellectuals formally established the Palestinian Campaign for Academic and 
Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI).  
Just three days before the ruling of the ICJ Advisory Opinion was read in July 
2004, PACBI issued its official call for the international community to boycott all 
Israeli academic and cultural institutions or state-sponsored events in support of the 
Palestinian struggle for justice. The academic and cultural boycott of Israel is based 
on the premise that Israeli institutions of higher education are complicit in the state’s 
violations of international law and human rights through direct funding or intellectual 
support. The boycott calls on academics and cultural workers around the world “to 
                                                 
129 Badil, “Boycott Israel to Enforce Respect and Implementation of International Law, Human Rights, 
and UN Resolutions,” 2002; www.badil.org.  
130 PACBI, “History,” http://pacbi.org.  
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comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural 
institutions…” in support of the Palestinian struggle.131 According to the cultural 
boycott guidelines, “these institutions (mainly major state and public entities), all their 
products, and all the events they sponsor or support must be boycotted.”132 In 
addition, the call for cultural boycott asks international artists and cultural workers to 
refrain from publishing, or taking part in events or lectures with complicit Israeli 
institutions. 
The establishment of PACBI was important because it built on and extended 
previous efforts since 2000 to establish a formal boycott campaign among 
Palestinians. Prior Palestinian boycott calls mentioned above were noteworthy, but 
tended to be isolated appeals. The global call for an academic and cultural boycott of 
Israel along with the establishment of PACBI provided an avenue for Palestinian 
boycott activists to connect with other campaigns and activists across borders. The 
formation of PACBI and its global call represented a determination among Palestinian 
academics and intellectuals to expand the organizational capacity and repertoire of 
boycott in Palestine. It also indicated the establishment of a mobilizing mechanism 
among Palestinian academics and intellectuals that would be used to organize and 
develop border-crossing academic and cultural boycotts of Israel in years to come.  
 
Initial Calls for a Moratorium on Research Funding and an Academic Boycott of 
Israel 
 
 
Appalled by the images and information coming out about Israel’s Operation 
Defensive Shield, Hilary and Steven Rose, both well-known British academics, 
published an open letter in The Guardian newspaper on 6 April 2002, calling for a 
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moratorium on collaborative research funding between the EU and Israel until Israel 
complied with UN resolutions and entered into serious negotiations with the 
Palestinians.133 The call was issued on the basis that any member country, or trading 
or research partner with member states, must adhere to human rights under the terms 
of the Framework of the European Research Area. The letter was originally signed by 
123 other academics and by July of that year, the number had reached 700.134  
Inspired by the Roses’ initial letter calling for a moratorium on research 
funding with Israel in April, a similar call was published in France. On 16 December 
2002, the Administrative Council of the Pierre and Marie Curie University (Paris VI) 
passed a resolution similar to the Roses’ call for a moratorium on EU research 
funding with Israel, and was later joined by two other universities – Grenoble and 
Montpelier III – that took similar positions.135  
At the time Tanya Reinhart, an Israeli Linguist working at Tel Aviv 
University, sent a letter in support of Paris VI to Le Monde. In the letter she stated 
“Never in its history did the senate of any Israeli university pass a resolution 
protesting the frequent closure of Palestinian universities, let alone voice protest over 
the devastation sowed there during the last uprising. It is not that a motion in that 
direction failed to gather a majority, there was no such motion anywhere in the Israeli 
academia.”136 She admitted that a cut in research funding from the EU would certainly 
be felt in Israeli academic institutions; however, given the inaction of Israeli 
academics and their institutions on the conditions affecting Palestinian scholars, it was 
necessary. 
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After the Roses published their open letter, interest in the call spread rapidly as 
it was forwarded through email to more scholars around the world. John Docker and 
Ghassan Hage organized a call for boycott in Australia, which was quickly endorsed 
by nearly a hundred scholars.137 Although the Australian call gained fewer signatures 
than the Roses call, it was significant for a number of reasons. The letter by the Roses 
called for a moratorium on joint research funding due to the specific relationship 
between Europe and Israel on collaborative projects; however, Australia had no such 
funding relationship with Israeli academic institutions at the time. The call from 
Australia specifically called for an academic and cultural boycott, and made a 
comparison to the role of boycotts in bringing down apartheid in South Africa. 
Docker and Hage’s call was similar to the Roses in that it drew attention to Israel’s 
activities in the occupied Palestinian territories, specifically the intensification since 
2000, although the call from Australia went further by contextualizing these activities 
in a larger program of Israeli colonization.138 The distinction between the two calls is 
important because it illuminates a range of options that scholars were debating and 
strategizing for future organizing of an academic boycott.  
Then in 2005, the Council of Associations of University Teachers (AUT) 
passed a historic resolution that called for a boycott of the University of Haifa and Bar 
Ilan University in Israel for their active role in perpetuating Israeli state policies 
toward the Palestinians.139 After intense pressure, a special meeting was called a 
month later and the AUT membership overturned the vote and the union set up a 
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special commission to investigate international boycotts.140 The following year the 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education in the UK passed a 
stronger resolution than the AUT, which criticized Israel’s apartheid policies and 
encouraged its members to boycott Israeli academics and institutions that are 
complicit in Israel’s policies. Although both resolutions were overturned at the time, 
the issue of academic boycott would be kept alive at union meetings in future years 
and would continue to be a top priority among a committed segment of union 
membership.141  
The critical engagements that scholars were undertaking in Britain, France, 
Australia, and elsewhere would help shape dynamics for mobilizing formidable 
academic boycotts in various countries in the future. Analyzing the Roses initial open 
letter calling for a moratorium on joint research funding with Israel, one anti-BDS 
critic commented, “The petition brought about the globalization of the boycott.”142 In 
addition, the early moratorium and boycott calls that were occurring at the same time 
as numerous divestment campaigns discussed below were similarly important in 
referring to international law and human rights violations. These themes would go 
onto be critical in framing calls emanating from Palestinians, and in the boycott and 
divestment campaigns that would be organized in the future.    
 
Early Divestment Initiatives  
 
 
Similar to the anti-apartheid movement against the South Africa regime, divestment 
campaigns among Palestine solidarity activists have been a popular way to raise 
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awareness and exert pressure on companies that contribute to Israel’s violations of 
international law and human rights. On 30 November 2000, Francis Boyle, a 
professor of international law, gave a public lecture at Illinois State University in 
which he called on students in the US to learn from their predecessors in the anti-
apartheid movement against South Africa and develop a similar movement to bring 
down the apartheid regime in Israel. He specifically mentioned divestment as a tactic 
that played a crucial role in building the anti-apartheid movement, which helped to 
create tangible victories in the movement and was an important component in 
bringing down formal apartheid in South Africa.143  
As a means of withdrawing or withholding of assets, divestment campaigns in 
the Palestinians struggle seek to eliminate investments in businesses that contribute to 
Israeli occupation and its violations of human rights. The purpose of divestment 
campaigns is to curtail the profits of those companies contributing to Palestinian 
oppression, raise awareness of companies that participate in the prolongation of the 
conflict, and illuminate issues of corporate responsibility and socially responsible 
investment in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Inspired by Boyle’s speech, which was subsequently disseminated as a call to 
action, students from around the US started organizing, and in the following year, the 
first formal divestment campaign was launched by Students for Justice in Palestine 
(SJP) at the University of California – Berkeley. A divestment petition was circulated 
around campus and in 2002, SJP hosted the first national student conference, which 
led to the creation of the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM). The PSM was a 
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national coalition of mostly student-based Palestine solidarity groups, whose top 
priority was to establish divestment campaigns on campuses across the US. In the 
following years, the PSM held four additional conferences at the University of 
Michigan - Ann Arbor, Ohio State University, Duke University, and Georgetown 
University.144 The conferences provided a space for activists to communicate and 
share knowledge with each other, and coordinate national days of action. Although 
the PSM eventually collapsed due to internal disagreements, campus-based 
divestment continued and by 2004, over 40 campuses in the US were working on 
divestment campaigns.145 Besides UC – Berkeley, divestment petitions were 
disseminated around prominent US universities and college campuses such as 
Princeton, Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In addition to 
campus-based divestment initiatives, divestment among faith-based groups started to 
increase, with a resolution that was passed in the Presbyterian Church. 
For a number of years, several Christian Churches in the US such as the 
Episcopal Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Presbyterian 
Church, the United Church of Christ, the United Methodist Church, the American 
Friends Service Committee, and the Mennonite Central Committee had made 
statements calling for economic pressure on corporations as a way to effect change in 
the Middle East. In 2004, the Presbyterian Church became the first to officially begin 
a process of “corporate engagement” and “selective divestment” from companies that 
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support or maintain the Israeli occupation, contribute to the expansion or maintenance 
of Israeli settlements, or assist any organization/group that enables violent attacks 
against civilians.146 In the following years, the United Methodist Church, the United 
Church of Christ, the Church of England, and the World Council of Churches would 
all take up divestment campaigns as a means to exert economic and symbolic pressure 
on multinational corporations contributing to conditions in the region.  
A number of corporations were targeted as a result of divestment campaigns; 
however, the most emphasis was placed on the Caterpillar Corporation, whose 
equipment was being used by the Israeli military in their operations (home 
demolitions, construction of the wall, razing olive trees and agricultural land, etc.) in 
the occupied Palestinian territories. Numerous groups took up divestment campaigns, 
specifically against the Caterpillar Corporation. Among a host of smaller groups 
taking up the Caterpillar campaign, large groups and coalitions also targeted the 
company. This included StopCat – a Chicago-based coalition of Caterpillar boycott 
and divestment initiatives, Stop US Tax-funded Aid to Israel Now! (SUSTAIN) – a 
DC-based organization with chapters around the country, the US Campaign to End 
the Occupation – a coalition of US Palestine solidarity organizations, The Rachel 
Corrie Foundation – an organization started by the parents of Rachel Corrie, an 
American peace activist that was killed in Gaza in 2003 with a Caterpillar bulldozer, 
and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) – a Jewish peace and justice organization with 
chapters throughout the US.  
These organizations along with smaller community-based groups pressured 
Caterpillar through divestment campaigns and raised awareness about the issues by 
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sending letters to congressional representatives, signing petitions, writing letters to 
Caterpillar’s CEO, and contacting local Caterpillar dealerships to encourage them to 
hold the company accountable for use of its equipment in the occupied Palestinian 
territories. The groups and organizations working on Caterpillar campaigns organized 
international days of action that included demonstrations at the company’s 
headquarters in Peoria Illinois, and local actions, usually at a Caterpillar dealership in 
the community. Similar to the Presbyterian Church that first began a process of 
corporate engagement with Caterpillar and other companies, JVP began pursuing 
shareholder activism by purchasing stock in Caterpillar as a way to influence the 
company’s activities from the inside. Since 2003, JVP has presented resolutions at the 
annual shareholder meeting trying to prevent the use of Caterpillar equipment in 
violating human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory.147  
Caterpillar also received the attention of large NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and War on Want, who were researching and documenting the use of 
Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers in Israel’s violations of international law and 
human rights. Two significant reports were “Razing Rafah,” a 135-page report 
published by HRW in October 2004 and “Caterpillar: the Alternative Report” issued 
by War on Want in the following year.148 The destruction from Operation Defensive 
Shield in 2002, especially in the Jenin refugee camp, the construction of the wall later 
in that year, the killing of Rachel Corrie in 2003 in the Gaza Strip, and the massive 
destruction during “Operation Rainbow” in Rafah in 2004 all led to an awareness of 
Caterpillar’s nefarious role in the Israeli occupation. In all instances of destruction to 
                                                 
147 US Campaign to End the Occupation, “Caterpillar Power Point Presentation,” 
www.endtheoccupation.org/article.php?id=1214.  
148 Human Rights Watch, “Razing Rafah,” 18 October 2004; www.hrw.org/reports/2004/10/17/razing-
rafah; War on Want, “Caterpillar: The Alternative Report,” March 2005; 
www.waronwant.org/campaigns/justice-for-palestine/hide/inform/17109-caterpillar-the-alternative-
report.  
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property and life, the reports documented and drew attention to Israel’s widespread 
use of Caterpillar bulldozers to conduct its military operations in the occupied 
Palestinian territories.  
Then, in 2005, the US Campaign to End the Occupation, voted in its Annual 
Conference to make the Caterpillar Campaign a top priority for the organization that 
year. The purpose of the campaign was to raise awareness on the use of the 
company’s equipment in ongoing international law and human rights violations in the 
occupied Palestinian territory and pressure the company to terminate sales of its 
equipment to the Israeli military. Organizing the national campaign included a three-
pronged approach – grassroots, institutional, and legislative – to educate people on the 
company’s complicity in war crimes and mobilize participants into the campaign. To 
help do this the US Campaign established a collection of online resources (fact sheets, 
tool-kits, presentations, posters, etc.) to help activists start local divestment campaigns 
against Caterpillar and facilitate the development of the national campaign.149  
The Caterpillar campaign received another boost later in that year when the 
parents of slain activist Rachel Corrie filed a lawsuit against Caterpillar in a US 
Federal Court. The case was filed on behalf of the Corrie family and four Palestinian 
families that also had family members killed or injured as a result of bulldozers 
destroying their homes and the structures collapsing on them. The case charged the 
Caterpillar Corporation with complicity in war crimes and other human rights 
violations on the grounds that the company sold its equipment to the Israeli military 
                                                 
149 US Campaign to End the Occupation, “Caterpillar Campaign,” 
www.endtheoccupation.org/article.php?list=type&type=158.  
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knowing it would be used illegally to indiscriminately destroy civilian homes and 
endanger civilian lives.150  
The early divestment initiatives were important because they indicated a 
substantial interest among some activists to pursue Palestine solidarity through 
divestment campaigns. These initial activities – by US university students, Christian 
church members, community-based and coalition organizations – all helped set in 
motion a process for additional and better-strategized divestment projects in the 
future. In this way, the early divestment initiatives established mobilizing dynamics 
that would develop more concretely after the Palestinian call was made in 2005. It 
was also the initial activities that helped incorporate divestment as a viable tactic 
within a collective action framework that would coalesce into a transnational 
movement in the years following the Palestinian BDS call.  
With important reference to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, 
international law, and human rights, the initial divestment initiatives also played a role 
in constructing how the movement would be framed in the future. These themes are 
important for raising awareness of the BDS movements and its targets, justifying BDS 
action, and mobilizing participants into the movement. As important principles 
embraced through the development of the border-crossing movement, the themes 
would become part of a template that nearly every BDS campaign in the future would 
draw on in some way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 The Rachel Corrie Foundation for Peace and Justice, “The U.S. Caterpillar Case: Corrie et all. vs. 
Caterpillar,” http://rachelcorriefoundation.org/trial/the-legal-docket-case-overviews#thenazarethcase.  
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Other Early Boycott Efforts 
 
 
In April 2001, a group of 35 Israelis and Jews of other nationalities called for a 
boycott of Israel. The call was issued six months after the second intifada began, as 
Israel had set in motion its brutal campaign to suppress the Palestinian uprising. The 
call referenced South Africa, noting the positive impact boycott had on bringing down 
the apartheid regime, and the hope that a similar effect could be produced from a 
boycott of Israel. The boycott asked people to endorse and circulate the call, 
immediately begin boycotting Israel on a personal level by not buying Israeli 
industrial and agricultural products or coming to Israel for vacation, and encouraging 
respective governments to sever economic relations and preferential trade agreements 
with Israel. The call gained the support of nearly 1,000 signatories from around the 
world.151  
At the same time that the Roses published their open letter in The Guardian 
and divestment petitions were circulating at prominent US universities such as MIT 
and Harvard, a petition for an artistic and cultural boycott was disseminated online. 
The petition asked artists to “…cancel all exhibitions and other cultural events that are 
scheduled to occur in Israel, to mobilize immediately and not allow the continuation 
of the Israeli offensive to breed complacency.” The appeal mentioned the positive role 
of artistic boycotts in South Africa. The petition garnered over 180 signatories from 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the 
US.152  
 
                                                 
151 Matzpun, “Appeal,” April 2001; www.matzpun.com/.  
152 “Boycott all Israeli Art Institutions, End the Occupation,” 7 April 2002; 
www.oznik.com/petitions/020407.html.  
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2004 Conference on Resisting Israeli Apartheid: Strategies and Principles 
 
 
A few months after the launch of PACBI, a conference was held in December at the 
School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London titled, “Resisting Israeli 
Apartheid: Strategies and Principles.” The purpose of the conference was to 
rationalize the principles and ideas, refine arguments, and strategize how to mobilize 
participants and develop the boycott movement. The conference brought together a 
diverse group of speakers and participants that had been active in crafting early 
boycott efforts such as Hilary and Steven Rose, Ilan Pappe, Omar Barghouti, John 
Docker, Mona Baker, Nur Masalha, Lawrence Davidson, and Lisa Taraki. Although 
not yet forged into a comprehensive movement, people were meeting each other, 
forming networks, and sharing ideas and knowledge about boycott campaigns. Many 
of the conference speakers also drew parallels between the boycott movement that 
helped bring down the apartheid regime in South Africa, and their hopes that a similar 
movement could bring change to Israel/Palestine.  
Overall, the conference was very successful for several reasons. It was the first 
formal international gathering after PACBI made its official call for boycott of 
academic and cultural institutions of Israel in July 2004. This provided PACBI an 
international arena to explain its rationale for boycott, present powerful rebuttals to 
arguments against it, and promote the academic and cultural boycott across borders. 
Although conferences had occurred in the past relating to Palestine, it was the first 
international conference of its kind that brought together numerous leading 
proponents of boycott from various countries, and included over two hundred 
participants.153 The conference represented the coming together of boycott and 
                                                 
153 Paul de Rooij, “London Conference, a Prelude to Academic Boycott of Israel,” Washington Report 
on Middle East Affairs January/February 2005, www.wrmea.org/component/content/article/271-
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divestment initiatives and was a key event in strengthening dynamics of mobilization 
in the movement by providing a space for activists to meet and network with each 
other, share information, and strategize future organizing of BDS campaign 
 
The Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Against Israel 
 
 
One year after the historic Advisory Opinion by the ICJ declared Israel’s construction 
of the wall illegal under international law, the official Palestinian call for BDS was 
issued to the world on 7 July 2005. The call is endorsed by over 170 Palestinian 
NGOs, associations, trade unions, charities, and other groups in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, present day Israel, and the diaspora. The BDS statement asks 
people around the world to enact boycott initiatives and pressure their respective 
governments to sanction Israel until it complies with international law and respects 
principles of human rights. Specifically, the call states that boycott tactics should be 
used until three demands are met. These demands are that Israel end its occupation 
and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantle the wall, that Israel recognize the 
fundamental rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel to full equality, and finally 
that Israel respect, protect and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to 
their homes and properties as specified in UN resolution 194.154 The call is important 
in the development and emergence of the movement for a number of reasons 
discussed below and represents a major turning point in the movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
wrmea-archives/washington-report-archives-2000-2005/january-february-2005/8643-special-report-
london-conference-a-prelude-to-academic-boycott-of-israel.html, 15.  
154 BDS Movement, “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” 9 July 2005, www.bdsmovement.net; 
See Appendix I for the full-text of the BDS call.  
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Analyzing the Emergence of the BDS Movement in the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the tactical repertoire of boycott was utilized in a 
variety of ways prior to 2005 as numerous BDS activities had taken place by that 
time. However, the official Palestinian call for BDS in that year helped transform 
seemingly disparate boycott and divestment activities into a transnational movement. 
As a call to mobilize, it gave focus to ongoing BDS activities and provided cohesion 
to a movement developing around a tactical repertoire of boycott across borders. It 
also provided a rationale for mobilization (Israel’s violations of Palestinian human 
rights and other international laws), which would become primary collective action 
frames that the movement would draw on in conceptualizing a program for action. 
The 2005 official Palestinian call for BDS is the primary document of the movement 
and referenced throughout this thesis.   
 Much of what was written in the call for BDS had been previously articulated 
in early boycott and divestment efforts discussed in this chapter. For example, the 
three demands enumerated in the BDS call were outlined in 2001 at Durban and 
featured prominently among the early boycott and divestment campaigns. Similarly, 
the collective action frames of human rights and international law were incorporated 
into the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action in Durban in 2001, in the 
initial campaigns for a moratorium on joint research funding and academic boycott, 
and in early divestment initiatives on university campuses and in Christian Churches. 
Thus, the Palestinian call in 2005 in many ways was a culmination and coalescing of 
BDS mobilizing dynamics until that time. It brought together a conceptual (through 
collective action frames) and tactical (through the repertoire of boycott) framework 
for intensifying and expanding BDS campaigns across borders.   
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 Importantly, the call for BDS represents the three main segments of the 
Palestinian population around the world – those living in the occupied territories, 
Palestinians in the diaspora (including refugees), and Arab-Palestinian citizens in 
Israel. The BDS call is inclusive in terms of the Palestinians it represents and their 
corresponding demands – that Israel end the occupation, end discrimination against 
Palestinian citizens in Israel, and respect the Palestinian right of return. In addition, 
the call is endorsed by over 170 Palestinian groups, associations, organizations, trade 
unions, etc. that are comprised of Palestinians from the three segments and working 
toward the demands enumerated in the 2005 call. The call’s broad base in terms of 
representation and endorsement is significant in the history of Palestinian politics, as 
Palestinians have historically been separated geographically due to colonial policies 
and often politically fragmented due to internal divisions.  
 It is also important to note that the Palestinian call for BDS does not proffer or 
prescribe any particular political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a point to 
which I return in chapter six on the movement’s challenges. The three demands listed 
in the call serve to create conditions towards resolving the conflict, though the call 
does not outline a projected political end goal, especially in the form of one state or 
two. While opinions vary on this among BDS activists and opponents, the call’s 
demands act as a “common denominator” among Palestinians that have been 
disconnected from each other and have frequently lacked political cohesion. While 
Palestinians may have a wide range of opinions about the BDS movement, many 
support the demands outlined in the call because they are the basic conditions for 
resolving the conflict as articulated by the historical experience of Palestinians in the 
diaspora (especially refugees), those in the occupied Palestinian territories, and 
Palestinians in Israel.   
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 As examined throughout this chapter, the transnational BDS movement that 
clearly took off after 2005 can be traced back to the historical usage of the tactical 
repertoire of boycott in the Palestinian struggle, specifically through boycotts, non-
cooperation, anti-normalization, and border-crossing solidarity activism. The 
movement also originated in a context of political constraints, in which the Oslo 
process and its fallout did not create positive, meaningful change for a majority of 
Palestinians. At the same time, an environment of political opportunities was created 
when the ICJ ruled that Israel violated international law in the construction of it wall 
in occupied Palestinian territory. The Court ruling, and the issue of international law 
more generally, became key collective action frames that the movement would use to 
justify mobilization and action. In addition to the structural-historical context that the 
movement emerged in, the mobilizing dynamics of the movement was initiated by the 
hard work of original campaigners documented in this chapter. Together these causal 
conditions were an impetus for developing a transnational movement that emerged 
following the official Palestinian call for BDS in 2005.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 
In this chapter, I analyzed causal conditions in a historical context that have led to the 
emergence of the BDS movement. Specifically, this chapter has traced the origins of 
the BDS movement to a long history of Palestinian boycotts, non-cooperation, and 
anti-normalization, along with border-crossing solidarity activism during the second 
intifada that set in motion dynamics of mobilization for activists to participate in BDS 
activities, especially upon returning to their home countries after being in Palestine. In 
comparison with other ways of confronting Israel such as armed resistance or the 
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state-based Arab boycott – the scope and way that much of BDS activism is being 
organized indicates a new form of transnational activism in the Palestinian struggle.  
In addition to the this background on challenging Israel in a historical context, 
the Oslo process and its fallout, and the ruling by ICJ in 2004 that determined Israel’s 
wall was illegal under international law were important developments for activists 
interpreting political constraints and opportunities. Although boycott is not a new 
tactic used in the Palestinian struggle, the emergence of the current BDS movement 
can be traced in part to a range of boycott and divestment activities. The movement 
began with individual and small group initiatives, but quickly expanded within a few 
years as activists became more connected and networked with each other. This was 
facilitated by in person gatherings such international days of action against the 
Caterpillar Corporation and the 2004 strategizing conference in London. The initial 
boycott and divestment campaigns established mobilizing dynamics that developed 
more in the future, and in addition to historical roots and a ripe political environment, 
contributed to the official call for BDS from Palestinians in 2005 and the expansion of 
a transnational movement thereafter. In the following three case study chapters, I 
examine in detail the organizing and operationalization of three BDS campaigns that 
are part of the larger movement that took-off after the Palestinian call in 2005.  
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Chapter 2 – BDS Case Study: The Academic Boycott in Britain 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The academic boycott of Israel is based on the premise that Israeli institutions of 
higher education are complicit in the state’s violations of international law and human 
rights through direct funding or intellectual support. The academic and cultural 
boycott calls on academics and cultural workers around the world “to 
comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural 
institutions…” in support of the Palestinian struggle.155 
In this chapter, I investigate the boycott of Israeli academic institutions in 
Britain, as these activities were some of the earliest undertakings that partly led to the 
movement’s emergence, as identified in the previous chapter, and became part of the 
larger BDS movement across borders. First, I consider both the background of Israeli 
academic institutions and the academic boycott against them that has developed in 
Britain. From there I explore the major groups involved and the organizational 
dynamics of the academic boycott, specifically the processes that occurred in Britain’s 
academic unions. Following this section, I lay out the significance of the academic 
boycott in Britain and the interplay between boycott campaigners and opponents. The 
chapter ends with an analysis of the case study in which I discern a number of aspects 
about the campaign that illuminate organizing dynamics in the larger BDS movement.  
The first of these aspects is that the movement is decentralized and takes on 
hybrid forms of organizing, using vertical and horizontal dynamics in its 
operationalization. Based partly on information from this chapter, this feature of the 
                                                 
155 BDS Movement, “Academic Boycott,” http://www.bdsmovement.net/activecamps/academic-
boycott.  
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movement is considered more in depth in chapter five on the movement’s structure 
and processes. The second aspect identified by an examination of the academic 
boycott in Britain is that anti-BDS proponents have pursued legal action as a strategy 
of silencing and weakening the movement. As the movement is decentralized, which 
will be shown in this and other chapters, the “lawfare” strategy for attacking the BDS 
movement can attempt to significantly damage local campaigns. This is a point I 
further consider in chapter six on the movement’s challenges and limitations. Thus, 
this case study provides evidence on the movement’s scope and organizational 
structure, which contributes to my argument that the BDS movement is an innovative 
approach to challenging Israel.      
 
2.1  Background of Institutions of Higher Education in Israel and the Academic 
Boycott in Britain 
 
 
Background of Israeli Institutions of Higher Education  
 
 
There are eight universities in Israel, with an additional university in Ariel, an Israeli 
settlement in the occupied West Bank, and nearly 60 colleges throughout Israel.156 A 
doctorate can only be obtained through a university, while a bachelor’s, and often 
master’s, degrees can be obtained from colleges. The Council for Higher Education 
(CHE) is the accrediting and governing body of higher education in Israel, which is a 
25-member council that is recommended by the Israeli government and appointed by 
the President. The Planning and Budgeting Committee, a subcommittee of the CHE, 
disperses the budget allotted for higher education to the universities and college, and 
is responsible for all budgetary related matters to the academic institutions.157 
                                                 
156 Council for Higher Education, “Institutions of Higher Education;” Israel; 
http://che.org.il/en/?page_id=15417#Universities.   
157 Ibid, “About the Council for Higher Education;” http://che.org.il/en/?page_id=4097.  
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Accordingly, a majority of academic institutions in Israel are funded by the state; 
research in particular is significantly supported, with the government spending $260 
million annually.158  
 In addition to a close relationship with the state, Israeli institutions of higher 
education also closely collaborate with private industry. Israeli universities that are 
research-based have research and development foundations that “facilitate the 
commercialization of innovation abilities and industrial know-how of the universities 
personnel.”159 In addition, “science-based industrial parks” have also been created, 
frequently located near university campuses.160 To support technological 
advancement in the parks the government “provides investment incentives, loans, 
grants, and tax benefits to industries moving into the parks.” Israel’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs boasts that the parks provide the expertise of university personnel and 
expenditure savings through joint purchasing with the universities.   
According to campaigners for an academic boycott, Israeli academic 
institutions are complicit in the state’s violations of Palestinian human rights and 
other international laws. The rationale for boycott is based on connections between 
the state, private industry, and Israeli academic institutions; in particular, the latter’s 
production of knowledge and equipment used in perpetuating oppressive policies and 
practices towards Palestinians. Academic boycott plays an important contributing role 
                                                 
158 European Commission, “Higher Education in Israel,” 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/overview/israel_tempus_country_fiche_final.p
df and Dan Izenberg, “Science and Technology in Israel,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 
1998; 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/israelat50/pages/science%20and%20technology%20in%20israel
.aspx.  
159 Izenberg, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/israelat50/pages/science%20and%20technology%20in%20israel
.aspx. 
160 Ibid.  
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in the larger BDS movement by bringing the Palestinian struggle to the academic 
sector across borders and pressuring Israel through its academic institutions.   
 
Background of the Academic Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions in Britain   
 
 
As stated in chapter one, early BDS activities that in part led to the emergence of a 
border-crossing BDS movement included a 2002 moratorium call regarding joint 
research projects between Europe and Israel. The call was made by Hilary and 
Stephen Rose and was based on Israel’s violations of the human rights terms set out in 
the framework of the European Research Area.161 That same year, Mona Baker, one 
of the signatories to the Roses’ open letter and professor of Translation Studies at the 
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology removed two Israeli 
professors from their roles on academic journals that she published.162 The move was 
especially controversial, as it appeared discriminatory of scholars based on their 
nationality. The matter was significant because it illuminated the inconsistency in how 
an academic boycott might be interpreted and applied. Baker was widely criticized for 
the decision and responded by stating, “This is the interpretation of the boycott 
statement that I’ve signed.”163 Though still in its early stages, the heated debate of an 
academic boycott had already begun.  
In April 2004, PACBI issued the official call for the international community to 
boycott all Israeli academic and cultural institutions or state-sponsored events in 
support of the Palestinian struggle.164 Specifically, the academic boycott asks scholars 
and cultural workers to apply the following: 
 
                                                 
161 Hilary and Stephen Rose, “More Pressure for Mid East Peace,” The Guardian, 6 April 2002.  
162 Suzanne Goldenberg and Will Woodward, “Israeli Boycott Divides Academics,” The Guardian, 8 
July 2002.  
163 Ibid. 
164 For the full text see Appendix III: The Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel.    
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1. Refrain from participation in any form of academic and cultural 
cooperation, collaboration or joint projects with Israeli institutions;  
2. Advocate a comprehensive boycott of Israeli institutions at the 
national and international levels, including suspension of all forms 
of funding and subsidies to these institutions;  
3. Promote divestment and disinvestment from Israel by international 
academic institutions;  
4. Work toward the condemnation of Israeli policies by pressing for 
resolutions to be adopted by academic, professional and cultural 
associations and organizations;  
5. Support Palestinian academic and cultural institutions directly 
without requiring them to partner with Israeli counterparts as an 
explicit or implicit condition for such support.165  
 
 
Following the PACBI call and building on the Roses’ call for a moratorium on joint 
research funding between Europe and Israel in 2002, the British Committee for the 
Universities of Palestine (BRICUP) was formed in 2004. In support of the Palestinian 
call for academic and cultural boycott, BRICUP’s specific mission is to:   
 
1. Continue to put pressure on the EU and the UK government for the 
exclusion of Israel from the European Research Area. 
2. Develop a policy which encourages individual academics to break 
their professional links with Israel by such actions as: 
 Refusing research collaborations with Israeli institutions or 
to referee papers or grant applications issuing from such 
institutions 
 Refusing to attend academic conferences in Israel 
 Supporting Israeli academic colleagues working with 
Palestinian colleagues in their demand for self-determination 
and academic freedom 
3. Work within our trades unions and professional organisations in 
support of such actions 
4. Explore forms of support to Palestinian academic colleagues.166 
 
 
2.2  Groups Involved in the Academic Boycott in Britain 
 
 
BRICUP is one of the main groups in Britain promoting an academic boycott. It is a 
group of UK-based academics and cultural workers that organized in response to the 
                                                 
165 Ibid.  
166 BRICUP, “BRICUP Mission;” http://www.bricup.org.uk/what.html.  
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Palestinian call for academic and cultural boycott in 2004. BRICUP supports 
Palestinian universities and academics along with opposing the occupation of the 
Palestinian territories, with its specific mission outlined above. The group says that an 
academic boycott of Israeli academic institutions is justified based on the complicity 
of these institutions in supporting the state policies and practices that oppress 
Palestinians. According to one member in the group, “The complicity is through 
support the universities give to the Israeli military, the research they do on arms and 
technologies of occupation and on the ideological legitimation of the forms of Israeli 
society and governance.”167 In addition to supporting the Palestinian academic and 
cultural boycott, BRICUP has also played a role in the medical boycott. The group 
has sought to expose the links between the Israeli Medical Association and the 
military, particularly through its condoning of unethical practices such as torture and 
preventing Palestinians from obtaining medical treatment. The groups identifies itself 
as part of the larger BDS movement and works with groups such as the Palestine 
Solidarity Campaign (PSC), Boycott Israeli Goods (BIG), Jews for Boycotting Israeli 
Goods (J-BIG), the Boycott Israel Network (BIN), and the Architects and Planners 
campaign.  
Another group involved in the academic boycott is the University and College 
Union (UCU), which was formed in 2006 with the merger of the AUT and NATFHE. 
The union currently represents approximately 120,000 faculty and staff from a range 
of institutions of higher and further education in the UK, and is the largest union of its 
kind in the world.168 The union is comprised of members who are organized into local 
branches and associations, usually through their workplace. Policies of the union are 
                                                 
167 Mike Cushman, “The British Committee for the Universities of Palestine (BRICUP),” Postcolonial 
Studies Association Newsletter no. 3 (May 2009); http://www.bricup.org.uk/documents/PSA.pdf.   
168 UCU, “About UCU;” http://www.ucu.org.uk/1685.  
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determined at the UCU’s Annual Congress. Members directly elect delegates to the 
Annual Congress and representatives for the National Executive Committee, which 
oversees union affairs between congress meetings.169 The UCU has a number of 
active campaigns including fair pay, workload and stress, ending casual contracts, and 
fighting privatization in education.170 Their role in the academic boycott is discussed 
more below in the section on organizational dynamics.  
The Boycott Israel Network (BIN) in Britain was formed in response to the 
global call for BDS by Palestinians in 2005, and works on a variety of BDS 
campaigns including academic boycott. It consists of individuals and organizations 
that support BDS, and works toward building and developing the movement 
throughout the UK. The network has two co-conveners and six regional contacts. 
Numerous BDS activists part of BIN are also active in student groups and trade 
unions. BIN has taken on a number of BDS campaigns, although these are largely 
determined by local interest and are not necessarily national campaigns. Activists part 
of the network have taken part in consumer campaigns against Israeli agricultural 
products, diamonds, Sodastream, Eden Springs, and Ahava, the cultural boycott, the 
sports boycott, campaigns against Veolia and G4S, along with the academic 
boycott.171        
 
2.3  Organizational Dynamics of the Academic Boycott in Britain  
 
 
In April 2005, the National Council of the AUT voted to boycott the University of 
Haifa and Bar-Ilan University in Israel. Motion 7D regarded a boycott of the 
University of Haifa that concerned the potential trial and dismissal of Dr. Ilan Pappe, 
                                                 
169 Ibid, “Structures and Decision Making;” http://www.ucu.org.uk/structures.  
170 Ibid, “Campaigns;” http://www.ucu.org.uk/campaigns.  
171 BIN, “About BIN;” http://www.boycottisraelnetwork.net/?page_id=2.   
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a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University. Dr. Pappe had defended a 
controversial Master’s thesis of a student, which argued that Israel’s pre-state army 
(the Hagenah) committed a massacre of unarmed civilians near Haifa. The motion 
that was carried called on AUT members to boycott the University of Haifa until it 
committed itself to academic freedom and ended the victimization of faculty and 
students who seek to research the establishment of the state. The motion also stated 
that the boycott of the University should follow that of the 2004 Palestinian call for a 
boycott of Israeli academic institutions.172  
Motion 7E regarded the boycott of Bar-Ilan University for its connections with 
the College of Judea and Samaria, now known as Ariel University, which is located in 
Ariel – an Israeli settlement in the northern West Bank. The University was originally 
founded as a regional branch of Bar-Ilan University in the early 1980s, and at the time 
the AUT passed its motion, was supervising degree programs in the settlement’s 
university. Based on its direct support for an institution of higher education in a 
location that contravenes UN resolutions, the AUT Council carried the boycott 
motion. It called on AUT members to boycott Bar-Ilan University until it 
discontinued its links with the College of Judea and Samaria and any other academic 
institution located in the occupied Palestinian territories. The motion also stated that 
the boycott should be consistent with the Palestinian call for academic boycott in 
2004.173   
After intense internal and external pressure and a request from 25 members of 
the Council, a special meeting was called a month later to debate the motions passed 
relating to the boycott of Israeli universities. In addition to the debate going on inside 
                                                 
172 AUT, “Report to Members from the AUT National Council,” 2005; 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060130124019/http:/www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/unions/aut/council.htm.  
173 Ibid.  
110 
 
 
the meeting, those for and against the boycott resolutions held protests outside the 
meeting.174 In the special meeting, the National Council passed several motions in 
which a number of points were resolved. The motions stated that the policy to boycott 
Israeli universities had not been given due deliberation or debate, the existing policy 
to boycott should be set aside, the Union valued academic freedom and the previous 
motions threatened these ideas, and a number of professional associations abroad had 
condemned the AUT’s previous motions based on ideals of academic freedom. One of 
the motions also called for an “investigative commission” to be set up and work with 
NATFE and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to determine how to work in solidarity 
with Palestinians and Israeli trade unionists that value academic freedom while 
asserting the need for Israel to comply with UN resolutions. Yet another motion called 
upon all members threatening legal action against the Union to accept the conclusions 
of the Special Council and withdraw all such threats.175  
The following year, NATFHE passed Motion 198C on Academic 
Responsibility at its Annual Conference in May. The motion noted “continuing Israeli 
apartheid policies,” particularly Israel’s construction of its separation wall and 
practices of educational discrimination against Palestinians. The motion invited 
members to consider their own role in these practices through their contacts with 
Israeli academics and institutions and “to consider the appropriateness of a boycott of 
those that do not publicly dissociate themselves from such policies.”176 At the same 
time, the AUT adopted the report of the investigative commission on Israel/Palestine 
that was established by resolution in its Special Council the year prior. The report set 
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out an interim international policy and a mechanism for implementing the policy. The 
interim policy stated that solidarity with colleagues abroad should protect and extend 
academic freedom and trade union rights. The mechanism for boycotting academic 
institutions required 1) a trigger to provoke the activity 2) a graded approach in using 
the tactic and 3) practical likelihood of securing support.177 When NATFHE merged 
with AUT to form the University and College Union (UCU) on 1 June 2006, all 
policies of the two unions took on advisory status.178  
In the UCU’s first annual conference in 2007, it passed Motion 30 on the 
Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions. In the motion, congress noted how Israel’s 
40-year old occupation had severely harmed Palestinian society, it deplored the denial 
of educational rights to Palestinians, and condemned the complicity of Israeli 
academic institutions in occupation. Furthermore, the motion instructed the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) to circulate to all local branches and associations the 
2004 Palestinian call for academic boycott, urged union members to consider the 
moral implications of sustaining links with Israeli academic institutions, and called for 
organizing a tour of Palestinian scholars to UK university campuses.179    
Again due to extensive internal and external pressure, particularly the threat of 
legal action, which will be examined more in the section below on dynamics between 
proponents and opponents of academic boycott in Britain, the Union sought legal 
advice regarding academic boycotts. In September 2007 UCU General Secretary, 
Sally Hunt, recommended that the Union inform local branches and associations that 
based on legal advice a call for boycott would be unlawful and could not be 
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implemented, that members’ opinions could not be tried at union meetings, and that 
the recommended tour for Palestinian scholars could not proceed. According to the 
legal advice obtained by the UCU, 
 
“It would be beyond the union's powers and unlawful for the union, 
directly or indirectly, to call for, or to implement, a boycott by the union 
and its members of any kind of Israeli universities and other academic 
institutions; and that the use of union funds directly or indirectly to 
further such a boycott would also be unlawful.”180 
 
 
In 2008, the issue was again discussed at the UCU’s Annual Congress. Although not 
explicitly calling for an academic boycott, Motion 25 passed that year in which a 
number of related topics were stated. In this regard, the Congress noted the “legal 
attempts to prevent UCU debating boycott of Israeli academic institutions, and legal 
advice that such debates are lawful,” and asked members “to consider the moral and 
political implications of educational links with Israeli institutions, and to discuss the 
occupation with their Israeli collaborators.”181 Once again, legal action was 
threatened, particularly by a group of 12 union members that claimed the motion was 
implicitly a boycott motion.182 However, in December of that year UCU General 
Secretary Sally Hunt stated, “…the position of the union, has not changed. There was 
no motion calling for a boycott and the implementation of Motion 25 within the law 
will continue.”183 
The following year the UCU passed Motion 29, which “affirm[ed] support for 
the Palestinian call for a boycott, disinvestment and sanctions campaign” and called 
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for an inter-union conference of BDS supporters to determine how to legally 
implement such a policy.184 However, Leading Counsel for the Union advised that the 
passing of the motion could be unlawful “because it is likely to be viewed by a court 
as a call to boycott Israeli academic institutions.” Although Motion 29 was passed by 
the Union’s membership, the leadership of UCU immediately determined the motion 
null and void.185   
Motions relating to a boycott of Israeli academic institutions that were raised 
in the 2010 UCU Annual Congress reaffirmed the 2009 motion with several 
additional clauses. Unlike the year prior, the motion was not considered unlawful as 
the Union, “reaffirm[ed] its support for BDS, and to seek its implementation within 
the constraints of the existing law.”186 The motion also called for dissolving any 
relationship with the Histadrut, Israel’s trade federation, as the Palestinian BNC had 
appealed for this. The motion urged other trade unions to also sever their links with 
the Histadrut. In addition, the motion called for an active campaign against the EU-
Israel Association Agreement, and working with other trade unions to coordinate 
these efforts.  
In 2011 and 2012, no new motions relating to academic boycott were 
proposed. Motion 36 was carried in 2011, which instructed the NEC to circulate the 
2004 Palestinian call for academic boycott to local branches and associations, 
although this had been affirmed in a number of previous motions that had passed. The 
motion also called for the circulation of an Israeli call by 155 academics to withdraw 
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support and collaboration with Ariel University (previously the College of Judea and 
Samaria), as it was in the process of seeking university accreditation by Israel’s CHE.      
 
2.4  Significance of the Academic Boycott in Britain  
 
 
The case of the boycott of Israeli academic institutions in Britain is significant 
primarily due to its successes in processes such as those in the academic unions 
described above. The academic boycott has played a considerable role in the UCU, 
the world’s largest academic union of its kind, where the process of debating and 
passing boycott-related motions have raised awareness of the BDS movement.187 In 
addition, the endorsement of the academic boycott by high-profile supporters such as 
Professor Stephen Hawking, which is discussed below, has contributed to an 
environment whereby boycott is reaching influential elites. This suggests that the 
movement has a wide scope, where boycott activities take place in a variety of 
settings such as union meetings or in supportive pronouncements by elite allies. 
The PACBI call and its related endorsements for academic and cultural 
boycott make clear that “academia is not exempt” from boycott actions as Israeli 
institutions of higher education are used in the maintenance and production of the 
Israeli state’s status quo.188 One such way that British academics have operationalized 
the academic boycott is through their professional unions. The processes that occurred 
in the academic unions in Britain were important in securing a space for discussing 
the boycott of Israel, thereby pushing the BDS movement into previously uncharted 
territory. As this case indicates, academic boycott campaigns can take shape in a 
range of places and venues, even beyond primary targets (i.e. institutions of higher 
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education). This is significant because as I argue throughout this thesis, the 
geographic and multi-sector scope of the broader BDS movement partially contributes 
to it being a new and different approach to challenging Israel in the Palestinian 
struggle.  
In addition to the academic boycott activities that have taken place in the 
academic unions in Britain, in May 2013, it was announced that renowned theoretical 
physicist and cosmologist Professor Stephen Hawking would not be attending the 
fifth Israeli Presidential Conference, Facing Tomorrow 2013 that was to take place 
from 18-20 June in Jerusalem. A statement approved by Hawking’s office at the 
University of Cambridge and published by BRICUP said that his decision to not 
attend the conference was based on “…his independent decision to respect the 
boycott, based upon his knowledge of Palestine, and on the unanimous advise of his 
own academic contacts there.”189 Contention surrounding a person of Hawking’s 
stature in endorsing the academic boycott of Israel unsurprisingly resulted in a flurry 
of media attention, and initially led to a dispute of the true reasoning behind Hawking 
declining his invitation to the conference.  
As stated above, BRICUP first published a statement approved by Hawking’s 
office regarding his participation in the academic boycott, which was immediately 
picked up by The Guardian and published on 8 May 2013. Shortly thereafter, 
Cambridge University released a statement that declared, “Professor Hawking will not 
be attending the conference in Israel in June for health reasons – his doctors have 
advised him against flying.” BRICUP denied this was the reason Hawking would not 
be attending the conference and published on its website an email they had received 
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from Hawking’s office the previous day. The email showed that Tim Holt, Acting 
Director of Communications at the University of Cambridge, and Hawking’s personal 
assistant had approved BRICUP’s initial statement on Hawking and the boycott.190 In 
addition, Hawking sent a letter to conference organizers on university letterhead on 3 
May explaining his reasons for not attending the conference. It stated, 
 
“I accepted the invitation to the Presidential Conference with the 
intention that this would not only allow me to express my opinion on the 
prospects for a Peace Settlement but also because it would allow me to 
lecture on the West Bank…However, I have received a number of 
emails from Palestinian academics. They are unanimous that I should 
respect the boycott. In view of this, I must withdraw from the 
conference. Had I attended, I would have stated my opinion that the 
policy of the present Israeli government is likely to lead to disaster.”191 
   
 
Hawking’s support for the academic boycott by not attending the conference in Israel 
was significant for the movement. It indicates that the academic boycott in particular 
and the BDS movement more generally, are capable of reaching academic and 
cultural icons. This is a major success for the movement, and as I argue in chapter six 
on the movement’s challenges and limitations, is an effective way of bringing a sector 
specific boycott such as the academic boycott to those not in scholarly professions. 
With his endorsement, Hawking brought attention to the academic boycott and the 
BDS movement to a wide audience, including people that knew little or nothing about 
the movement. Similar to the union processes by British academics described above, 
Hawking’s endorsement of the boycott has contributed to the movement’s broad 
scope in that Israel is challenged in range of venues across borders.  
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2.5  Dynamics between Campaigners of Academic Boycott in Britain and 
Opponents  
 
 
From the 2002 letter that the Roses published in The Guardian calling for a 
moratorium on joint research funding between Europe and Israel there have been 
prolific efforts to stop an academic boycott of Israeli academic institutions. A number 
of groups have mobilized against a British academic boycott of Israel; these groups 
include Engage, Academic Friends of Israel, Academic Study Group, Union of Jewish 
Students, The Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the Campaign Group for 
Academic Freedom. In this chapter, I draw on a particular instance – that of Ronnie 
Fraser’s lawsuit against the UCU – to illustrate the use of “lawfare,” or the use of the 
law to engage in attacking opponents, against the BDS movement. While the case 
specifically refers to circumstances occurring in Britain, anti-BDS activism 
corresponds to nearly all BDS campaigns and the Fraser case is but one example of 
the lawfare strategy utilized to stifle the movement.   
In 2012, Ronnie Fraser, a mathematics teacher in colleges and secondary 
schools, brought a harassment case against his union, the UCU. The case was heard in 
an Employment Tribunal with a 20-day hearing in December 2012. The case garnered 
23 volumes of evidence, and heard from 34 witnesses; 29 were called on behalf of 
Fraser and five on behalf of UCU.192 Fraser charged the union with “institutional anti-
Semitism,” which he argued comprised harassment of him as Jew, a “protected 
characteristic” of race and religion or belief under the Equality Act of 2010. Fraser’s 
lawyer, Anthony Julius, best known for negotiating Princess Diana’s divorce 
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settlement, argued that an attachment to Israel was a “related aspect” of the 
aforementioned “protected characteristics” in the Equality Act. While the 2010 Act 
protects against harassment in an employer-employee relationship, and an 
Employment Tribunal can rule on employment disputes, Fraser argued that 
harassment was wider in the UCU and that liability extended to acts of Congress, the 
NEC, officials, employees, and members of the union. He made 10 claims to support 
his argument.  
Among others, these claims related to resolutions passed in Congress 
pertaining to Israel, behavior on the union’s email Activist List, resignations of Jewish 
members from the union, the invitation of a South African trade unionist that was 
being investigated for hate speech, behavior at union meetings, and rejection by the 
union of a then working definition of anti-Semitism produced by the former European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Despite the large size of the case in 
terms of evidence and witnesses, the Tribunal dismissed the proceedings, finding 
“…almost the entire case as manifestly unmeritorious.”193 In its Findings and 
Conclusion, the Employment Tribunal denied that an attachment to Israel could be a 
protected characteristic, as the sentiment is not inherently Jewish. The Tribunal also 
found it “wholly untenable” that the union could be held liable for the conduct of 
fellow members at union meetings or on the email list, and denied that resignation by 
some Jewish members constituted harassment of Fraser by the union. In chiding 
language the Tribunal asserted,  
 
“We regret that the case was ever brought. At heart, it represents an 
impermissible  attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means. It 
would be very unfortunate if an exercise of this sort were ever repeated.” 
194 
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The Tribunal went on to state that it was concerned by the implications of Fraser’s 
complaints, remarking that, “Underlying it we sense a worrying disregard for 
pluralism, tolerance and freedom of expression…”195 In closing, the Tribunal 
additionally expressed that the costs incurred due to the case were burdensome and 
should not be misused in the future. They said,   
 
“The Employment Tribunals are a hard-pressed public service and it is 
not right that their limited resources should be squandered as they have 
been in this case…[nor] should the Respondents have been put to the 
trouble and expense of defending proceedings of this order or anything 
like it.”196 
  
 
In response to the judgment of the Employment Tribunal, UCU General Secretary 
Sally Hunt said,  
 
“I am delighted that the Tribunal has made such a clear and 
overwhelming judgment in UCU’s favour. There are many different 
views within UCU and wider society about Israel and Palestine and this 
decision upholds our and others’ rights to freedom of expression and to 
continue to properly debate these and other difficult questions.”197  
 
 
The union acknowledged Fraser’s right to bring the case forward and said he and his 
views would be treated fairly in the union in the future. They also stated that they 
hoped the Tribunal’s judgment would encourage Fraser and other union members to 
debate issues within union meetings rather than seek legal recourse.    
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2.6  Analyzing the Case of the Academic Boycott in Britain  
 
 
The academic boycott in Britain case represents the hybrid nature of the movement’s 
organizational structure and processes. The structure of the union and the processes 
that took place there were rooted in a vertical style of organizing and decision-
making. The strategy of passing motions concerning Israel/Palestine and boycott 
specifically, was a bottom-up approach, where local branches and associations would 
discuss the issues and then propose a motion for the annual congress. Proposed 
motions by local branches would then be discussed by elected regional delegates at 
congress, and if passed, then implemented by the union’s leadership. As documented 
in this chapter, these motions included: in 2005 AUT passed motion 7D and 7E, in 
2006 NATFHE passed motion 198C, in 2007 UNC passed motion 30, in 2008 UCU 
passed motion 25, in 2009 UCU passed motion 29, in 2010 UCU reaffirmed motion 
29, and in 2011 UCU passed motion 36. The process of discussing and passing these 
motions were part of the unions’ centralized power structures.  
Overall, however, the process of implementing an academic boycott in Britain 
has been horizontal in the sense that activists there determine how to proceed with and 
implement an academic boycott of Israel. The movement is operationalized through 
networks of Palestinians and solidarity activists in a decentralized power structure. In 
the border-crossing BDS movement, the principles and values of the movement are 
determined by Palestinians. Specifically in this case, the call for academic and cultural 
boycott was formulated by PACBI in 2004 with fairly specific guidelines for 
implanting boycotts published shortly thereafter. Nonetheless, the actual process of 
implanting boycotts is largely determined by participants in their own locale. While 
groups such as BRICUP or BIN may coordinate or seek advice occasionally from the 
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Palestinian BNC or PACBI, their activities and the ways they proceed are not 
predetermined or activated through a centralized structure.        
In addition, the academic boycott in Britain shows how exercising “lawfare” is 
a strategy that anti-BDS proponents use for challenging the movement. The Fraser 
case was important because it represents one of several attempts to legally challenge 
the ability to discuss or engage in activities surrounding boycotts of Israel. While the 
Fraser case was fought by UCU’s legal team and not BDS activists, the lawsuit had 
wider implications for the movement, and free speech more generally. If Fraser’s case 
would have prevailed, even after an appeal by the union, it would have made 
discussion critical of Israel and boycotts very difficult in not only unions, but 
elsewhere as well. In this way, the case represented an experiment for UK unions’ 
rights to discuss boycott and promote the BDS movement. 198    
In addition, the charge of anti-Semitism and/or the delegitimization of the state 
of Israel, as either the motivation or effect of boycotts against Israel has been a 
powerful accusation driving the lawfare strategy. In BRICUP’s special issue on the 
matter, Brenna Bhandar, a Lecturer in Property Law, said that attempting to challenge 
BDS through legal action has an “underlying rationale,” which is that “political 
criticism of the State of Israel and political action that supports BDS are viewed as 
anti-Semitic – with inherently so or in particular instances.”199 Due to the potent and 
sensitive nature in deploying the charge of anti-Semitism, if it were upheld it would at 
the minimum produce a silencing effect against BDS activism. Clearly, a central tactic 
of anti-BDS advocates is an attempt to restrict the scope of debate around the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict and the space in which BDS activists can legitimately (legally) 
operate.   
Because the ability to express views critical of Israel and dispense those views 
through BDS activism is vital to the movement’s growth and expansion, the judgment 
had border-crossing effects for the movement. In particular, the judgment removed 
the legitimacy of a legal challenge to BDS on grounds that it is inherently anti-
Semitic.200 The Fraser case was brought against the UCU, but it set an important 
precedent for the movement as it demonstrated that the allegation of anti-Semitism in 
the lawfare strategy is not a forgone conclusion in silencing or debilitating the 
movement.  
The last major action of the academic boycott of Israel in Britain was in 2013, 
when Stephen Hawking announced he would not be attending a conference in Israel. 
There has been no significant activity with respect to boycott motions in the academic 
union since the last motion was passed in 2011 as numerous motions are currently in 
force. As the academic boycott of Israel in Britain has waned in the academic union, it 
has greatly picked up in the US, although mostly in academic associations. Similar to 
the motions passed in British academic unions, grassroots organizing takes place 
among like-minded scholars that build support among the membership of their 
association. When a significant amount of support is gained, activist-members push 
for a motion in support of the BDS movement to be passed. Over ten academic 
associations in the US currently endorse the academic boycott of Israel, though as the 
case with the academic boycott of Israel in Britain demonstrates, the path forward will 
be challenging and will be subject to lawfare tactics by BDS opponents.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
This case study chapter has critically investigated the academic boycott in Britain to 
illuminate aspects of the transnational BDS movement. To do this, I first outlined the 
background of Israeli institutions of higher education and of the academic boycott in 
Britain that has arisen against them. I then described some of the groups involved in 
these boycott activities and organizational dynamics of the academic boycott, 
especially as occurred through the trade union processes. Next, I discussed the 
significance of these boycotts and the dynamic interaction between academic boycott 
campaigners and opponents, particularly the Fraser case that was brought against the 
UCU. I concluded the chapter by ascertaining various features about the campaign 
case study that demonstrate aspects of the broader BDS movement across borders.  
 In this regard, the academic boycott in Britain demonstrates the decentralized 
structure of the movement, along with its vertical and horizontal forms of organizing. 
The processes that occurred in Britain’s trade unions regarding the academic boycott 
represent vertical organizing processes from the bottom, up to the union leadership. 
Though these are specific processes of organizing that stem from codified union 
procedures, the process of implementing academic boycotts in general has been 
horizontal. As this case study suggests, the BDS movement is operationalized across 
borders in ways specific to the places and people that are organizing a particular BDS 
campaign. This point is further addressed in chapter five on the structure and 
organizing in the movement. In addition, the academic boycott in Britain shows how 
opponents of BDS campaigns use lawfare as a strategy to silence BDS activists and 
weaken the border-crossing movement. Because the movement is decentralized, these 
attacks can be daunting for individual, local campaigns, and is considered more in 
chapter six on the movement’s challenges and limitations. In furnishing evidence on 
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the movement’s scope and organizational structure, this case study contributes to my 
assertion that the movement is a new and different way of confronting Israel in the 
Palestinian struggle for justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
 
Chapter 3 – BDS Case Study: The We Divest Campaign 
  
 
Introduction 
  
 
Divestment campaigns within the BDS movement seek to illuminate issues of ethical 
and socially responsible investment in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Divestment campaigns in the BDS movement want to eliminate investments in 
businesses that contribute to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories or its 
violations of Palestinian human rights. The aims of divestment campaigns are 
twofold: “to curb the profits of Israel’s war and apartheid economy” and to “raise 
awareness about Israel’s policies.”201 The most notable divestments have come from 
Christian churches, universities, banks, and pension funds.   
This chapter examines the case of the We Divest campaign as an example of a 
divestment initiative of the BDS movement. The campaign targets TIAA-CREF, one 
of the largest retirement fund providers in the US, to divest funds currently held in a 
number of companies the campaign has identified. The chapter is structured just as the 
previous and following case study chapters by showing the background of the target 
(TIAA-CREF) and the We Divest campaign. The chapter describes groups involved 
in the campaign, organizational dynamics, the significance of We Divest in the BDS 
movement, and the interaction between challengers (We Divest) and opponents (anti-
We Divest) in the development of the campaign. I conclude with an analysis of the 
case study in which I identify a number of features about the campaign and the 
movement overall.  
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The first of these features is that similar to the academic boycott in Britain, the 
We Divest campaign is decentralized, and uses both vertical and horizontal structures 
and processes for organizing. Information from these chapters is analyzed more in 
chapter five on the movement’s organizational dynamics. Secondly, the We Divest 
campaign uses collective action frames such as international law, corporate 
complicity, socially responsible investment, etc., which are similar to other BDS 
campaigns, and are used to mobilize participants and garner support for the 
movement. These frames parallel those of other contemporary transnational 
movements, which I explore more in chapter six where I consider the BDS movement 
in a global justice framework. By pointing to critical components of the movement – 
its organizational structure and collective action frames – this case study supports a 
central claim of this this thesis that the movement is a new and unique way of 
confronting Israel in the Palestinian struggle for justice.  
 
3.1  Background of TIAA-CREF and the We Divest Campaign  
 
 
TIAA-CREF Background  
 
 
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) was established in 1918 by 
Andrew Carnegie as a pension system for university professors. Due to a number of 
factors including rising inflation during the 1940s and 1950s, TIAA established the 
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), a variable annuity that would allow clients 
to invest in the stock market. Today, TIAA-CREF is considered one of the 100 largest 
US corporations and is currently ranked 97 in the Fortune 500.202 As such, the 
company is a predominant supplier of financial services for those in the academic, 
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governmental, medical, and cultural sectors. TIAA-CREF presently manages $542 
billion worth of assets for 4.8 million individuals, of which 3.9 million participants 
are in institutional retirement plans.203  
In addition to its size and client-base, the financial organization prides itself on 
socially responsible investment (SRI). The company says it began responsible 
investment practices in the 1970s by engaging with companies on social issues. In a 
historical slideshow on the website, the organization boasts: 
 
“TIAA-CREF was one of the first institutional investors to engage with 
portfolio companies on social responsibility issues, including 
automotive safety, pollution control, and apartheid policies in South 
Africa. We continue to champion responsible investing and strong 
corporate citizenship.”204 
 
 
In 2004, TIAA-CREF began an advertising campaign with the slogan “Financial 
Services for the Greater Good.” The campaign included national and local television, 
newspaper, magazine, and radio ads with a debut television ad during the opening 
ceremonies of the 2004 summer Olympics – the company’s first time it had advertised 
on national television. According to TIAA-CREF executive vice president Steven 
Goldstein, "TIAA-CREF is a model financial service company with an impeccable 
reputation and great financial strength – that’s a story worth telling."205 The motto 
was also featured prominently on the company’s website and became part of its 
official logo. It was this slogan that the We Divest campaign initially chose to focus 
on in pressuring the financial services organization to live up to its motto by divesting 
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128 
 
 
from companies that profit from Israel’s violations of human rights and other forms of 
international law. 
 
We Divest Campaign Background  
 
 
The We Divest campaign is a divestment initiative of the BDS movement that was 
built on the research of Adalah-NY: The New York Campaign for the Boycott of 
Israel. In 2009, Adalah-NY determined that TIAA-CREF had investments in Africa-
Israel, a company owned by Lev Leviev, a major developer of Israeli settlements and 
target of an already existing boycott campaign of the group. The following year, JVP 
launched the We Divest campaign by delivering a petition to TIAA-CREF. Over 250 
TIAA-CREF participants and supporters that included professors, doctors, authors, 
rabbis, and others signed the petition. The petition asked the company to divest from 
businesses that:  
 
1. Directly profit from or contribute to the Israeli occupation of the Gaza 
strip and the West Bank, including east Jerusalem. 
2. Provide products or services that contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of Israeli settlements and/or the separation Wall, both of 
which are illegal under international law. 
3. Provide products or services that contribute to or enable violent acts 
that target civilians 206  
 
 
The overall aim of the We Divest campaign as set out in its initial petition is to 
pressure TIAA-CREF to divest from companies that profit from Israel’s violations of 
human rights and other forms of international law. The petition illustrated how several 
companies that TIAA-CREF invests in are involved in activities related to Israel’s 
separation wall or its Jewish-only settlements in the West Bank, and identified 
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businesses that TIAA-CREF should divest from based on these violations of 
international law. The original petition to the company listed five examples of 
companies along with reasons for their listing.  
The businesses named were Caterpillar, Veolia, Northrop Grumman, Elbit, 
and Motorola. In the petition, the groups stated that Caterpillar supplies armored 
bulldozers used in the destruction of Palestinian homes and uprooting of Palestinian 
orchards. Veolia operates a landfill in the West Bank for Jewish-only settlement 
refuse and takes part in a light rail system that connects illegal Israeli settlements with 
Jerusalem. Northrop Grumman supplies parts for Apache helicopters and F-16 jets 
that were used against civilians in the Gaza Strip during Israel’s assault in 2008-09, 
and Elbit provides surveillance equipment for Israel’s wall. Motorola provides 
surveillance equipment used in Israeli settlements, checkpoints, and bases in the West 
bank, and provides communication systems for the IDF and Israeli settlers. The 
campaign says that investments in these companies by TIAA-CREF “implicate the 
retirement fund in Israel’s systematic violation of Palestinian rights.”207 
The We Divest campaign pressures TIAA-CREF to stop investing in 
companies the group has identified as profiting from Israel’s colonization and 
occupation. The campaign has chosen to focus on TIAA-CREF for a number of 
reasons. The campaign says that the company prides itself on its commitment to SRI, 
yet its invests in companies that violate human rights standards and international law. 
The We Divest campaign says it wants to hold TIAA-CREF accountable to its stated 
interest in pursuing SRI, and that it is more likely to bend to pressure when the 
demands come from clients or participant institutions than the general public. Because 
of the financial services organization’s involvement in ethical investment, they are 
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likely to be more susceptible to pressure than corporations that have no inclination in 
pursuing SRI. 208 
The size of the financial organization also appears to be a major consideration 
for the campaign. TIAA-CREF has clients throughout the US, especially within most 
universities and colleges, and the company has offices in 60 US cities. As a very large 
financial services organization, divestment would set a precedent. According to the 
campaign, “[TIAA-CREF’s] divestment from the Israeli occupation would send a 
powerful signal to other companies violating international laws by abetting the 
occupation.”209 In addition, because TIAA-CREF involves a substantial amount of 
people throughout the country, the campaign has the potential to raise awareness of 
the campaign and recruit significant support around the country. In addition, the size 
and geographic span of the corporation makes possible a national We Divest 
campaign that is networked through the development and collaboration of local 
community-based campaigns. Similar to most initiatives of the BDS movement, the 
We Divest campaign is decentralized in that activists organize the campaign at the 
local level.  
Targeting TIAA-CREF is also significant because many of these companies 
tracked for divestment are chosen as targets for other BDS campaigns. Campaigns 
against Veolia for example, are widespread in the US and other countries. In Sweden, 
BDS activists in the group Diakonia and other groups pressured the Stockholm 
community council, who subsequently announced in early 2009 that it would not 
renew their contract with Veolia worth $4.5 billion. Veolia had operated the subway 
for the Stockholm County for the previous ten years.210 At the same time in the West 
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Midlands in the England, BDS activists launched the “Sandwell Bin Veolia 
Campaign” against Veolia’s bid for a waste improvement plan. In March 2009, the 
Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council announced that it would not consider Veolia 
for the contract, which was worth $1.5 billion over 20 years.211 In Ireland, activists 
called on city councils to adopt a motion refusing to renew contracts with Veolia and 
to date, Sligo County, Galway City and Dublin City have agreed.212 That same year 
the French “Faisons dérailler Veolia” campaign successfully fought Veolia’s bid for 
an urban transport network in Bordeaux, a contract worth $1 billion.213  
 
3.2  Groups Involved in the We Divest Campaign  
 
 
The We Divest campaign was spearheaded by JVP, which as stated above, built on 
the research of Adalah-NY regarding TIAA-CREF investments. In 2011, We Divest 
transitioned from being a campaign of JVP to a coalition-based initiative. The main 
groups that comprise the coalition form the national Coordinating Committee (CC). In 
addition to JVP, the CC contains Adalah-NY, the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC), US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, Grassroots 
International, and the US Palestinian Community Network (USPCN). In addition to 
the CC, the We Divest Campaign is currently endorsed by over 70 groups and 
organizations, mostly in the US. These organizations include (but are not limited to) 
local BDS groups in the US, a number of university-based SJP chapters, several 
Christian related organizations, a number of Jewish-American peace and justice 
groups, and the Palestinian BNC.   
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All the groups involved in the We Divest Campaign are organizations that 
work on peace and justice issues. Some of the groups only work on these issues 
within the context of Israel/Palestine, while others are engaged in a wide-variety of 
work around the world. In this section, I briefly outline the basic composition of 
organizations in the national CC of the We Divest campaign to present an overview of 
the kinds of groups involved in the divestment initiative.   
The organization that originally launched the We Divest campaign – JVP – is 
a Jewish-American peace and justice organization that works on challenging Israel’s 
occupation of the Palestinian territories and US support for its occupation. The group 
was established in 1996 in response to the opening of an archeological dig site under 
Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif that caused fatal confrontations between 
Israelis and Palestinians. JVP’s activities include demonstrations, educational 
activities, and cultural events to end Israel’s occupation, advance human rights, and 
change US policies in the Middle East. The group has offices in California and New 
York, 25 local chapters throughout the US, a small paid staff, a Rabbinical Council, 
and an Advisory Board with influential Jewish figures such as Noam Chomsky, Udi 
Aloni, Judith Butler, Avi Shlaim, and the late Howard Zinn. According to the group, 
it is the only major national Jewish organization that works towards equal rights of 
Israelis and Palestinians as the basis for its activism.214  
Adalah-NY, the group that originally learned of the financial ties between 
TIAA-CREF and companies involved in Israel’s occupation, identifies itself as “a 
local, grassroots, non-hierarchical volunteer-only group of concerned individuals that 
advocates for justice, equality, and human rights for the Palestinian people…”215 As 
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the group’s name indicates, it is only active in the New York area. Similar to other 
Palestine solidarity groups that engage in BDS activities, the group states that it 
“organizes in support of the 2005 call by Palestinian civil society organizations” and 
will protest Israel’s policies and actions until it respects international law and 
Palestinian human rights. Although BDS is a major priority of the group it also 
engages in demonstrations and educational activities that have focused on Israel’s 
attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, the US and Israeli walls with Mexico and Palestine, 
and Palestinian citizens’ rights in Israel. Adalah-NY collaborates with other groups on 
Israeli Apartheid Week, Nakba commemoration events, anti-Iraq war activities, and 
immigrant rights protests.216    
The US Campaign to End the Occupation also works on the We Divest 
campaign. It is a coalition organization that presently includes more than 400 
Palestine solidarity groups in the US, and exclusively “works to end US support for 
Israel’s occupation.” The group supports "a US policy that upholds freedom, justice, 
and equality.”217 Although BDS campaigns are a major component of the work of the 
US Campaign to End the Occupation, the organization also works on a number of 
other Palestine solidarity related activities such Nakba commemoration activities and 
challenging US policy through congressional advocacy. The organization provides a 
wealth of research, information, and educational materials for supporting BDS and 
other Palestine-related campaigns on its website.  
Another group that is part of We Divest is the USPCN, a US-based network of 
Palestinians in the diaspora. According to the group, it aims to strengthen the voice of 
Palestinians in the US to “affirm the right of Palestinians in the Shatat (exile) to 
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participate fully in shaping our joint destiny.” The organization has a few chapters in 
communities around the US. The three objectives of the USPCN stated on their 
website are nearly identical to the three demands outlined in the global Palestinian 
call for boycott in 2005.  
The AFSC is a Quaker organization that was established in 1917 during World 
War I and is also on the We Divest CC. At the time, AFSC provided a way for 
American conscientious objectors to serve their county without joining the military or 
participating in the violence of war. To this day, the AFSC places great emphasis on 
finding nonviolent alternatives to fighting injustice through development, service, and 
peace projects.218 Prior to and during World War II, the AFSC became experienced in 
providing assistance to refugees and other displaced persons. Due in part to this 
background, the UN requested in 1948 that the AFSC assist in providing relief to 
Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. Since that time, AFSC has been active in 
Israel/Palestine, with a focus on peace-building and humanitarian assistance.   
Finally, Grassroots International takes part in the We Divest campaign. It is a 
human rights and development organization that works in various locations around 
the world. Partnering with local organizations on projects in nearly 20 countries, 
Grassroots International works on “community-led, sustainable development projects” 
around issues such as food sovereignty, climate justice, and movement building. The 
organization aims to “speak out in support of global justice” by supporting political 
struggles that work toward securing human rights.   
The groups that are involved in the We Divest Campaign in particular, and the 
BDS movement more generally, have done so for various, although similar, reasons. 
According to the We Divest campaign, 
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“BDS is a form of economic activism which is premised on the idea that 
violations of Palestinians’ rights result not only from Israeli government 
policies and actions, but also from corporate and institutional policies 
and actions that support and sustain Israel’s occupation and violations 
of human rights and international law.”219 
 
 
In another statement on its website, the group says that the various BDS campaigns 
around the world are connected with each other through “their common goal of 
ending corporate and institutional complicity” with Israel’s violations of human rights 
and other forms of international law.220 
The AFSC officially endorsed the We Divest campaign in 2010, although it 
had been involved in BDS activities prior to that time. 221 For example, in March 
2008, the Board of the AFSC approved screening investments relating to 
Israel/Palestine. According to the Board,  
 
“Investments should not be made in any company that provides products 
or services, including financial services, to Israeli governmental or 
military bodies that are used to facilitate or undertake violent acts against 
civilians or violations of international law, or to Israeli or Palestinian 
organizations or groups that are used to facilitate or undertake violent 
acts against civilians or violations of international law.”222 
 
 
The investment screen approved by the Board supplements the AFSC “Social 
Investment Policy and Guidelines,” which avoids among others, AFSC investment in 
businesses that manufacture weapons, tobacco, or contribute to environmental 
degradation. Shortly after the Board approved the screen for investments in 
Israel/Palestine, a committee created a plan for implementation and a “No-Buy List” 
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of 29 companies. All the companies listed in the original We Divest petition to TIAA-
CREF were listed on AFSC’s Investment Screen No-Buy List.223 
Congruent with its history, the AFSC says, “Our support for the use of 
boycotts and divestments is contextualized by Quakers and AFSC's long support for 
boycotts, divestment, and sanctions as economic tactics that appeal to human 
conscience and change behavior."224 Citing numerous examples, the AFSC points to 
the use of these tactics in the Free Produce Movement of the 1800s, which boycotted 
goods using slave labor – to more recent boycott campaigns regarding civil rights, 
anti-apartheid, farm workers, and prison rights.  
Although Grassroots International does not provide specific reasons for its 
involvement in the BDS movement, its network of partners on the ground in the 
occupied Palestinian territories along with the issues it focuses on make its 
participation explicable. Nearly all of Grassroots International partnering 
organizations in the occupied Palestinian territories are signatories to the global call 
for boycott in 2005 by Palestinian organizations. This includes the Palestinian 
Agricultural Relief Committees, the Palestinian Medical Relief Society, Stop the Wall 
Campaign, and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC). In 2012, 
partial financial support from Grassroots International for the Stop the Wall 
Campaign and UAWC included a travel grant for activists to participate in the World 
Social Forum – Free Palestine gathering in Brazil, of which expanding the BDS 
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movement was one of the main agenda items.225 In addition to local partners that 
support the BDS movement, Grassroots International is known for focusing on issues 
such as defending human rights and developing the capacity of social movements 
around the world. Within the context of Israel/Palestine, the organization states that 
by “working with allies and partners we facilitate international linkages to support and 
amplify the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and peace with justice.”226 
With respect to the We Divest campaign, Grassroots International has specific 
information on its website requesting TIAA-CREF to divest from Elbit Systems. The 
webpage, “The Wall, Elbit and TIAA-CREF: Barriers to Resource Rights in 
Palestine,” contains a fact-sheet on the relationship between TIAA-CREF, Elbit, and 
Israel’s separation wall. The page also has a FAQ document regarding the relationship 
and web links with updates on the campaign and stories from local partner 
organizations regarding the wall. Grassroots International asks TIAA-CREF clients to 
add their name to the “Call to Action” that requests the financial services organization 
divests from Elbit, and calls on non-TIAA-CREF participants to sign a different 
petition making the same request. To date, the call to action has 1,129 client 
signatures and the petition has 5,462 signatures of general supporters.  
 
3.3  Organizational Dynamics of the We Divest Campaign  
 
 
In general, the campaign says it “…organizes retirement fund recipients to exercise 
their rights as shareholders and pressure TIAA-CREF...”227 As the target of the 
campaign is TIAA-CREF, not its clients, the campaign does not ask clients to move 
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their retirement funds. Rather the campaign wants to educate and mobilize TIAA-
CREF participants at the local level for a national campaign against the pension 
funds’ investments in companies that are involved in Israel’s activities in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. This is operationalized at the national and local levels in 
various ways.  
At the national level, work is organized by the CC, whose members are 
described above, and working groups. The CC meets in-person twice a year to 
strategize the campaign. According to the We Divest campaign, the CC utilizes 
“consensus-based decision making.” The working groups comprise members of the 
CC and their supporters, and include local organizing, campus organizing, socially 
responsible investment, shareholder activism, outreach, and media.  
The campaign was initiated by TIAA-CREF clients signing a petition that 
requested the retirement fund divest from companies that profit from Israel’s 
violations of international law.228 The campaign was officially launched when the 
petition was then delivered to TIAA-CREF headquarters in New York in 2010. The 
following year, nearly 20 TIAA-CREF participants submitted a shareholder resolution 
asking the financial services organization to engage with companies in which 
investments are held and that profit from Israel’s occupation. TIAA-CREF requested 
permission from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to exclude the 
resolution from its annual shareholder meeting without consequences from the SEC, 
which was allowed.229 In June, the We Divest campaign held a national call-in day in 
which participants and supporters contacted TIAA-CREF to denounce investments 
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held in companies that profit from Israel’s occupation and voice their displeasure at 
the withholding of the shareholder’s resolution regarding these investments submitted 
the month prior.230 Those that participated were then asked to take their message to 
social media sites by posting a status on Facebook stating, “just told @tiaa-cref they 
can’t silence Occupation” or tweeting “just told @tc_talks they can’t silence 
Occupation #tiaa-cref #wedivest_callday.” The group also provided an image stating, 
“Why is TIAA-CREF censoring you?” that supporters could use for their Facebook 
profile picture.231  
The following month, We Divest organized a flashmob in New York’s Times 
Square to draw attention to the shareholder resolution being ignored by TIAA-CREF, 
and the companies involved in Israel’s occupation. Dressed in costumes of 
professions of TIAA-CREF investors, a group of activists sang and danced to the tune 
of the Village People’s YMCA with substituted lyrics.232       
 
Verse       Chorus   
   
T-CREF     It’s time to divest, T-I-A-CREF 
Are you listening to me? I said  It's time to divest, T-I-A-CREF 
T-CREF     You got to pull all your funds 
Who do you want to be?   From the corporations 
I said T-CREF     Profiting from occupation 
 Invest responsibly    Of Palestine. T-I-A-CREF233 
So Palestine can be free 
 
       
On 19 July, protests were held outside the TIAA-CREF annual meeting held in 
Charlotte, North Carolina, along with demonstrations in cities across the US. Activists 
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held signs, handed out flyers, encouraged passerby to sign the We Divest petition, and 
tweeted throughout the day using the hashtag #tcdivest.234 Shareholders and proxies 
also raised the issue of divestment within the annual meeting. Following the 
demonstrations in 2011, the TIAA-CREF shareholder meeting would be the occasion 
for a national day of action each year. 
Similar to the year before, the national day of action in 2012 included TIAA-
CREF investors confronting trustees of the financial services organization inside the 
meeting and protests outside local TIAA-CREF offices in major US cities across the 
US.235 In 2013, campaigners again took to the boardroom and streets in over 12 cities 
during the annual shareholder meeting. Activist sang and performed street theater, 
handed out flyers, and encouraged individuals to sign the We Divest petition. As was 
the case in 2011, TIAA-CREF investors submitted a shareholder resolution regarding 
investments held in companies that profit from Israel’s occupation, and again the 
corporation asked the SEC for permission to disregard the measure, which the federal 
regulator granted.236 This is discussed more in the section below on interactions 
between We Divest activists and opponents of the campaign.  
At the local level, the campaign is organized in various ways. “Context 
sensitivity” – the notion that local people “know best how to apply BDS most 
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effectively in their particular circumstances...” is a priority of the BDS movement, and 
this is evident in the organizational dynamics of the We Divest campaign.237 The 
campaign touts that it is “flexible” and that there are numerous ways that activists can 
participate in the campaign.238 The campaign suggests several examples. For instance, 
organizing at a university could include encouraging faculty to pass a resolution on 
the matter, having the student body take a stand, or organizing a department around a 
statement. Local campaigns could also focus on organizing TIAA-CREF participants 
in Churches, hospitals, or NGOs to request investment options that do not include 
violating human rights and other forms of international law. Local campaigns could 
also focus on one of the companies identified as profiting from Israel’s occupation 
(Caterpillar, Veolia, SodaStream, etc.).  
One of the main forms of organizing at the local level is by reaching out to 
TIAA-CREF clients in that area, educating them about the retirement funds 
investments in particular companies that the campaign has identified as violating 
international law and human rights in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and persuading 
them to take action in various forms. This could be as minimal as signing the TIAA-
CREF petition available on the We Divest website or meeting with a representative of 
the financial services organization at one of the local offices to discuss investment 
concerns. Another activity at the local level is raising educational awareness of the 
issues: TIAA-CREF investments in companies that profit from Israeli activities in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, the BDS movement, and the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict overall. In doing this activists hope to influence the discourse on the conflict, 
garner support for the movement, and mobilize participants.   
Closely connected with its local chapters, JVP says that it has issued 
guidelines for engaging in BDS campaigns at the local level. The Boston chapter of 
JVP supports the national We Divest campaign in a variety of ways. For instance, 
they organize a local protest on the national day of action, usually in front of a TIAA-
CREF local office. Last year, the group organized a flashmob as part of its protest of 
the retirement fund. In the video, a group of approximately 20 activists donning black 
t-shirts with the We Divest logo sang and danced to the tune of Taylor Swift's song, 
"Trouble" with alternative lyrics. The video was later uploaded to YouTube and the 
group’s website. In addition to participating in the National Day of Action, JVP 
Boston says that is also conducts research on SRI, mobilizes TIAA-CREF participants 
and client institutions, and collaborates with local branches of AFSC, Grassroots 
International, and SJP to strengthen the We Divest campaign in the Boston area.   
 
3.4  Significance of the We Divest Case  
 
 
The case of the We Divest campaign is significant for a number of reasons. The first 
is that the campaign has claimed a number of victories, which serves the movement 
particularly well for purposes of mobilizing participants and gaining support. 
Although the first accomplishment took place before the official inception of the We 
Divest campaign, it is still important in that it helped set a precedent for the campaign. 
In 2009 Adalah-NY sent a letter to TIAA-CREF that was signed by approximately 50 
clients, and asked the financial services organization to divest from Africa-Israel, a 
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company involved in the construction of Israeli settlements.239 The Israeli company 
announced earlier in the year that it could not meet the liabilities of bondholders and 
was suffering from financial crisis. TIAA-CREF confirmed in 2009 that it had 
removed the company from its investment portfolios after it had fallen out of the 
MSCI Emerging Markets Index.240 Although the letter from Adalah-NY and the 
divestment from Africa-Israel were likely coincidental in their timing, it provided 
incentive to pursue a campaign against TIAA-CREF for divestment from other 
companies that support Israel’s occupation.      
Several years later in June 2012, after the We Divest campaign had formalized 
into its present coalition-based group, TIAA-CREF removed Caterpillar from its 
Social Choice Fund, a divestment worth $72 million. This occurred when the 
company was removed from MSCI ESG indexes that TIAA-CREF uses in 
determining which companies are suitable for investment among their social choice 
products. MSCI said the company’s status had been downgraded for a number of 
reasons including environmental concerns, employee safety issues, a plant closure in 
Canada, and "an ongoing controversy associated with use of the company's equipment 
in the occupied Palestinian territories."241  
TIAA-CREF attempted to avoid publicizing the issue by saying “the only 
reason that (Caterpillar) came off our list was because it came off MSCI’s index.”242 
However, this disregards the larger context in which the company was initially 
removed from the indexes that includes the company’s association with the Israeli 
                                                 
239 Emma L. Carew, “Updated: Professors Urge TIAA-CREF to Divest from Company Involved in 
West Bank Settlements,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 11 September 2009; 
https://chronicle.com/article/Professors-Urge-TIAA-CREF-to/48381/.   
240 TIAA-CREF, “Statement About Former Holding in Africa-Israel Investments Ltd.,” 14 September 
2009; http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/about/news/gen0909_185.html.  
241 Blake Sobczak, “Caterpillar Pulled from Social Indexes,” Business Week, 27 June 2012; 
www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-06-27/caterpillar-pulled-from-social-indexes.  
242 Ibid.  
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military and the use of its products in the Palestinian territories. In this way, the 
campaign has contributed to an environment in which the company’s activities are 
scrutinized, particularly among those interested in socially responsible investment.  
Directly inserting the BDS movement into the ideas and concepts of global 
justice, Rabbi Alissa Wise, the Director of campaigns at JVP and National 
Coordinator of the We Divest Campaign stated in response to TIAA-CREF’s 
divestment from Caterpillar, “We’re glad to see the socially responsible investment 
community appears to be recognizing this and is starting to take appropriate 
action.”243 Rebecca Vilkomerson, the JVP spokesperson, also stated that because of 
activism of this nature there is a “consensus in the human rights community” on 
Caterpillar’s violations of Palestinian human rights.  
The We Divest campaign is also the largest BDS divestment campaign in the 
US. The organization is currently endorsed by 71 organizations and is also the largest 
in terms of groups and organizations that compose the campaign. 244 At the national 
level, the coalition-based CC is comprised of some very large organizations such as 
the US Campaign to the End the Occupation, which itself is a coalition organization 
that currently comprises over 400 Palestine solidarity groups in the US. The CC also 
contains the AFSC and Grassroots International, both of which include thousands of 
people and have connections across the globe through their other programs. This 
means that the We Divest campaign potentially has thousands of participants at its 
disposal, considering only those linked to the campaign through member groups.  
                                                 
243 We Divest, “Caterpillar Removed from TIAA-CREF’s Social Choice Funds: Victory for Pro-
Divestment Advocates,” 21 June 2012; https://wedivest.org/post/207/caterpillar-removed-tiaa-cref-
social-choice-funds#.Uwmt9_mSxhg.  
244 Ibid, “Endorsing Organizations,” https://wedivest.org/endorsing-orgs.  
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The significance of the We Divest case, in part, also derives from the 
endorsement of the Palestinian BNC. The national committee has formally signed 
onto the campaign as one of over 70 groups that have endorsed the campaign, and  the 
BNC Secretariat published an official statement in support of the campaign on 4 
October 2010. 245 Similar to the original We Divest petition sent to TIAA-CREF, the 
statement by the Secretariat referred to the financial services motto (at the time) and 
asked the company to live up to “providing ‘financial services for the greater 
good’”246 Similar to the campaign’s original petition as well the BNC’s statement 
listed the companies designated as targets for the campaign (Caterpillar, Veolia, Elbit, 
Motorola, Northrop Grumman), along with a brief explanation. The BNC Secretariat 
stated that it urged “all groups working on boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) 
campaigns in the U.S., especially on university campuses, to endorse this campaign 
and join it, whenever possible, to amplify its reach and impact across the U.S.”247  
 
3.5  Dynamics Between We Divest Campaigners and Opponents  
 
 
As is the case with all social movements, there is a dynamic interaction between 
challengers and opponents in the development of the movement. In this particular 
divestment campaign, the target (TIAA-CREF) has sought to circumvent the efforts of 
the We Divest campaign by avoiding divestment-related shareholder resolutions 
submitted by campaigners. TIAA-CREF has also been the target of anti-BDS 
organizations such as Shurat HaDin (Israel Law Center), whom threatened legal 
                                                 
245 Ibid and BNC, “TIAA-CREF: Divest from Injustice,” 4 October 2010; 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/2010/tiaa-cref-divest-injustuce-4761.  
246 Ibid (BNC).   
247 Ibid.  
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action against TIAA-CREF should it consider the shareholder resolutions submitted 
by We Divest activists.  
As briefly mentioned earlier, TIAA-CREF participants that are part of the We 
Divest campaign filed shareholder resolutions in 2011 and 2013. In 2011, nearly 20 
TIAA-CREF investors that are part of the We Divest campaign filed a resolution to be 
considered by shareholders at the annual meeting. The measure requested that the 
financial services organization engage with companies such as Caterpillar, Veolia, 
and Elbit that profit from Israel’s occupation, and consider divestment if there is no 
commitment from the companies to cooperate by the time of TIAA-CREF’S annual 
meeting the following year. TIAA-CREF sent a letter to the SEC requesting that no 
enforcement action be taken by the federal regulator should the resolution be excluded 
from its annual shareholder meeting.  
In its request to the SEC, TIAA-CREF argued that the divestment-related 
resolution was excludable because it interfered with ordinary businesses operations 
and attempted to “micromanage” the investment decisions of the corporation. It also 
claimed that the essential objectives of the proposal were already implemented, and 
finally, that the resolution made statements that were misleading and asked 
shareholders to take a position on “a complex, controversial geopolitical dispute,” and 
attempted to make the annual meeting a “forum for debate on Middle East politics.”248 
A lawyer representing the We Divest participants sent a letter to the SEC refuting all 
the claims of TIAA-CREF and asked the Commission to deny the no-action request. 
However, in May of that year, the SEC confirmed to TIAA-CREF that it would not 
recommend enforcement action based on its first claim that the resolution interfered 
                                                 
248 SEC, “TIAA-CREF Initial Submission,” 22 March 2011, 8-9; 
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2011/cref-levitt050611-14a8-incoming1.pdf. 
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with ordinary business operations and therefore it was not necessary to address the 
other claims proffered by the financial services organization.      
We Divest activists again submitted shareholder resolutions two years later, 
this time on behalf of approximately 200 investors. In March, TIAA-CREF once 
again requested that enforcement action by the SEC not be taken if the proposal were 
omitted from that year’s annual meeting. The following month, lawyers from the 
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), who legally assisted the We Divest campaign, 
submitted an extensive 34-page rebuttal of TIAA-CREF’s claims to the SEC.  
Shortly thereafter, the corporation sent a letter to the SEC that responded to 
the campaigners’ rebuttal and also submitted another letter to the federal regulator 
informing them that they had received a letter from Shurat HaDin – an Israeli legal 
organization that in part aims to prevent BDS activities – threatening legal action 
against TIAA-CREF should the shareholder proposal be considered. The letter from 
the Israel Law Center referred to the shareholder proposal as a “racist resolution” that 
is sponsored by “activists that seek to harm and discriminate against Jewish people 
and inflict violence against the state of Israel,” and quotes the Anti-Defamation 
League in stating, “BDS is anti-Semitic.” Referring to We Divest investors as “BDS 
operatives” the letter further asserts that the BDS movement is a “clear extension of 
the historic and continuing Arab boycott” and “BDS’s demands are fairly clearly 
made on behalf of [Arab] boycotting countries.” The letter also claimed that the 
proposed shareholder resolution violated numerous New York state laws and “might 
be” in violation of US federal law. The letter concluded with the threat of legal action 
should the shareholder resolution be considered.249  
                                                 
249 Shurat HaDin, “Letter to TIAA-CREF,” 10 April 2013; http://israellawcenter.org/wp-
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The NLG lawyers on behalf of the We Divest TIAA-CREF investors again 
sent a letter to the SEC responding to the letters submitted by the corporation. The 
legal team argued that the threat of third party litigation was not recognized in SEC 
rules as a justification for exclusion of a shareholder proposal. The letter further 
outlined how the Shurat HaDin letter to TIAA-CREF sought to infringe on the First 
Amendment rights of TIAA-CREF participants by attempting to outlaw criticism of 
Israel and silence critics. Moreover, the letter questioned how any New York state 
laws were being violated in the state, and implied that Shurat HaDin itself found the 
claim of federal law violations unsound by the phrasing in its letter. TIAA-CREF and 
the NLG lawyers sent several more letters to the SEC arguing their legal positions. 
The SEC did not get involved in the issue or contents of the Shurat HaDin letter sent 
to TIAA-CREF or the rebuttal by the We Divest lawyers. In May of 2013, the SEC 
sent confirmation to TIAA-CREF that enforcement action would once again not be 
taken against the corporation for omitting the shareholder resolution on grounds that it 
had done so in 2011 and the same criteria of interfering with ordinary business 
operations still applied. Despite this conclusion last year, it is highly likely that based 
on their previous activities We Divest campaigners will continue to submit 
shareholder resolutions in the future, and will develop ways to respond to or work 
around the SEC rules that permit the omission of their resolutions and the efforts of 
anti-BDS organizations such as Shurat HaDin.   
 
3.6  Analyzing the Case of the We Divest Campaign 
 
 
As is the case with the academic boycott in Britain, the We Divest campaign 
illuminates aspects of the BDS movement’s organizational form. In this respect, the 
We Divest campaign is decentralized with characteristics of horizontal and vertical 
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organizing. According to the campaign, “We Divest is a national campaign with 
global reach, but its strength comes from local organizing.”250 Vertically, the structure 
of campaign is national in that it is a coalition-based organization of coordinating 
members from around the US, with priorities and strategies largely set at the national 
level through the CC. Communicating these objectives and information about the 
campaign down to the local level occurs through networks using various means of 
communication such as email, listservs, Facebook, Twitter, and the We Divest 
website.  
The We Divest website is a central channel for spreading information about 
the campaign; it is the location where groups can endorse the campaign and 
supporters can sign the petition asking TIAA-CREF to divest from companies that 
violate human rights principles and international law. It contains the most updated 
information on the campaign and also highlights the successes of other BDS 
campaigns that have similar corporate targets. The national campaign provides 
resources and toolkits for starting local campaigns and facilitates “opportunities to 
network between campaigners.”251 The website has a widget that activists can use to 
find groups with We Divest related campaigns in their area.252 
Despite the national structure of the We Divest campaign, the initiative is 
largely decentralized and horizontal in that it is comprised of local campaigns across 
the country. Local groups determine how local campaigns are organized. They decide 
the goals of the local campaign (e.g. faculty statement), and how to make it relevant 
within the larger We Divest campaign and BDS movement. Local groups form a web 
of activity, that taken together, form a national campaign to pressure TIAA-CREF to 
                                                 
250 We Divest, “Organize Locally,” https://wedivest.org/p/231/local#.UwyPPPmSxhg.  
251 Ibid.  
252 Ibid.  
150 
 
 
divest from companies that profit from violations of international law and human 
rights standards.   
The frames that activists deploy in conceptualizing the We Divest campaign 
are parallel to the frames that other BDS initiatives adopt. The first is that of human 
rights and other forms of international law in constructing a basis and justification for 
action. These themes were written into the original petition to TIAA-CREF organized 
by JVP in 2010, and further reinforced in We Divest statements as shown in 
campaign’s rationale for BDS quoted earlier. Both shareholder resolutions submitted 
to TIAA-CREF on behalf of We Divest investors significantly emphasized human 
rights and international law throughout the short proposals. These themes are also 
prevalent in the work of all members on the We Divest national Coordinating 
Committee and in many of the endorsing organizations of the campaign. The AFSC 
investment screen and the work of Grassroots International discussed earlier are two 
such examples.  
Motivations for participating in the We Divest campaign and the BDS 
movement more generally indicate that issues of corporate complicity with Israel’s 
violations of international law and Palestinian human rights are important for BDS 
participants. Activists in the BDS movement want to draw attention to and target 
corporations that profit from Israel’s human rights abuses and violations of other 
international laws, thereby exposing an underlying system of support and 
maintenance for Israel’s colonization and occupation. By creating bad press through 
negative associations with Israel’s activities, these campaigns hope that individuals 
and institutions will divest from companies that are engaged in these endeavors.  
These frames correspond with other contemporary transnational movements 
working on justice related causes and are analyzed more in chapter six, where I 
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consider the BDS movement in a global justice framework. The We Divest campaign 
embraces ideas of global justice by focusing on issues of socially responsible 
investment, corporate complicity, international law, and principles of human rights, 
which resonates with activists working on issues other than Palestine-related activism. 
As these cross-cutting themes have proliferated, particularly through the development 
of anti-globalization and global justice movements from the late 1990s onward, the 
priorities of the We Divest campaign have interconnecting linkages with ideas that are 
promoted on a wide-range of issues and in other struggles across the globe. From 
sweatshop labor to climate change, corporations are susceptible to public scrutiny of 
profit making at the expense human rights and environmental considerations, among 
others.  
Organizationally as well, the We Divest campaign corresponds to the 
dynamics of other groups and organizations that are involved in issues related to 
global justice. Coalition-building, consensus-based decision-making, and a 
decentralized national campaign through local community-based groups parallels how 
groups working on causes not specific to Palestine are organized. By exploring the 
organizational dynamics of the We Divest campaign, we can see that BDS campaigns 
have similarities to other groups that work on other issues. This opens up possibilities 
for broad-based coalitions in which Palestine is considered among other issues, such 
as the case in a number of Veolia campaigns where labor, resource-privatization, and 
Palestine activism have all intersected and worked together to prevent Veolia 
contracts from going through.253   
 
 
                                                 
253 Charlotte Silver, “Palestine Activists, Labor and Environment Groups in US Unite Against Veolia,” 
The Electronic Intifada, 4 March 2014; http://electronicintifada.net/content/palestine-activists-labor-
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Conclusion  
 
In this case study, I analyzed the We Divest campaign to identify facets of the wider 
BDS movement across borders. As explained in the chapter, the campaign is one of 
the largest divestment initiatives in the BDS movement and targets TIAA-CREF, a 
major provider of retirement funds in the US. The chapter began with an overview of 
the company and the We Divest campaign aimed at its investments. Some of the 
groups involved in the campaign and the organizational dynamics of We Divest were 
then discussed, along with the significance of the case. Following these sections, 
dynamics between We Divest campaigners and opponents were considered, especially 
the actions by the SEC and Shurat HaDin, and the chapter ended with an analysis of 
the case study. In this section, I identified features of the campaign such as its 
organizational structure and collective action frames that are illustrative of the 
movement in general. 
 The We Divest campaign is similar to the academic boycott in Britain that I 
analyzed in the previous chapter in that both initiatives represent how the movement 
is decentralized and uses hybrid forms of organizing that are both vertical and 
horizontal. The campaign in vertical in that priorities and strategies are set at the 
national level and communicated to local community-based campaigns. However, the 
campaign is largely decentralized and horizontal as activists in their own locales 
decide for themselves how to operationalize the campaign in their area. In addition, 
We Divest utilizes collective action frames such as international law, corporate 
complicity, and socially responsible investment, which are the same frames used in 
other BDS campaigns and among other border-crossing movements working on 
justice-related causes. Evidence from this chapter informs part of my analysis in 
chapter six on the BDS movement in a global justice discourse. The rationale assigned 
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in these collective action fames also provides motives for mobilization, and are 
generally similar for participants in the academic boycott in Britain and We Divest 
campaigns. Although there are general similarities in motives between the two BDS 
campaigns analyzed thus far, each campaign illustrates that activists interested in or 
working in a specific sector are more likely to join a campaign around that theme. 
Thus, academics are more likely than people in other professions to join the academic 
boycott of Israel and activists that are TIAA-CREF participants are more inclined to 
join the We Divest campaign. Taken together, this case study provides evidence on 
the movement’s organizational structure and collective action frames, which 
reinforces my argument that the movement is a novel approach to challenging Israel.  
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Chapter 4 – BDS Case Study: Consumer Boycotts of Ahava 
Dead Sea Products  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Consumer or products boycotts in the BDS movement want to eliminate support from 
companies that profit from Israel violating international law and principles of human 
rights. Symbolically, consumer boycotts of Israeli products seek to create bad 
publicity and negative images of corporations that contribute to Israel’s oppressive 
policies and practices towards Palestinians. Economically, consumer boycotts seeks to 
inflict economic damage on Israeli companies or those that do business in Israel. By 
pressuring through boycott, activists try to induce the companies to change their 
behavior and relationship with the state of Israel, thereby indirectly pressuring the 
state to change the status quo.    
In this chapter, I investigate BDS campaigns against Ahava Dead Sea 
Laboratories, an Israeli cosmetics company located in the occupied West Bank, as 
these campaigns have scored several notable successes and take place in a variety of 
locations around the world. First, I outline the background of Ahava and the 
campaigns against the company. I then describe a number of the groups involved in 
consumer boycott activities to illustrate the types of groups involved in these efforts. 
In the section that follows, I summarize various BDS activities against Ahava to 
explain the organizational form and dynamics of the groups involved. Next, I go over 
the significance of the campaigns against the business in the BDS movement and the 
relationship between BDS campaigners and opponents. I conclude the chapter by 
analyzing aspects of consumer boycott campaigns against Ahava that elucidate 
characteristics of the broader BDS movement.  
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The case study indicates that by focusing on a company in an Israeli 
settlement, the BDS initiatives against Ahava draw attention to a range of violations 
of international law. The campaigns use international law as a frame in addition to 
that of corporate complicity, which as is the case in other campaigns such as We 
Divest in the previous chapter, activists use as a rationale for boycott and to gain 
support for the campaign and the border-crossing movement. The frames utilized in 
BDS campaigns against Ahava are also similar to collective action frames used in 
other forms of activism related to global justice. Based in part on evidence from this 
chapter, this is discussed more in chapter six where I analyze the BDS movement in a 
global justice framework. Therefore, this case study contributes to my argument that 
the BDS movement represents a new and different way of challenging Israel by 
presenting information on the movement’s scope and collective action frames.  
  
4.1  Background of Ahava and BDS Campaigns against Ahava  
 
 
Ahava Background  
 
 
Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories is an Israeli skincare and cosmetics company that uses 
Dead Sea minerals and mud in its products. The company was established in 1988 and 
is currently a global brand that started exporting its products abroad in 1992, and 
today has a presence in over 30 countries. The company’s headquarters are in Holon, 
Israel; however, its production factory and its visitor’s center, which opened the same 
year the company was created, are located in Mitzpe Shalem, an Israeli settlement in 
the occupied West Bank. The settlement lies on the northwest shore of the Dead Sea 
and is located approximately six miles north of the Green Line. Two of Israel’s 
settlements in the West Bank own shares in the company – Mitzpe Shalem, where the 
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visitor’s center and production facility are located, and Kalia. Other shareholders in 
Ahava include Hamashbir Holdings and Shamrock Holdings.  
Marketing its products to conscientious consumers who are interested in more 
natural products,  Ahava reformulated its brand in 2009 to be more “skin friendly” 
and started advertising that their products are “paraben free, sls/sels free, allergy 
tested, approved for sensitive skin, not tested on animals, and produced without 
petroleum, harsh synthetic ingredients, or GMOs.”254 According to the company, it is 
committed to the environment and has worked to preserve environmental stability in 
the area. In doing this Ahava says that its water cleaning process is “used for local 
irrigation and to support a popular nearby park” in a Jewish-Israeli settlement.255 The 
company asserts that it wants “to keep the Dead Sea region as it is, for the future and 
for our children,” and is active in raising educational awareness about the ecological 
risks to the region by teaching children about the importance of sustainability.256  
In addition to its environmental and skin-friendly branding, Ahava boasts that 
it invests heavily in research and development. The company does this by actively 
engaging in studying the therapeutic effects of Dead Sea minerals in a range of 
technologies such as nanotechnology, human genome research, and biotechnology.257 
According to Ahava, its scientists and researchers work with “leading scientific 
centers in Israel and Europe” to conduct this research.258 
Ahava has been the target of several boycott campaigns because of its location 
and use of natural resources in occupied territory. The groups or individuals that focus 
                                                 
254 Ahava, “Our Ingredients,” www.ahavaus.com/discover-ahava/our-ingredients.   
255 Ibid, “Reducing the Impact of Beauty: Ahava’s Innovative Water Return Process,” 
www.ahava.com/discover-ahava/ahava-gives-back/ahava-loves-water/.  
256 Ibid, “Ahava Loves Education,” www.ahava.com/discover-ahava/ahava-gives-back/ahava-loves-
education/.  
257 Ibid, “Research and Development,” www.ahava.com/discover-ahava/rd.  
258 Ibid. 
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on boycotting Ahava products do so for three main reasons. The first is that the 
company’s production faculty, visitor’s center, and a portion of the company is owned 
by Mitzpe Shalem, an Israeli settlement, which are considered illegal under 
international law. The second focus for activists is that Ahava products have often 
been mislabeled as “Made in Israel,” when the products are made in an Israeli 
settlement in the occupied West Bank. Lastly, activists want to illuminate the 
exploitation that the company engages in to proliferate Israeli settlements in occupied 
Palestinian territory. The company exploits the natural resources of the region for its 
own profit and for its own objectives, while preventing Palestinians from accessing 
natural assets in the territories for the development of a Palestinian economy. Similar 
to other boycott and divestment initiatives in the BDS movement, the campaigns 
against Ahava seek to raise awareness and educate consumers about the company’s 
violations of international law, thereby pressuring the company to end its illegal and 
exploitative practices 
 
Background of Campaigns against Ahava  
 
 
Campaigns focus on a range of issues that are raised by the existence of the company 
in an Israeli settlement in the West Bank – its location, mislabeling, and exploitation 
described in the previous paragraph. In focusing on these issues, activists hope to shed 
light on aspects of Israel’s larger system of colonial control. By focusing on the 
presence of Israel’s illegal settlements, its settlement industries and economy, the lack 
of Palestinian access to resources in these areas, the prevention of Palestinian 
economic development, and environmental issues of the area in which Palestinians 
have no say illustrates structures and processes whereby Israel violates international 
laws and Palestinian rights. Codepink, a US woman’s initiated peace and social 
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justice group, established its “Stolen Beauty” boycott campaign in 2009 to raise 
awareness about the company and the ways that corporations such as Ahava profit 
from Israel’s military occupation. The campaign was formally launched with a 
demonstration of “bikini-clad” activists holding signs and chanting at Ahava’s booth 
at the Cosmoprof conference in Las Vegas, a major trade show held by the beauty 
industry each year.259 The formal launch of the campaign followed three 
demonstrations by the “Bikini Brigade” that took place in Tel Aviv and New York, 
and a fact-finding delegation to the Mitzpe Shalem settlement. According to the 
campaign: 
  
“ ‘Stolen Beauty’ is Codepink’s contribution to the international 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement against 
institutions and corporations that give tacit or material support to the 
Israel's occupation of the Palestinian Territory, designed to pressure the 
Israeli government to end the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and 
East Jerusalem.”260   
 
 
In the Netherlands, a group of women called “Badjassenbrigade” (Bathrobe Brigade) 
started demonstrating outside Ahava stores, wearing bathrobes, carrying signs, and 
singing in an effort to raise awareness of the company and encourage boycott of their 
products. Inspired by Codepink’s Stolen Beauty campaign, the Bathrobe Brigade 
launched “Gestolen Schoonheid – Mooi Niet!” (Stolen Beauty – Not Nice!) in 
September 2009 and considers itself part of a broader international campaign against 
Ahava. Inspired by their friends in the Netherlands and their use of bathrobes in 
protests, Codepink’s Stolen Beauty campaign then started to adopt a variety of spa 
attire in its demonstrations at Ahava stores.    
 
                                                 
259 Codepink, “Today: Bikini-Clad Activists Protest Ahava Cosmetics at Cosmoprof Trade Show,” 
Common Dreams, 20 July 2009; www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009/07/20-4.  
260 Ibid.   
159 
 
 
4.2  Groups Involved in BDS Campaigns against Ahava 
 
 
There are a number of groups involved in the consumer boycott of Ahava products, 
although most are short-term campaigns organized for specific goals and are ended 
once the objective (e.g. removal of Ahava products from a company’s shelves) has 
been met. Codepink has the largest and most formal campaign against the company. 
Other groups such as the Dutch Badjassenbrigade or the Presbyterian Church (USA) 
have taken part in the consumer boycott of Ahava, but have less formal campaigns 
against the company. In this section, I briefly describe a number of the groups that 
have been or are currently engaged in consumer boycott activities against Ahava to 
provide an overview of the types of groups that have engaged in this form of BDS.  
Codepink is a women’s-led grassroots anti-war organization in the US. The 
group began in 2002, in response to then President Bush’s color-coded terrorist threat 
warnings, and seeks to end US funding for war and militarism through a wide range 
of campaigns. The group boasts 150 chapters across the US and over 150,000 email 
list subscribers. The group says it does not have members and does not “require 
official affiliation to speak, act, or protest” with the group. In addition to 
Israel/Palestine issues, the group has numerous other campaigns including “Peace 
with Iran,” “Bring our War $$ Home,” and “Ground the Drones.” The group uses a 
range of tactics in their campaigns such as protests, direct action, street theater, 
holding educational events such and conferences and workshops, and utilizing social 
media.  
Another group organizing consumer boycotts of Ahava is Open Shuhada 
Street, a South African organization that works for human rights in Israel/Palestine. 
The group was established in 2009 after a delegation of South African activists visited 
Hebron in the West Bank, where the group witnessed the closure of Shuhada street 
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and lack of freedom of movement that Palestinians experience in the city. The group 
says that it believes the conflict should be resolved according to international law with 
respect for the rights of those living in the region. The group uses advocacy, lobbying, 
research, and education to work towards these goals.   
The PSC, one of the largest Palestine solidarity organizations in the UK, also 
works on boycotting Ahava products. Although headquartered in London with a small 
paid staff, the PSC has 40 branches across the UK. The organization works through an 
executive committee, which is elected by PSC members at its Annual General 
Meeting. PSC says the Annual General Meeting is its “policy-making body,” which is 
run by its members and affiliates. According to the organization, these members and 
affiliates make up the PSC. The organization says it was established to “campaign for 
Palestinian rights” and that it works for justice and peace for Palestinians “in support 
of international law and human rights and against all racism.”261 PSC holds events 
(film screenings, art exhibitions, talks, protests, etc.), letter writing campaigns to 
companies that supply Israeli products or members of the British government, 
circulating petitions to artists and cultural workers to refrain from performing in 
Israel, lobbying MPs, sending media complaints to the BBC, pledges for boycotts, etc.  
Finally, the Presbyterian Church (USA) has endorsed the boycott of Ahava. It 
was formed in 1983, when the Presbyterian Church in the US – the “southern branch” 
– merged with the Presbyterian Church in the USA – the “northern branch.” 
Presbyterians trace their history to the Protestant Reformation and are largely 
influenced by the writings of French/Swiss lawyer John Calvin (1509-1564), who 
became associated with “Reformed theology” and built on the ideas of Martin Luther 
(1483-1546). Presbyterians claim that their religious thought of Reformed theology 
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and their active and representational form of governance makes them distinctive from 
other Christian denominations. The Presbyterian Church (USA) is the largest 
Presbyterian denomination in the United States with 2.3 million members, nearly 
11,000 congregations, 21,000 ordained ministers, and 94,000 elders.262 
 
4.3  Organizational Dynamics of BDS Campaigns against Ahava 
 
 
In this section, I present a brief overview of a selection of campaigns and activities 
against Ahava to illustrate the organizational form and dynamics of consumer boycott 
activism in the BDS movement. These activities take the form of demonstrations, 
direct actions, letter-writing campaigns, and approaching celebrities that have 
connections to Ahava, among other tactics. Campaigns against Ahava have taken 
place in numerous locations around the world (e.g. US, UK, South Africa, etc.) and 
are usually very loosely organized with very few taking on formal long-term 
campaigns. Often an objective will be identified (e.g. removing Ahava products from 
a department store’s shelves) and then individuals and/or groups will organize around 
that particular goal. If the objective is met, activists will likely move on to a different 
target. Many of the consumer boycotts in the BDS movement, such as those against 
Ahava, are short-term with specific goals.  
An early success of Codepink’s Stolen Beauty campaign was to expose and 
dissolve the association between Ahava, former Sex in the City star Kristin Davis, and 
Oxfam. At the time, Davis was a Goodwill Ambassador for Oxfam and then signed a 
contract with Ahava to be their spokesmodel. Oxfam had previously publicly 
condemned Israeli settlement products, and according to the organization’s Advocacy 
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and Media Manager, Mike Bailey, “The settlements on the West Bank are illegal 
under international humanitarian law and that creates a lot of problems for the 
Palestinians that live there. Consumers that are buying…[products from]…illegal 
settlements need to have that information so that they can make an informed 
choice.”263  
The Stolen Beauty campaign approached Davis with a letter during one of her 
promotional events at Lord & Taylor in New York. The letter handed to Davis and a 
subsequent letter sent by the group outlined their concerns about the company and 
asked her to resign from her position as a spokesperson for Ahava. Shortly after 
Stolen Beauty activists approached Davis at Lord & Taylor, the story was picked up 
by Page Six, the gossip column of the New York Post. The article stated, “This has 
been a huge thing…From an Oxfam perspective, Ahava is a polarizing company and 
Kristin shouldn't be involved with it.”264 A statement from Oxfam affirmed, “Oxfam 
remains opposed to settlement trade, in which Ahava is engaged.”265 During the 
remainder of her contact with Ahava, Davis did not appear in public relations 
activities for Oxfam and a few months after Davis was approached by the Stolen 
Beauty campaign in New York her contract was not renewed with Ahava. Following 
the break with Ahava, Davis continued her work with Oxfam.266  
Although not strictly related to consumer boycotts, another high profile 
success for the Stolen Beauty campaign was the decision by Abigail Disney to disown 
her investments in Ahava. Disney is the granddaughter of Roy O. Disney, co-founder 
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with his brother of The Walt Disney Company. Her father Roy E. Disney founded 
Shamrock Holdings, which in 2008 purchased 17 percent of Ahava shares, worth 
approximately $12 million at the time.267 After learning about Israel’s use of natural 
resources in the occupied West Bank from the Stolen Beauty campaign Disney 
released a statement saying,  
 
“Recent evidence from the Israeli Civil Administration documents that 
Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories sources mud used in its products from the 
Occupied shores of the Dead Sea, which is in direct contravention to 
provisions in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention 
forbidding the exploitation of occupied natural resources…I cannot in 
good conscience profit from what is technically the ‘plunder’ or ‘pillage’ 
of occupied natural resources and the company’s situating its factory in 
an Israeli settlement in the Occupied West Bank.”268  
 
 
The evidence from Israel’s Civil Administration that Disney referred to was obtained 
from Who Profits, the research project of the Israeli group Coalition of Women for 
Peace. 269 Through Israel’s Freedom of Information law, Who Profits received 
confirmation from the Civil Administration that Ahava obtained a permit to extract 
mud from the West Bank section of the Dead Sea. Due to financial and legal 
restrictions, Disney was not able to divest her assets from Shamrock Holdings at the 
time. Instead, Disney said that she would donate funds equal to her investments and 
profits from the investment firm to organizations that work to end illegal use of 
natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territories.270 While not directly related 
to a consumer boycott of Ahava products, the negative publicity about the company, 
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particularly from a high-profile figure, positively contributed to the Stolen Beauty 
campaign as it added to an environment where consumers may think twice before 
purchasing controversial products.  
Also in the US, the Presbyterian Church (USA) voted in its 220th General 
Assembly (2012) to boycott products made in Israeli settlements. Overture 
(resolution) 15-02 titled, “On Boycotting Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories and 
Hadiklaim (an Israeli Date Growers Cooperative)” was submitted by the San 
Francisco Presbytery to the Middle East and Peacemaking Issues Committee. In the 
“Rationale” section of the overture the Committee specifically cited the Who Profits 
research project and the Stolen Beauty Campaign as sources of information about 
Ahava and other companies operating in the Palestinian territories. The Committee 
made minor amendments and passed the overture in a vote of 37 to 6 with two 
abstentions. The New Brunswick Presbytery, the Presbytery of Scioto Valley, and the 
Synod of the Covenant concurred with the overture. The Advocacy Committee for 
Racial Ethnic Concerns (ACREC) changed the wording to include all settlement 
products, not just those from Ahava and Hadiklaim, and advised the General 
Assembly to approve the overture. In the General Assembly, textual changes 
suggested by the committees were taken into consideration and the final draft was 
overwhelmingly approved with 457 members voting for, 180 voting against, and three 
abstaining.271  
While the company names of Ahava and Hadiklaim names were retained in 
the title of the overture, due to the amendment process the actual final text reads, 
“Call for the boycott of all Israeli products coming from the occupied Palestinian 
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165 
 
 
Territories…” Ahava and Hadikliam are then listed as examples. It is important to 
note that Ahava was used as an initial example and then the application of a consumer 
boycott was expanded to include all products produced in Israel’s settlements. In its 
rationale for the change of wording AREC cited a measure passed by the United 
Methodist General Conference in April 2012 calling it “….a sweeping boycott of 
ALL goods from ALL Israeli companies operating in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories” [emphasis in original] and recommending “widening this overture from 
two companies to all Israeli companies based in the illegal settlements.”272 
In the UK, campaigns against Ahava have also been organized. BDS activists 
demonstrated outside Ahava’s store in London’s upscale Covent Garden 
neighborhood, and beginning in 2009, a loose group of boycott activists used direct 
action to physically block the entrance to the store. That year a number of activists 
were arrested for aggravated trespass, but the cases were dismissed. The following 
year, numerous activists were arrested and their cases went to trial, although the trial 
collapsed and the activists were acquitted. Later in 2010 four activists were arrested, 
their cases went to trial, and the activists were convicted of the charge of aggravated 
trespass. Of “the Ahava Four,” as they became known in Palestine solidarity circles, 
two campaigners appealed their convictions, although failed, in the High Court.273  
In addition to direct actions, activists in London from the BIG campaign, the 
informal London BDS group, and other unaffiliated activists held bi-weekly 
demonstrations outside the Ahava store. 274 The group demonstrated with signs, 
chants, musical instruments, and leaflets passed out to passerby to educate the public 
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on Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and to promote boycott of the 
company. Israel’s most widely circulated daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, stated, 
“The shop's location…has exposed the organized protest against Ahava to masses of 
British residents and tourists.”275 Eventually, the activists’ campaigns were successful, 
as the property owner of the shop would not renew Ahava’s tenancy in the building 
due to the controversy the store caused. According to an Ahava spokesperson, “The 
protests damaged our image and created negative media coverage.”276   
In January 2011, John Lewis, a major retail chain throughout the UK 
confirmed that is had stopped stocking Ahava products in its stores. In a letter to the 
PSC, Managing Director for John Lewis Andy Street, stated, “As a socially 
responsible retailer, John Lewis takes very seriously the treatment of workers and 
their working conditions. We expect all our suppliers not only to obey the law, but 
also to respect the rights, interests, and well-being of their employees, their 
communities, and the environment.”277 A spokesperson for the company later told the 
Jerusalem Post, “John Lewis’ decision to no longer stock Ahava beauty products was 
based solely on the sales performance of the products.”278 The spokesperson 
confirmed that managing director Andy Street had written to PSC regarding 
discontinuation of Ahava products at the company’s stores and the company’s policy 
on ethical sourcing.279   
Canadian BDS activists pressured The Bay, a Canadian retailer, not to carry 
Ahava products. In early 2011, the store confirmed that it had removed the company’s 
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products from its shelves. Originally, a spokesperson for the The Bay stated that the 
removal of Ahava products was part of their plan to update their wellness area and 
make room for new, upcoming products.280 The following day Bonnie Brooks, the 
CEO of Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), the parent company of The Bay, stated that 
Ahava “has been discontinued globally by the brand owner, not the Bay…”281 
However, Ahava responded, “Our products are available globally.”282 Brooks 
maintained the HBC decision was completely financial, but acknowledged, “it 
occurred at the same time as an aggressive campaign by several groups advocating for 
a boycott of Ahava products.”283     
In South Africa, activists started encouraging Wellness Warehouse, a natural 
and wellness retail chain mainly in the Cape Town area, to stop carrying Ahava 
products. In 2010 activists from the Open Shuhada Street group lodged a complaint 
with the Office of Consumer Protection that Wellness Warehouse and SDV 
Pharmaceuticals were misleading consumers by carrying Ahava products, which were 
incorrectly labeled as “Made in Israel.” Activists from the group, along with 
University of Cape Town Palestine Solidarity Forum and other supporters started 
organizing regular protests at the store.  
Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies published Notice 379 in May 2012 in 
the Government Gazette, which is the official means of communication between the 
government and public. The notice required businesses to not incorrectly label goods 
from the occupied Palestinian territories as goods from Israel, as this would violate 
the Consumer Protection Act of 2008. The Notice stated, 
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“The Open Shuhada.org (Open Shuhada) [group] has alleged that 
products of Ahava…are being distributed in South Africa as products 
that originate in Israel whereas they originate from the OPT. In this 
regard consumers in South Africa should not be misled into believing 
that products originating from the OPT are products originating from 
Israel.”284   
 
The public had 60 days to comment on the Notice. The government considered the 
comments and in October 2012 published Notice 832 in the Government Gazette. The 
Notice stated said that goods that originate from “Israeli Occupied Territory (IOT)” 
must be labeled as such and that only products originating from within the Green Line 
may be labeled as “Made in Israel.”285 Again, the public was given 30 days to make 
comments on the proposed regulation. During that time a range of pro-Israel and anti-
BDS groups and individuals claimed that labeling products as made in the IOT was 
racist, discriminatory, and motivated by “political bias against the state of Israel.”286 
In April 2013, the Ministry published its final Notice on the matter and changed the 
wording for goods from the occupied territories as originating from “IOT” to “East 
Jerusalem: Israeli Goods,” “Gaza: Israeli Goods,” and “West Bank: Israeli Goods.”287    
The combination of repeated protests outside the store organized by BDS 
activists and the policy decisions of the government, which was itself influenced by 
BDS activists in the Open Shuhada Street group as indicated in the original Notice, 
led to the temporary removal of Ahava products from the shelves of Wellness 
Warehouse. In October 2012, a staff member at the store confirmed that Ahava 
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products had been removed from the shelves stating, “the stock was not moving.”288 
In April of the following year when the government issued its final Notice on product 
labeling from Israel and the occupied territories, Wellness Warehouse issued a press 
release. In the statement the store said, “The Ahava product labels are not compliant 
with the new regulation, as they are currently labelled ‘Made in Israel’. Wellness 
Warehouse has returned the products to the importer for correct labeling in 
accordance with the regulation.”289 While Ahava products will likely return to the 
shelves of Wellness Warehouse at some point, the dedicated efforts of BDS activists 
in South Africa on the street and through government channels were significant. The 
activists raised awareness among the public and the government, and were 
instrumental in changing product labels for goods made in Israeli settlements.  
In addition to these boycott activities leveled at Ahava by BDS activists, a 
number of key reports from organizations have been published about the company. 
B’Tselem, an Israeli NGO that works on Palestinian human rights in the occupied 
territories, published in May 2011 a report titled, “Dispossession and Exploitation: 
Israel’s Policy in the Jordan Valley and the Northern Dead Sea.” The report 
specifically mentioned Ahava as a company engaging in economic exploitation. In 
addition, the report provided a detailed context of Israeli control over natural 
resources in the area (especially land and water), and the restrictions on movement 
and development imposed on Palestinians. The organization urged Israel to evacuate 
the settlements, close any businesses operating there, allow Palestinians access to 
natural resources, and permit building in Palestinian communities.  
                                                 
288 “Retailers Sticks to Ahava,” Voice of the Cape, 3 October 2012; 
www.vocfm.co.za/index.php/news/general/item/6551-retailer-sticks-to-ahava.  
289 Wellness Warehouse, “Wellness Warehouse Returns Ahava Products to Importer for Relabeling in 
Accordance with Consumer Protection Act,” Press Release 23 April 2013; 
www.wellnesswarehouse.com/blog/?blogID=374.  
170 
 
 
In 2012 Al-Haq, a prominent Palestinian organization focusing on legal issues, 
published, “Pillage of the Dead Sea: Israel’s Unlawful Exploitation of Natural 
Resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” The report argued that Israel 
violates humanitarian and human rights laws by favoring Israeli interests in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, thereby preventing Palestinian self-determination, and 
contributing to the pillage of Palestinian natural resources by private actors. Ahava 
was cited as a particular example of these violations. The report called on Israel to 
cease all violations of international law and human rights and called on third parties to 
ensure Israel conforms to international conventions. The report particularly mentioned 
that EU-funded research projects with Ahava and incorrect labeling of settlement 
products not only violated European laws, but also the EU Strategic Framework on 
Human Rights and Democracy and the European Neighborhood Policy, which allows 
duty free access to European markets.  
In April 2012, Who Profits (mentioned earlier) published “Ahava: Tracking 
the Trade Trail of Settlement Products.” The report is the most extensive and detailed 
of the Ahava corporation to date. The report tracked the company’s supply chain that 
involves numerous companies who source raw ingredients to Ahava, which the 
company than combines to form its brand of products. The report revealed these 
companies, as they are not listed on Ahava products yet contribute to violations of 
international law. The information also showed that Ahava excavates mud from the 
occupied portion of the West Bank, which according to Israel’s Civil Administration 
is the only company that has a permit to extract the mud for commercial purposes. 
Who Profits also considered how Ahava labels its products in foreign markets. In 
Europe and South Africa in particular Ahava’s “Made in Israel” label has come under 
scrutiny. The report stated that the company knowingly misleads consumers and 
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incorrectly labels its products, which is illegal in the European Union. The report 
concluded that the company undeniably extracts components for its products from 
occupied Palestinian territory, that companies involved in the supply chain of Ahava 
products indirectly violate international law, and that the company falsely labels its 
products. Taken together, Who Profits said these practices exploit Palestinian natural 
resources, violate international law, and contribute to Israel’s prolonged occupation of 
the Palestinian territories. 
As discussed earlier, the relationship between Oxfam and their Goodwill 
Ambassador Kristin Davis became problematic when Davis signed a public relations 
contract with Ahava. Oxfam’s stated positions on Israel’s settlements were not 
compatible with a celebrity publicly promoting settlement products. In addition to 
previous statements, Oxfam published a briefing paper in July 2012 titled, “On the 
Brink: Israeli Settlements and their Impact on Palestinians in the Jordan Valley.” 
Although the report only focused on Israeli settlements in a particular area of the West 
Bank, the thrust of the findings and recommendations were similar to those echoed in 
other reports. The report stated that Israel expropriates and exploits Palestinian natural 
resources, which helps maintain and expand the settlement economy. At the same 
time, these policies and practices destroy Palestinian livelihood in the area and the 
possibility for a Palestinian state in the future on the land.  
In addition, a group of 22 prominent European organizations published a 
report titled “Trading Away Peace: How Europe Helps Sustain Illegal Israeli 
Settlements” in October 2012. Similar to other reports, it provided a background on 
the impact of illegal Israeli settlements on Palestinian livelihoods, the two unequal 
economies in the West Bank – that of the settlement economy and that of the 
Palestinian economy, European economic links with settlements, and European 
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policies on settlements. The report listed 12 recommendations including banning the 
import of settlement products to European markets, excluding settlement companies 
from public procurement, excluding settlements from bilateral agreements and 
cooperation schemes, and removing organizations funding settlements from tax 
deduction systems.  
These reports add to a general boycott environment of Ahava often providing 
activists with the ethical and legal legitimation for pursuing further BDS activities 
against the company. These reports are cited by activists and frequently appear on 
websites promoting consumer boycott. The Stolen Beauty website for example 
contains links to the reports described above, along with links to the latest news 
regarding campaigns against Ahava or other BDS campaigns, particularly those 
against settlement products. The links to news and analysis on the Stolen Beauty 
website do not follow that of formal campaigns; rather these info-links provide 
general news and analysis that relates to the BDS movement. For example, at the time 
of writing, selected news titles included “Close the EU to Israeli Settlement Products” 
in Haaretz newspaper, “9 Brands You Can Boycott to Hold Israel Accountable for its 
Violations of International Law” on the PolicyMic website, and “In West Bank 
Settlements, Israeli Jobs are Two-Edged Sword” from the New York Times. The 
reports by organizations on Ahava along with other news and analysis leads to the 
production of research and information within the movement, which supports the goal 
of raising awareness of consumer boycotts against Ahava and the BDS movement 
more generally.  
In addition to presenting research and information, the websites of groups 
involved in activities against Ahava are also interactive portals for further activism. 
On its Stolen Beauty website, Codepink has numerous ways that activists can 
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participate in boycotts of Ahava products. The first is by signing the boycott pledge, 
which is available in seven languages. The next is by taking action at an Ahava store, 
for which Codepink has provided a 10-point guide. Activists can also participate in 
online actions. This includes asking Nordstrom to stop selling Ahava products, 
thanking Lonely Planet for removing the Ahava visitor’s center from its suggested 
itinerary for the Dead Sea region, signing the Codepink e-card thanking Abigail 
Disney for her stand against Ahava, and contacting Macy’s department store to ask 
them to stop carrying Ahava and SodaStream products. The website also has links for 
following the campaign on Twitter and Facebook. On the PSC website, green buttons 
with capital letters stating “TAKE ACTION” take participants to specific pages with 
information for action. Once redirected to the specific webpages, users can take part 
in a variety of ways – often something as simple as typing in one’s postcode to find 
their MP and sending a form letter prewritten by the organization. These user-friendly 
tasks can disseminate information quickly and easily mobilize participants, 
particularly for actions such as letter-writing campaigns.  
   
4.4  Significance of Consumer Boycotts against Ahava 
 
 
Campaigns against Ahava are significant for a number of reasons. The first is that, as 
illustrated in the previous section, there have been a number of achievements in the 
campaigns against Ahava. Codepink’s success in exposing and breaking the link 
between Kristin Davis, Oxfam, and Ahava, along with persuading Abigail Disney to 
denounce her connection and investments with the company has raised the issue of 
settlements and consumer boycott in high profile cases. The Presbyterian Church 
(USA) resolution calling for a consumer boycott of Ahava products that was extended 
to include all settlement products was a recent iteration of increasing church-related 
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activism in the BDS movement. The closing of an Ahava store in central London due 
to continued activist pressure made clear that the company cannot open stores 
wherever it would like. Moreover, the formal channels through which South Africa’s 
Open Shuhada Street and other BDS activists were successful in changing the labels 
that appear on settlement products so that consumers are aware of where goods 
originate prevents the company from incorrectly labeling its products as “made in 
Israel.”  
As this chapter has indicated, campaigns and actions against Ahava are not 
limited to a specific location and have taken place across borders. A selection of 
activities detailed in this chapter against the company have taken place in the US, 
Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, Britain, and Canada. This is significant because 
Ahava is a global brand that wants to develop and expand its markets abroad, 
particularly as the Israeli market is limited due to its size and is the source of less than 
half of the company’s revenue. Activists use the company as a target to bring 
contention across borders – seeking to illuminate not just aspects of the company 
discussed in this chapter, but also to raise the issue of settlements among the general 
public and use the company as a representative example of many of the related 
problems in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
Campaigns against Ahava are also significant because the Palestinian BNC 
has endorsed them. With respect to the Presbyterian Church (USA) 2012 resolution 
that calls for the prohibition on imports of Israeli settlement products in which Ahava 
is specifically named, the BNC stated, 
 
“As Palestinians, we are inspired by the impressive mass mobilization 
brought by this resolution and the spirit of genuine international 
solidarity demonstrated by those who have tirelessly worked to stand up 
firmly behind the full set of Palestinian human rights…We salute the 
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Presbyterian Church (USA) for its decisive steps towards ending forms 
of direct complicity in Israel’s oppression of Palestinians.”290 
 
In November 2012, the BNC published an article titled, “Five Ways to Effectively 
Support Gaza through Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions.” The first way mentioned 
was to refrain from purchasing Israeli goods. The document encouraged supporters to 
refuse to buy Israeli products, let merchants know the products are being boycotted, 
and encourage family and friends to also not buy Israeli goods. Of the five companies 
listed, Ahava is the first one named. Finally, although not relating to Ahava in 
particular, the BNC endorsed in February 2013 the report of the “UN Fact Finding 
Mission on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” The BNC said 
that it particularly appreciated the Mission’s conclusion that Israel’s settlement 
enterprise involves third-party accountability, including legal responsibilities of 
private businesses. The BNC went on to call on governments and corporations to 
implement the Mission’s recommendations and encouraged activists to use the report 
“as a tool to intensity the global civil society BDS Campaign.” 
 
4.5  Dynamics between Campaigners and Opponents  
 
 
The dynamic interaction between the campaigners of consumer boycotts in the BDS 
movement and opponents shows that the relationship between the two sides is 
ongoing and contentious. Boycott activists produce negative publicity about the 
company and bring to the fore the issue of Israel’s settlement project in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. In response, those that support Israel’s colonial endeavors 
strive to impede boycott activities against Ahava and other companies. This has taken 
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several forms, including an official response from Ahava’s CEO refuting the claims 
(e.g. that the settlement’s location violates international law) of boycott activists and 
pro-Israeli settlement activists directly contesting consumer boycotts by purchasing 
Israel’s settlement products.  
In 2010, Ahava CEO Yaacov Ellis sent a letter to suppliers of Ahava products 
in response to boycott activities against the company. In the letter, Ellis addressed the 
main points and countered the claims of BDS activists. Ellis referred to those that 
organize boycott campaigns against Ahava as “small, radical fringe organizations,” 
and a “fanatical group.”291 He said the groups are known for their “anti-
American…[and] anti-Israeli conduct…”292 With respect to the legal status of the 
West Bank, Ellis stated, 
  
“Ahava’s use of the Mitzpe Shalem facility is legal and does not violate 
any provision of International Law, especially as there is no recognized 
right of any people’s other than Israel to the West Bank.”293   
 
 
In regards to effect of the settlement or its industries on Palestinians, the CEO said 
that the company had not received any complaint from “any legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian population and does not violate any rights of any peoples.” He went 
on to say that the company would resist any boycott actions against it and would 
consider legal action if required.  
In addition to the official response from the company to BDS campaigns, a 
group has formed in the US to directly challenge the consumer boycott efforts of BDS 
activists. Buy Israeli Goods (BIG) was formed by the America-Israel Chamber of 
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Commerce Chicago and StandWithUs. The America-Israel Chamber of Commerce 
Chicago is an organization that seeks to build business connections between the US 
and Israel, and StandWithUS is a pro-Israel advocacy organization with branches 
across the US.294 The group’s name – Buy Israel Goods – is an explicit play on the 
phrase “Boycott Israeli Goods,” (BIG), for which there was an official campaign of 
the PSC discussed earlier. The goal of Buy Israel Goods is to promote the purchase of 
Israeli products, specifically those being targeted for boycott by Palestinians and 
solidarity activists. According to the group’s website, “…the frequent purchase of 
Israeli products will have a broad and significant impact on the Israeli economy and 
its citizens, and perhaps even on its ability to survive.”295 The group’s website is a 
database of stores that carry Israeli products, from which consumers can search for 
retailers in their local area or for online stores that carry Israeli products.296  
Specific actions have been planned by these groups and others to oppose 
boycott actions by BDS campaigners. For example, 30 November 2010 was planned 
as a “Buy Israel Goods Day” in direct response to an Ahava boycott action organized 
by Codepink at Ricky’s in New York for the same day. The two organizations that 
formed the Buy Israel Goods website “urg[ed] members of synagogues, schools, 
colleges and community groups to go to local stores and request Israeli-made 
products, particularly those targeted by boycotters.”297 Similarly, when The Bay was 
targeted by Ahava boycotters in Canada, anti-BDS challengers recommended that 
supporters visit their local store, purchase Ahava products, and thank the store for 
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www.standwithus.com/aboutus/.  
295 Buy Israel Goods, “Help Israel,” www.buyisraelgoods.org/.  
296 StandWithUS, “Buy Israeli Goods,” www.buyisraeligoods.com/landing2013.asp.   
  America-Israel Chamber of Commerce & Industry. “Buy Israel Goods,” www.buyisraelgoods.org/.  
297 Sue Fishkoff, “Nov. 30 Declared Buy Israel day,” 23 November 2010; 
www.jta.org/2010/11/23/news-opinion/united-states/nov-30-declared-buy-israel-day.  
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stocking Ahava. Those opposing BDS were also asked to write to The Bay 
executives, for which the contact details were provided for the Chairman, President 
and CEO, and the Director of Beauty Products, to encourage them to continue 
carrying Ahava products in their stores.298 In these particular actions, challengers to 
BDS campaigners directly sought to thwart the boycott goals of activists.  
In this way, the dynamics between boycotters and opponents is somewhat of a 
tit for tat interplay. BDS activists will push the status quo by calling for a boycott and 
other punitive measures, which lead the opposing side to respond, often with reverse 
actions. The letter written by Ahava’s CEO to suppliers of the company’s products 
and the Buy Israeli Goods days organized in response to boycott actions are direct 
forms of contesting consumer boycotts in the BDS movement. The goal of BDS 
opponents is to overturn the abilities and achievements of BDS activists, or at the 
least to hamper these efforts; however, this has yet to be accomplished as consumer 
boycott campaigns and activities successfully continue against Ahava.   
 
4.6  Analyzing the Case of BDS Campaigns against Ahava 
 
 
In analyzing the case of BDS campaigns against Ahava, a number of attributes can be 
identified about the campaigns and the movement overall. The first has to do with the 
campaigns targeting a company located in an Israeli settlement in occupied 
Palestinian territory. BDS campaigns or even less formal boycott activities against 
Ahava raise the issue of settlements in Palestine activism. By concentrating on 
settlements, activists can explain how settlements are contrary to international law, 
why Palestinians lack access to resources in the occupied territories, and how this 
                                                 
298 StandWithUs, “URGENT BUYcott Israel Alert: Shop AHAVA at the Bay,” 
www.standwithus.com/news/article.asp?id=1720.  
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prevents the development of a Palestinian economy. Therefore, the focus on 
settlements that arises from consumer boycott efforts against Ahava illuminates part 
of a larger Israeli system of colonial control over Palestinians.   
As is the case with most BDS campaigns, a major objective in participating in 
such boycott activities is to raise public awareness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and the BDS movement. By directing attention to the contentious nature of Jewish-
Israeli only colonies, activists broach topics that supporters of settlements would 
prefer go unnoticed and unquestioned so that the status quo prevails. By focusing on a 
particular company located in a settlement that uses natural resources not granted to 
the state of Israel, campaigns and actions against Ahava have brought to the fore the 
illegal and colonial character of Israel’s settlement endeavors in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. In doing this activists justify boycott as a legitimate tactic to 
pressure the company and the state to comply with international law and respect 
Palestinian rights.  
Another important aspect of the consumer boycott campaigns against Ahava 
and the movement is the importance in continually referring to international law by 
BDS activists. This frame of reference morally and legally justifies the campaigners’ 
claims that Israel violates international standards and principles, thereby requiring 
action. Codepink’s website, the resolution passed by the Presbyterian Church (USA), 
letter-writing campaigns by British activists to John Lewis and Canadian activists to 
The Bay, and all the reports written by organizations discuss Israel’s violations of 
international law. Specifically activists focus on the illegal nature of Israel’s 
settlements in occupied Palestinian territories, the economy surrounding settlement 
industries that maintains and supports their existence, and the harm this causes 
Palestinians individually and collectively in pursuit of their rights. Focusing on 
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international law provides BDS activists with moral and legal justification for boycott 
action against companies such as Ahava.  
 Campaigns and actions against Ahava also indicate that corporate complicity 
in Israel’s system of control is an important underlying reason for activists to pursue 
targets such as Ahava. This aspect of the movement is identifiable in other BDS 
campaigns, specifically in the We Divest campaign discussed in the previous chapter. 
Similar to the divestment campaign against TIAA-CREF, activists believe that 
corporations should be held accountable for their actions and that profit making at the 
expense of human rights or the environment can be subject to consumer attention. 
Clearly, the role of businesses in supporting and continuing Israel’s policies against 
the Palestinians is essential for activists in the BDS movement.  
This facet of the movement conceptually situates BDS activism alongside the 
work of other causes. The ideas of international law and corporate complicity are 
widespread across a range of global justice issues, thereby making the notions 
recognizable to activists not familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the BDS 
movement. The collective action frames that BDS activists use in their campaigns is 
one point of intersection that I suggest the border-crossing movement has with other 
contemporary transnational movements. Collective action frames along with other 
points of intersection are discussed more in chapter six, where I explore the 
connective linkages between the BDS movement and other movements working on 
justice-related causes across borders.   
 
Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter has investigated the case of consumer boycotts against Ahava in the BDS 
movement. Specifically, this chapter has laid out the background of Ahava and 
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campaigns against the company. I provided an overview of a number of the groups 
involved in the campaigns, and then examined the organizational form and dynamics 
of consumer boycott campaigns and activities against the company. This was to offer 
a summary of the kinds of groups involved in consumer boycotts in the movement 
and the ways in which these boycotts take shape. I also discussed the significance of 
campaigns against Ahava and the dynamic interactions between boycott campaigners 
and opponents to illuminate the contested terrain in which BDS campaigns develop. 
The chapter ended with an analysis of the campaigns in which I identified aspects of 
the consumer boycott campaigns against Ahava and the wider BDS movement across 
borders.   
  These boycott campaigns and activities aim to expose the company as a 
business that contributes to and promotes the proliferation of Israel’s state-building 
project in the occupied Palestinian territories. Throughout these BDS efforts, activists 
attempt to raise awareness of Israel’s Jewish-only settlements and the industries that 
sustain them, which form an integral part of Israel’s occupation and colonization on 
the ground. By raising the issue of settlements, consumer boycotts against Ahava 
indicate that the role of international law and corporate complicity are important 
conceptual themes for activists within the BDS movement as they ultimately try to 
pressure the state to change its policies and practices towards Palestinians. These 
collective action frames resonate with activists working on other causes and are not 
unique to the BDS movement. Information from this chapter partly contributes to an 
analysis of these frames and other points of intersection with other contemporary 
transnational movements in chapter six. In these ways, the case of consumer boycott 
campaigns against Ahava in the BDS movement indicate that the movement’s scope 
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and frames play a part in the movement’s distinctiveness in the Palestinian struggle 
for justice.  
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Chapter 5 – BDS Movement Structure and Processes 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
The BDS movement is organized in a variety of ways across borders and is widely 
flexible in terms of its structure and processes. As indicated in the case study chapters, 
groups and organizations involved in the BDS movement largely determine their own 
campaigns – the target, the tactics (boycott, divestment), and the sub-tactics such as 
demonstrations, sit-ins, flashmobs, etc. Individuals, groups, and organizations for the 
most part participate in the BDS movement as they would like. There is no formal 
membership or terms for participation in the movement. The basic conditions of 
support are agreement with the three demands in the Palestinian call for BDS in 2005.  
In this chapter, I first consider the Palestinian Boycott National Committee 
and the question of leadership. I examine how the committee came into existence, 
what its main roles are, and then consider precisely what is Palestinian-led in the BDS 
movement. I argue that the principles and goals, historical use of boycott in the 
Palestinian struggle, many foundational efforts in developing the movement, and the 
movement inside the occupied Palestinian territories are all Palestinian-led. Outside 
these areas, there is a large degree of autonomy in local campaigns around the world. 
I then consider context sensitivity and the role of local organizing in the movement. In 
this section, I maintain that this is a critical component in the structure of the 
movement and makes possible a border-crossing, decentralized movement based on 
BDS. Finally, I analyze networks and border-crossing coordination in the movement. 
Vast connections among groups form the web of the BDS movement. Taken together, 
these aspects of the BDS movement contribute to and further demonstrate the 
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movement’s decentralized structure and fluid organizational processes, which 
represents a new and different way of challenging Israel in the Palestinian struggle.   
 
5.1  The Palestinian Boycott National Committee and the Question of Leadership 
  
 
The global call for BDS in 2005 was endorsed by over 170 Palestinian groups, 
organizations, unions, and political parties in the Palestinian territories, present-day 
Israel, and the diaspora. The Palestinian body that speaks on behalf of the movement 
and for Palestinians is the Palestinian BNC. According to the BDS movement’s 
website, the current role and mandate of the BNC is: 
 
• To strengthen and spread the culture of boycott as a central form of 
civil resistance to Israeli occupation, colonialism and apartheid;  
• To formulate strategies and programs of action in accordance with the 
9 July 2005 Palestinian Civil Society BDS Call;  
• To serve as the Palestinian reference point for BDS campaigns in the 
region and worldwide;  
• To serve as the national reference point for anti-normalization 
campaigns within Palestine;  
• To facilitate coordination and provide support & encouragement to the 
various BDS campaign efforts in all locations 299 
 
The BNC was established following the first BDS conference in Ramallah in 2007 
and is comprised of 27 members.300 Structurally the BNC includes a General 
Assembly (GA) and a Secretariat. The GA includes representatives from each BNC 
member, while the Secretariat is smaller and “designed more as a working body.”301 
Groups that are part of the BNC internally select their representatives that attend GA 
and Secretariat meeting.302 The GA meets approximately every three months in open 
meetings, where the Secretariat presents reports and updates members on activities. 
                                                 
299 BDS Movement, “Palestinian BDS National Committee,” www.bdsmovement.net/bnc.  
300 Ibid. 
301 Michael Deas, BNC, interview by author, 7 September 2012.  
302 Mohammed Yahya, GUPW, interview by author, GUPW, 4 April 2012.  
185 
 
 
Any Palestinian coalition that signed the 2005 global call had the opportunity to join 
the BNC; those that wanted to play a more direct and active role in the movement are 
the organizations that comprise the BNC. Members of the BNC Secretariat are 
directly involved in day-to-day decisions and implementing BNC plans.303  
  With respect to the position of the BNC within Palestinian civil society, 
George Giacaman, a prominent Palestinian intellectual and Director of Muwatin, The 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, said “…those civil society 
organizations that are represented are the most prominent, more effective, largest, 
most well-known; the ones that can influence internal Palestinian public opinion…”304 
PACBI member and member of the BNC Secretariat Omar Barghouti says the BNC 
“[is the] biggest Palestinian coalition in existence – nothing is as wide and democratic 
as the BNC…” He explains, 
 
“[the] BNC is a coalition of coalitions and networks – if you are a single 
organization you can’t join the BNC, but if you are part of a coalition 
then the coalition can be a member of the BNC. That’s why it’s the 
biggest and most important coalition in Palestinian civil society 
today…If you are part of PFLP student group you can’t be part of the 
BNC. This guarantees that no political party dominates and all political 
parties participate. This guards our independence and autonomy; [the] 
most important aspects. [The] BNC commands respect in Palestinian 
society because it is totally autonomous and inclusive – everyone is in it 
and no one controls it.”305  
 
 
In 2008, the BNC published a position paper titled, “United against Apartheid, 
Colonialism, and Occupation – Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People.” This 
document would become an ideological cornerstone for Palestinian goals for a border-
crossing BDS movement. According to the BNC, it “provides the legal and ethical 
                                                 
303 Omar Barghouti, PACBI and BNC, interview by author, 17 April 2012.  
304 George Giacaman, Muwatin, interview interview by author, 3 March 2012.  
305 Omar Barghouti, PACBI and BNC interview by author, 17 April 2012.  
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foundation for the BDS campaign.”306 It detailed Israel’s three-pronged system of 
control over Palestinians, and how each of the three demands of the BDS movement 
specifically corresponded to each aspect.  
Shortly after the BNC adopted the strategic position paper described above, 
“The Bilbao Initiative: Towards a Just Peace in Palestine” took place in the Basque 
country. At the Initiative, Palestinian organizations that were members of the BNC 
gathered with Israeli and European groups to strategize new ways to support the 
Palestinian struggle. To participate in the Initiative, organizations had to agree to “The 
Document of Reference,” which included the three demands of the Palestinian call for 
BDS made in 2005. During the Initiative, the BNC position paper mentioned above 
was discussed and accepted. Similar to other gatherings before and after dealing with 
BDS and related themes, the Initiative was a space for activists to meet in person, 
strategize, and coordinate activities. The first point of the Action Plan that was 
adopted because of the proceedings specifically called for global implementation of 
BDS based on the 2005 call.  
The BNC clearly has an important position in the movement. Its stated role 
and mandate are to promote and assist in the development of a movement across 
borders, and the coalitions and networks on the BNC indicate broad representation of 
Palestinian organizational actors. The committee articulated moral and legal 
legitimacy for the movement in its strategic position paper in 2008 and has deployed 
that rationale in border-crossing meetings such as the Bilbao Initiative. While the 
importance of the BNC is apparent, its function and standing within the larger 
movement does not suggest a hierarchical or centralized structure that commands the 
                                                 
306 BNC, “Apartheid, Colonisation and Occupation,” www.bdsmovement.net/apartheid-colonisation-
occupation.  
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transnational movement. In this regard, it is necessary to address the question of a 
“Palestinian-led” movement.   
It is often repeated within the BDS movement and by opponents that the 
movement is Palestinian-led. The We Divest campaign, for example, states in the 
“About BDS” section on its website that it is a “Palestinian-led movement.”307 In a 
letter to the Director of Public Relations for Nordstrom, Code Pink’s Linda Frank 
called on the fashion retailer to boycott Ahava products to comply with the 
company’s own guidelines regarding product labelling and “to honor the Palestinian-
led call for an international boycott…”308 In 2014, a New Jersey Rabbi developed an 
app called Am Yisrael Buy to help consumers support Israeli-made products. The app 
“is meant to act against BDS, a Palestinian-led movement that calls for a boycott of 
Israeli goods…”309 In a 2010 Policy Brief for al-Shabaka, Barghouti stated that the 
transnational BDS movement is “guided by its Palestinian leadership” and the 
establishment of the BNC “created a unified reference and guiding force for the 
global BDS movement” (emphasis in original). Later in the document, Barghouti 
referenced the South African anti-apartheid struggle stating, “genuine solidarity 
movements recognize and follow the oppressed.”310  
In the organizational survey that I conducted as part of my doctoral research 
on the BDS movement the following statement was posed to Palestine solidarity 
organizations: “It is important to support the BDS movement because the principles 
and ideas are Palestinian-led.” Of the 83 responses, 62 answered Strongly Agree, 17 
                                                 
307 We Divest, “About BDS,” https://wedivest.org/p/240/bds#.VSFUcPmUefg.  
308 Stolen Beauty, “Letter from Linda Frank to Tara Darrow, Nordstrom’s Director of Public 
Relations,” www.stolenbeauty.org/article.php?id=5389.  
309 Jessica Mazzola, “N.J. Rabbi Creates App to Combat Palestinian-Led Boycott of Israel,” NJ.com, 8 
October 2014; www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2014/10/nj_rabbi_creates_app_to_combat_palestinian-
led_boycott_of_israel.html.  
310 Barghouti, “BDS: A Global Movement for Freedom and Justice,” http://al-shabaka.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/bds-global-movement-freedom-amp-justice_0.pdf.  
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Agree, and 4 Neutral. Of all respondents, none disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement. Of the 83 respondents, 95.2 percent responded positively to the 
importance of supporting the movement because of Palestinian-led principles and 
ideas.311  
Is the BDS movement guided by Palestinians? Do Palestinians lead the 
movement? Do Palestine solidarity groups follow Palestinians? If so, how is the 
movement Palestinian-led? What appears to be the case in the border-crossing BDS 
movement is less formal, established, or potentially even agreed upon. In the 
following paragraphs, I outline the ways the movement is Palestinian-led.  
First, and most importantly, the principles and goals of the movement are 
Palestinian-led and form the basis for the border-crossing BDS movement. These are 
based in the specific historical experience of Palestinians that has to do with colonial 
subjugation and the long-term pursuit for freedom and justice. Specifically, the 
experiences associated with the state of Israel’s creation in 1948 and the resulting 
Palestinian nakba, the continued military occupation of Palestinian territories, and 
discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, have been the tangible basis for 
organizing a BDS movement across borders. These experiences inform the principles 
and goals in the Palestinian call for BDS in 2005, specifically the three demands in 
the global call.  
In addition, the historical repertoire of boycott in the Palestinian struggle plays 
a significant role in developing a BDS movement for Palestinian justice. This has 
been analyzed in chapter one of this thesis on the origins of the BDS movement. As 
illustrated in that chapter, boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-normalization are 
broadly connected concepts and practices of refusing to engage with colonial 
                                                 
311 BDS Survey, Question Number 5. See Appendix II for the complete survey.  
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authorities that have been repeatedly used in the Palestinian struggle. In particular, 
these tactics have been collectively demonstrated during the 1936 revolt, the first 
intifada that began in 1987, and the second intifada that started in 2000.    
Moreover, many (although not all) of the foundational efforts towards 
developing the movement were Palestinian-led. As evidenced in chapter one of this 
thesis on the emergence of the BDS movement, Palestinian initiatives have been 
active from 2000 on. At the NGO Forum at the World Conference against Racism in 
2001 Palestinian organizations showed their ability to organize and mobilize support 
for their agenda among NGOs around the world. Specifically, the reference to the 
South African struggle against apartheid and Israel’s violations of human rights and 
other international laws would go on to be strategically deployed frames within the 
movement and utilized by nearly every BDS campaign around the world thereafter. 
The main issues affecting Palestinians – the right of return for Palestinian refugees, 
ending the occupation in the Palestinian territories, and equality for Palestinian 
citizens of Israel – were coherently articulated as a platform for action. As mentioned 
above, the BNC adopted this platform in its 2008 position paper, which according to 
the BNC provides the ethical and legal basis for the BDS movement. Also in chapter 
one, I noted that Palestinian intellectuals issued a letter in 2002 during Operation 
Defensive Shield calling for the suspension of economic relations and military aid to 
Israel. Two years later, the academic and cultural boycott was established and 
formalized through the creation of PACBI.   
Lastly, the movement in Palestine, specifically within the occupied Palestinian 
territories, is Palestinian-led.312 Academic boycott, cultural boycott, and anti-
normalization campaigns are active. Specific Palestinian groups and organizations 
                                                 
312 BDS activities in Israel are organized by Palestinian-Israelis and Jewish-Israelis.  
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such as PACBI, PTUC-BDS, the BNC, etc. are directly engaged in the BDS 
movement in Palestine (and abroad to a certain degree through networks and 
campaign coordination). In addition to specific BDS groups and organizations, some 
organizations such as Badil have particular BDS campaign sections as part of their 
larger organizational program.  
Outside these areas, the transnational BDS movement is operationalized 
outside of Palestine at the local level by activists living in those locales. This is not to 
suggest that Palestinians in the diaspora do not play important roles in BDS 
campaigns outside of Palestine, including leadership roles in various groups and 
organizations.313 What is meant here is that campaigns outside of Palestine are not 
directed from a centralized command structure in Palestine. There is not a formal 
chain of command, again leading to the movement’s fluid organizational structure and 
processes. There is flexibility within the movement and a large degree of autonomy in 
local campaigns. These local campaigns largely determine for themselves their 
targets, tactics, sub-tactics, and how much they coordinate with other Palestine 
solidarity groups or the BNC.  
 
5.2  Context Sensitivity and the Role of Local Organizing 
 
 
In outlining what is precisely Palestinian-led in the border-crossing BDS movement, 
the notion of context-sensitivity or context specific BDS campaigns is a critical 
component in the structure and processes of the movement. The concept is vital and a 
core principle of the movement. This important part of the movement provides the 
ability to challenge the state of Israel and bring the Palestinian struggle to various 
                                                 
313 See Rafeef Ziadah, “Sixty Years of Nakba: Palestinian Refugees and the New Anti-Apartheid 
Movement,” Left Turn (April/May 2008); www.leftturn.org.  
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sites across the world. Context-sensitivity and the role of local organizing makes 
possible a decentralized movement across borders based on BDS. 
  In the organizational survey that I conducted as part of my research on the 
BDS movement, the following statement was posed to Palestine solidarity groups and 
organizations: “My group supports BDS because it is flexible. It allows activists to 
decide their own targets for BDS campaigns and strategies for confronting those 
targets.” Of 81 respondents, 26 answered Strongly Agree, 42 Agree, 11 Neutral, and 2 
Disagree. Zero respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Of all answers to 
the statement, 84 percent positively reacted, indicating that among those that 
responded to this statement in the survey, there is great importance in the movement’s 
flexibility and context-sensitivity.314  
Additionally, the emphasis on context-sensitivity is frequently repeated 
throughout the movement. According to former BNC Coordinator Hind Awwad,  
 
“The BNC has consistently provided a strong and unified Palestinian 
voice, and continues to lead and guide the global BDS movement, while 
fully respecting the principle of context sensitivity—the idea that the call 
for BDS should be implemented in each community in a way that suits 
the particular circumstances in the local environment, as decided by 
local activists.”315 
 
 
Current BNC Europe Coordinator Michael Deas says that context sensitivity “[is a] 
really important principle that we interact with our partners. The idea is that each 
partner organization knows how best to move forward and develop the movement in 
that particular area and that particular context. It’s certainly not the role of the BNC to 
micro manage or dictate to partners what their strategy should be.”316 Referring to the 
                                                 
314 BDS Survey, Question Number 8. See Appendix II for complete survey. 
315 Hind Awwad, “Six Years of BDS: Success!” Ceasefire Magazine, 15 May 2012; 
https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/hind-awwad-six-years-bds-success/.  
316 Michael Deas, BNC, interview by author, 7 September 2012. 
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We Divest campaign against TIAA-CREFF, discussed in chapter three, Nadia Hijab 
says, “Through such context-specific actions, BDS is putting a financial price tag on 
Israel's occupation.”317  
Many of the early and foundational efforts that went into developing the BDS 
movement that were discussed in chapter one of this thesis on the emergence of the 
movement were context-specific actions. The divestment initiatives that emerged on 
university campuses around the US, in Christian churches, and in local and coalition-
based organizations outside Palestine were important for incorporating divestment as 
a viable tactic in the movement. Similarly, the initial academic boycott efforts in 
Britain, France, Australia and elsewhere, along with other early boycott efforts such 
as the 2001 boycott call from Israelis and Jews around the world and the 2002 call for 
cultural boycott that garnered signatories from 18 countries all helped set in motion 
the border-crossing BDS movement.  
    In addition to the foundational efforts that went into establishing a context-
sensitive, decentralized border-crossing movement, the case studies in this thesis 
show how context-specific campaigns are organized in the movement. The academic 
boycott in Britain that was discussed in chapter two of this thesis was established after 
the Roses publically called for a moratorium on joint research funding between the 
European Union and Israel. Their call for a moratorium was context-specific – they 
are both scholars that live and work in the European Research Area. In addition, the 
work for boycott in the academic unions in Britain involved passing motions there in 
local branches and national councils. The motions largely had to do with British 
institutions and British academics, and their relationships with Israeli institutions and 
                                                 
317 Nadia Hijab, “For Human Rights Advocates, Supporting BDS is a No-Brainer,” bitterlemons, 21 
July 2011, Edition 22; www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1414.  
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academics. Finally, BRICUP’s mission and activities play a critical role in 
operationalizing an academic boycott of Israel in Britain. BRICUP was established 
after the call for an academic and cultural boycott in 2004 by PACBI. PACBI (a BNC 
member) and BRICUP communicate and coordinate with each other, however; 
BRICUP Secretary Robert Boyce recalled a disagreement between the two and said, 
“PACBI didn’t dictate. We had a serious debate about it and simply chose to differ in 
the end.”318 
Also, the We Divest campaign that was discussed in chapter three of this 
thesis is based and organized outside the Middle East. We Divest is a US-based 
divestment initiative that targets TIAA-CREF – one of the largest retirement fund 
providers in the US. The campaign is based and organized entirely in the US. 
Activists there decided the target (TIAA-CREF), the tactic (divestment), and at the 
national and local level sub-tactics are chosen among activists there (petitions, 
shareholder resolutions, flashmobs, protests, etc.). The BNC endorsed the We Divest 
campaign and supports its activities, but it does not lead the campaign.  
Similarly, the consumer boycott campaigns against Ahava discussed in chapter 
four of this thesis have taken place outside Palestine and without direction from the 
BNC. Code Pink’s Stolen Beauty Campaign, Open Shuhada Street in South Africa, 
the Presbyterian Church (USA), the Dutch Badjassenbrigade, and various groups in 
London such as PSC and London BDS have targeted Ahava through demonstrations, 
direct-actions, letter-writing campaigns, and approaching celebrities in their own 
locales. Similar to the We Divest campaign against TIAA-CREF, the BNC has 
endorsed many of the campaigns against Ahava, and actively encourages the boycott 
of Ahava products, but it does not lead these campaigns abroad.  
                                                 
318 Robert Boyce, BRICUP, interview by author, 18 June 2013.  
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Although not studied as a case in this thesis, the BDS campaign against G4S is 
another major campaign in the movement. G4S is a British private security 
corporation that provides security services and equipment for Israel’s prisons, 
checkpoints, military bases, police stations, and private businesses inside the occupied 
Palestinian territories and Israel. In 2012, Palestinian political prisoners held inside 
Israel’s prisons began a mass hunger strike, and BDS campaigns started developing to 
hold G4S accountable by calling on companies and public bodies to cancel their 
contacts with G4S. In recounting how the campaign against G4S developed Michael 
Deas, the BNC Europe Coordinator said,     
 
“The G4S call for example, that wasn’t a bunch of people sitting in 
Palestine deciding on G4S. The decision to achieve its goal and provide 
support to G4S campaigns came out of knowing that there was already 
a body of work taking place on G4S in Belgium, Denmark, the UK, and 
partners elsewhere in Europe and the US. That particular moment, in the 
middle of the hunger strike, releasing the call and working with 
[Palestinian] organizations like Adameer who are directly involved in 
the hunger strike to produce stuff on G4S, turned out to be really helpful 
to ongoing [G4S] campaigns.”319 
 
 
Campaigns such as G4S, We Divest, the academic boycott in Britain, and product 
boycotts against Ahava comprise the BDS movement. Without local campaigns, the 
movement could not exist in its current form. Therefore, the role of local organizing 
and context-sensitivity plays a significant part in the structure and processes of the 
movement, specifically how the movement is organized across borders in a 
decentralized manner. PACBI coherently summarized the movement in the following 
statement:  
 
“As was the case in the international struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa, taking guidance from broadly-endorsed representatives of the 
oppressed, in this case the Palestinian leadership of the BDS movement, 
                                                 
319 Michael Deas, BNC, interview by author, 7 September 2012. 
195 
 
 
the BNC, and respecting boycott guidelines set by the great majority in 
the oppressed society is an ethical obligation for any conscientious 
person or group genuinely standing in solidarity with the oppressed. This 
must be understood in the context of a decentralized global movement 
based on respect for partners’ tactics and choice of targets, so long as 
the overall principles of the movement are safeguarded.”320 
 
 
The role of context-specific local organizing is paramount to understanding the larger 
organizational dynamics of the broader transnational BDS movement. The 
operationalization of the movement in this way allows activists to challenge Israel in 
different contexts around the world and bring the Palestinian struggle to range of sites 
such as boardrooms and storefronts. The various BDS campaigns around the world 
are nodes across borders that form the web of the BDS movement. These activists, 
groups, campaigns, etc. are connected to each other through networks. These 
networks provide the infrastructure for border-crossing coordination in the movement. 
 
5.3  Networks and Border-Crossing Coordination  
 
 
Tilly’s influential definition of social movements emphasizes the fact that they are 
sustained interactions between participants making collective claims at power 
holders.321 While useful for understanding certain movements, the formal state-based 
model that Tilly suggests does not account for many contemporary social movements 
engaged in transnational activism. Mario Diani, on the other hand, argues that social 
movements are more than the sum of sustained interactions and instead exemplify 
particular political and social forms of collective action. According to Diani, social 
movements are “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, 
groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a 
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shared collective identity.”322 In their work on transnational advocacy networks, Keck 
and Sikkink say, “The network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open 
relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized 
areas.”323 Conceptualizing the BDS movement in this way emphasizes its networked 
nature and is useful for analyzing its border-crossing structure and processes, which in 
part indicates how the movement is organized.  
Many contemporary social movements, including the BDS movement, are 
comprised largely of groups and organizations that work with or have connections 
with other groups. Within the movement, there is extensive layering in the networks, 
further contributing to the dynamic web that forms the border-crossing BDS 
movement. According Keck and Sikkink, networks are “communicative structures” 
and “the flow of information among actors in the network reveals a dense web of 
connections among these groups, both formal and informal.”324 In the following 
paragraphs, I show the “dense web of connections” among some of the participant 
groups in the BDS movement. I outline how groups and organizations working in the 
BDS movement are networked, and how the movement is coordinated through its 
participants’ websites, social networking sites, email lists, and frequent conferences. 
The movement is comprised of networks upon networks and through informal, loose 
coordination, which further illustrates the movement’s decentralized structure and 
fluid organizational processes.  
As was explained in chapter two of this thesis, BRICUP is one of the main 
groups in Britain promoting an academic boycott of Israel. The group has worked 
                                                 
322 Mario Diani, “The Concept of Social Movement,” The Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (February 
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323 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Google ebook, 22.  
324 Ibid, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” UNESCO (1999), 
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with numerous groups such as PSC, BIG, J-BIG, BIN, and the Architects and 
Planners campaign. In addition, a number of BRICUP members have been active in 
the academic unions, which as discussed in the case study chapter, have repeatedly 
debated and voted on boycott-related matters. In addition to these formal networks 
and areas of coordination, scholars and cultural workers often have other networks 
(formal and informal), such as professional networks, that may be utilized to 
disseminate information and garner support for specific campaigns or events.  
The We Divest campaign that was analyzed in chapter three of this thesis is 
coordinated as a coalition-based initiative. JVP has local offices across the US that 
work with other groups in their locales. Adalah-NY works with other New York-
based groups on a number of campaigns and actions. Among other activities in 2013, 
they participated in protest against SodaStream with JVP-NY and Park Slope Food 
Coop Members for BDS. On the TIAA-CREF Student Day of Action, they 
participated in demonstrations with New York City-based SJP chapters. The group 
also participated in a number of conferences, workshops, and other educational 
activities such as the US Campaign to End the Occupation’s 12th Annual Organizers 
Conference, and organized cross-issue events such as “Building Solidarity across 
Black, Native American, and Palestinian Struggles,” featuring discussion and 
music.325  
Other members in the We Divest Coordinating Committee such the US 
Campaign to End the Occupation, is a coalition-organization that currently comprises 
over 400 Palestine solidarity groups across the US, and the USPCN is a network of 
diaspora Palestinians throughout the US. The AFSC has 38 offices in the US and has 
a presence in 15 international locations. The AFSC Screen List of 29 companies 
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mentioned in chapter four was taken from the New England Conference of the United 
Methodist Church that was researched and compiled with the assistance of Who 
Profits. It was also the list that the Mennonite Central Committee would go onto use 
for monitoring its investments starting in 2013. Grassroots International works with 
partners in 13 countries. As stated in the case study, nearly all organizations that 
Grassroots International works with in Palestine are signatories to the 2005 
Palestinian call for BDS. In addition to these networks, the companies targeted within 
the campaign against TIAA-CREF (Africa Israel, Caterpillar, Elbit, G4S, Hewlett-
Packard, Motorola, Northrop Grumman, SodaStream and Veolia) are the same targets 
in other BDS campaigns, thus providing opportunities for networking and 
coordinating with other Palestine solidarity groups and/or the BNC.   
In the consumer boycotts against Ahava that were discussed in chapter four of 
this this thesis, many of the groups active are also working on other issues and 
coordinating with a variety of other groups. Codepink, the group that organizes the 
Stolen Beauty campaign against Ahava, works on numerous other campaigns (outside 
the BDS movement) and has an entire web page with links to a long list of “campaign 
allies.”326 PSC in the UK has over 40 branches working on a number of Palestine-
related campaigns and coordinates with trade unions, students, faith groups, and other 
Palestine solidarity groups. Numerous PSC activists are involved in other groups such 
as trade unions in the UK, and the PSC has recently announced that it will be 
coordinating a trade union network to strengthen and widen work on Palestine in UK 
trade unions. At the regional level, PSC works to ensure Palestine is on the EU 
agenda with the European Coordination of Committees and Associations for 
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Palestine, which is comprised of 52 European committees, organizations, NGOs, 
unions and international solidarity movements from 22 European countries.  
As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the BDS movement is comprised 
of extensive connections among groups. Palestine solidarity groups work with other 
Palestine solidarity groups. Christian churches active in issues related to the Middle 
East work together and share information, particularly regarding divestment. Large 
organizations such as AFSC and Grassroots International have partner organizations 
in several other countries. Various groups participate in cross-issue events and 
numerous groups have allies and partners working on issues other than Palestine. In 
addition, common targets within the movement provide the opportunity for 
networking and coordinating. Illustrating the extensive networks present in the BDS 
movement is useful for understanding its structure and processes, as they in part 
describe how the movement is organized. 
Similar to much of the BDS movement, coordination through these networks 
is often informal. Groups can and do coordinate with each other and the BNC on 
campaigns, actions, events, etc. although none of it is required within the movement. 
In the organizational survey that I conducted on the BDS movement, the following 
two statements were posed to Palestine solidarity groups: “My group coordinates with 
the Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC)” and “My group coordinates with 
other Palestine solidarity groups on BDS campaigns.” 75 groups responded to the first 
statement and 78 responded to the second statement. With respect to coordination 
with the BNC, 18 (24 percent) responded Frequently, 37 (49.3 percent) responded As 
Needed, and 20 (26.7 percent) responded Never. Regarding coordination with other 
200 
 
 
Palestine solidarity groups, 47 (60.3 percent) responded Frequently, 30 (38.5 percent) 
responded As Needed and 1 (1.3 percent) responded Never.327    
In addition to the above statements in the organizational survey, groups were 
asked if coordination with the BNC and other Palestine solidarity groups working on 
BDS campaigns should increase. 76 responded to the first statement regarding 
coordination with the BNC and 74 responded to the statement regarding coordination 
with other Palestine solidarity groups. With respect to the first statement that 
coordination should increase with the BNC, 23 (30.3 percent) responded Strongly 
Agree, 35 (47.4 percent) Agree, 14 (18.4 percent) Neutral, 2 (2.6 percent) Disagree, 
and 1 (1.3 percent) Strongly Disagree. With respect to the second statement that 
coordination with other Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns 
should increase 35 (47.3 percent) responded Strongly Agree, 27 (36.5 percent) Agree, 
12 (16.2 percent) Neutral, and none responded Disagree or Strongly Disagree.328  
  Taken together, the survey data indicates that coordination is medium between 
Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS and the BNC (just as many groups 
frequently or never coordinate as those that coordinate on an as needed basis). Thus, 
most groups coordinate on an as needed basis with the BNC, although many groups 
believe that coordination should increase.  
With respect to Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns there is strong 
coordination (of those groups that responded to the question, only one said they had 
never coordinated with another group). The same amount of groups think 
coordination between Palestine solidarity groups and the BNC should increase as 
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those that believe that coordination among Palestine solidarity groups working on 
BDS campaigns should also increase.  
To assist in this coordination through its networks, various tools are utilized in 
the movement such as group or campaign websites, social networking through 
Facebook, Twitter, etc., and email groups and lists. In addition to internet-based tools, 
frequent conferences and other events such as Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) have 
regularly brought people together to share knowledge and further develop the 
movement. According to Jeffrey Juris, “…Internet use, including electronic 
distribution lists and interactive web pages has broadly facilitated new patterns of 
social engagement…Using the Internet as technological infrastructure, such 
movements are increasingly ‘glocal,’ operating at both local and global levels, while 
seamlessly integrating both online and off-line political activity.”329 In this way, the 
BDS movement combines a variety of mechanisms for coordinating movement 
campaigns locally and across borders.  
Nearly every group and organization involved in the BDS movement has an 
extensive website. BRICUP’s has a plethora of news and analysis on its homepage, in 
addition to the BRICUP newsletter (currently 85 editions available online), an 
events/action calendar, background information and links for reading, podcasts, 
information on other campaigns, and ways to get involved. The We Divest website 
has information on the campaign, TIAA-CREF, and the companies targeted as part of 
the campaign. On the homepage, activists can sign the petition, get information on 
upcoming events, tools for organizing a local campaign, read posts from social 
networking sites, and donate to the campaign. Similarly, the Stolen Beauty campaign 
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website by Codepink has information on Ahava and the campaign to boycott the 
company, sign the boycott pledge and other ways to take action, links to the campaign 
on social networking sites, the latest BDS-related news, and the reports by al-Haq, 
Who Profits, and the EU that were mentioned in chapter four.   
These websites act as info sites and portals within the transnational, 
decentralized, networked movement. On the surface, the websites provide a wealth of 
information on Palestine, the BDS movement, and its campaigns. Border-crossing 
aspects of the movement can be found in the multiple languages available for key 
documents in the movement and its campaigns. For example, the BDS movement 
website has the 2005 Palestinian call for BDS available in English, Arabic, Spanish, 
French, Italian, German, and Hebrew. The boycott pledge on the Stolen Beauty 
website is available in Arabic, Czech, Dutch, English, French, Hebrew, and Spanish. 
In addition to news and information, many websites in the movement contain 
information for activists to participate in the movement and provide “activist tool 
kits” – specific information for organizing local campaigns or actions and educational 
materials such as factsheets, flyers, and posters to support the creation of local 
campaigns and/or actions. These groups actively facilitate the further development of 
a decentralized movement by encouraging the proliferation of local, context-specific 
campaigns.  
While still in its infancy when the BDS movement was first being established, 
the use of social networking through sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Google+, Instagram, Flikr, Tumblr, Pinterest, etc. has become more common for 
organizing and coordinating the border-crossing movement. Nearly all groups and/or 
campaigns in the movement have a presence on social media and anyone can join 
BDS groups on Facebook or follow a group on Twitter. Groups and campaigns 
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frequently share or retweet each other’s posts contributing to information sharing 
within the movement. Some events are live tweeted, depending on the activists 
present and their interest in doing so. Anyone can film a protest or flashmob and 
upload the video to YouTube, and some of the campaigns feature YouTube videos on 
their websites of past actions or activities. While the use of social networking sites has 
clearly increased in recent years, they have not completely replaced other forms of 
electronic communication (e.g. email), which still plays an important role in 
coordinating the movement.   
As is the case with websites and social media in the BDS movement, all 
groups and organizations have email groups or lists. Similar to other internet-based 
tools in the movement, email lists are used to facilitate organizing in the movement by 
disseminating news, information, and updates. Despite a range of other web tools 
available, email groups and lists are still important for organizing and coordinating 
the movement as almost everyone has an email address. Email lists provide the ability 
to quickly communicate with numerous people, thus enabling much of the day-to-day 
coordination and decision-making that takes place within the movement.  
In addition to internet-based tools used to facilitate organizing in the border-
crossing movement, coordinating the broader movement has taken place during 
frequent conferences, workshops, symposia, etc. While not all conferences have been 
mentioned in this thesis, those that have include the five conferences of the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement on US university campuses in the early 2000s, the 2004 
conference at SOAS, the 2007 conference in Ramallah that led to the creation of the 
BNC the following year, the Bilbao Initiative in 2008, and the US Campaign to End 
the Occupation Annual Organizer’s Conference. Other major conferences include the 
annual BDS conference in Palestine that the BNC has organized since 2010. In 
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addition to conferences, IAW has been a major event for coordinating and further 
developing the movement. The stated aim of the IAW “is to educate people about the 
nature of Israel as an apartheid system and to build Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions (BDS) campaigns as part of a growing global BDS movement.”330 Since 
IAW began in 2005 in Toronto it has increased to over 100 cities in 2015, and 
includes lectures, films, workshops, demonstrations, and other activities for 
organizing and coordinating the movement.  
The dense web of connections among groups in the BDS movement indicates 
that much of the movement’s structure consists of extensive networks through which 
coordination is informal and nonobligatory. Extensive linkages and support for 
starting context-specific campaigns facilitate the further development of a 
transnational BDS movement for Palestinian justice. Networks and border-crossing 
coordination in the movement contribute to its decentralization and fluidity. These 
aspects are important for identifying how the BDS movement organizationally 
represents a new way of challenging Israel across borders.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined the BDS movement’s organizational structure and 
processes, referencing throughout aspects of the case studies in this thesis to highlight 
how the movement is organized. In particular, I have outlined the structure of the 
Palestinian BNC and addressed the question of a Palestinian-led movement. In this 
regard, I have argued that the movement’s principals and goals, the historical 
repertoire of boycott in the Palestinian struggle, key foundational efforts in 
establishing the movement, and all aspects related to the movement in the Palestinian 
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territories are Palestinian-led. Beyond these areas, there is much autonomy in local 
campaigns around the world. I then considered the concept of context-specificity and 
the role of local organizing in the movement, arguing that these are key components 
of the border-crossing movement and that the movement could not exist in its current 
form without these necessary local campaigns. Finally, I considered networks and 
border-crossing coordination in the movement. I showed how groups working in the 
movement form a dense web of connections, and through these networks, the 
movement is coordinated across borders.       
It is important to identify these aspects of the movement’s structure and 
processes because it shows how the movement is a new and different way of 
challenging Israel. Transnational activism organized in this way in the Palestinian 
struggle has not been seen in the past. Specific aspects of the movement are 
necessarily Palestinian-led, but the question of leadership in the movement, even 
when examining the role and relationships of the BNC, does not suggest a formal top-
down, centralized command structure from Palestine (or Palestinians in the diaspora 
as was the case when the PLO directed the national liberation movement from 
abroad). No other time in Palestinian history has witnessed such fluid structures and 
processes on a transnational level for organizing in the Palestinian struggle. 
Specifically, when boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-normalization have been 
historically used in the Palestinian struggle, as shown in chapter one of this thesis, 
they have largely been localized, at best regional, initiatives.   
The movement’s organizational structures and processes have facilitated the 
development of a movement that resists the fragmentation of Israel’s policies that 
separates Palestinians in the diaspora, the occupied territories, and in Israel from one 
another. Principles and goals of the movement are shaped from these historically 
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specific experiences while the ability to participate in the movement anywhere and 
create context-specific campaigns makes possible a transnational movement. 
Coordination through movement networks illustrates how the BDS movement is a 
web of activity across borders. The transnational movement’s decentralized and 
networked structure, along with fluid organizational processes all contribute to a new 
and different way of challenging Israel, which can affect future dynamics in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
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Chapter 6 – Strategizing Movement Outcomes 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I considered the causes, both in terms of structure 
and agency, which led to the creation and development of a border-crossing BDS 
movement for Palestinian justice. Then, I examined and analyzed in detail specific 
BDS campaigns in three case study chapters to illuminate the inner-workings and 
dynamics of the movement through its constituent campaigns. In the previous chapter, 
I investigated the movement’s structure and processes, specifically referencing the 
case study chapters throughout, to illustrate how the decentralized movement is 
organized at the grassroots level across borders. In this chapter, I consider how the 
movement might strategically conceptualize moving towards achieving outcomes. I 
suggest that this may be done by acknowledging and advancing the movement’s 
position in a global justice framework and by handling its limitations.  
In the sections that follow, I first consider the BDS movement in a global 
justice framework to situate the movement in a larger transnational context. In 
particular, I analyze four main points of intersection between the BDS movement and 
other movements working on causes related to global justice. In the sub-sections 
within this category, I outline how the movement’s frames, targets, tactics, and 
organizational structures and processes parallel other contemporary transnational 
social movements oriented around justice. In identifying a larger context for the 
movement and its connective linkages with other movements I argue that the BDS 
movement utilizes these points of intersection to broaden its base of support among 
like-minded activists not necessarily engaged in the Palestinian cause. In the second 
part of the chapter, I explore challenges and limitations of the movement. In line with 
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crafting movement-relevant research, I consider three main impediments for the 
movement. The first is that the BDS movement alone cannot solve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The second is that the movement’s structure and processes can be 
a weakness, and lastly, not all movement targets are familiar and legitimate to 
activists not involved in the Palestinian struggle. With each challenge, I consider why 
this may be a limitation for the movement, and how the movement might manage 
these difficulties to offset opponents’ objectives of distracting or debilitating the 
movement.  
 
6.1  BDS in a Global Justice Framework  
 
 
Historically, the current BDS movement for Palestinian justice has the closest 
resemblance to the BDS activities that were part of an anti-apartheid movement 
against the ruling white regime in South Africa. As suggested in the review of this 
literature in the introduction to this thesis, these tactics were utilized over decades and 
were part of a larger strategy that was successful in ending formal apartheid in that 
country. In comparison to more recent movements, the BDS movement shares 
similarities and connections with a number of movements. According to John Collins,  
 
“For those who see it as the last remaining struggle against colonialism, 
it is the quintessential Third World issue, one that still awaits resolution 
in the form of Palestinian statehood. For others, however, Palestine’s 
primary importance lies in its connection with wider struggles for social, 
economic, and even environmental justice.”331 
 
 
The BDS movement is similar to other movements working on global justice in a 
number of ways. First, the movement frames are familiar and accessible to a range of 
activists. Collective action frames such as justice, international law, human rights, 
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corporate complicity, socially responsible investment, etc. resonate with a wide 
variety of activists. Second, many of the targets of BDS campaigns are within the 
purview of other activists. In particular, the corporate targets, some of which have 
been named in the thesis (e.g. Caterpillar, Ahava, G4S, etc.), make sense and are 
legitimate targets for their profit making at the expense of human rights or the 
environment, among other reasons. Third, the tactics – boycott, divestment, and 
sanctions – are enduring tactical repertoires that have been historically applied to a 
range of issues around the world, and often have been effective in pressuring for 
change. Finally, the organizational structure and processes that were analyzed in the 
previous chapter are well-known ways of organizing among a variety of activists 
working on issues related to anti-globalization and global justice. Because these four 
main areas represent potential intersection with other movements, the BDS movement 
provides a way for people to come to the Palestine issue. The similarities with other 
movements opens doors of opportunity for coalitional and cross-sector organizing 
through ways of thinking (frames, targets) and acting (tactics, organizational structure 
and processes) about Palestine and the world overall.  
It is important that BDS is organized in ways similar to other movements, 
particularly to those working in the global justice movement, because it indicates a 
number of features about current activism relating to Palestine and about transnational 
activism relating to global justice more generally. The former is noteworthy because 
the ways that the BDS movement is organized represents a new way of confronting 
Israel. While the BDS movement has firm historical roots in Palestinian resistance to 
colonial rule as illustrated in chapter one of this thesis, the structure and processes of 
the movement take on a new form of transnational activism in the Palestinian 
struggle. This organizing is intrinsically border-crossing as demonstrated in chapter 
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one of this thesis, and opens possibilities for expanding mobilization by bringing new 
participants and bystander support to the Palestinian issue through common ways of 
thinking and acting. In addition to this, similarities between the BDS movement and 
other movements are important because it indicates how a portion of transnational 
activism is being operationalized, specifically among those movements organizing 
around the idea that “another world is possible.” Within a global justice framework, 
Palestinian freedom and justice are part of this actualization as the continued 
oppression of Palestinians through violations of their rights are unacceptable to 
activists trying to create a more just and equitable world.  
While this chapter seeks to identify points of intersection between the BDS 
movement and other movements working on global justice related issues, it is 
important to point out that the BDS movement is unlike many groups or organizations 
working within a global justice framework. For example, large NGOs such as 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, HRW, etc. are very active in the global justice 
movement, though have little resemblance to the BDS movement overall particularly 
regarding tactical repertoire and organizational structures and processes. These 
international NGOs do however share some similarities in frames and targets with the 
BDS movement, and some are indirectly involved in the movement through the 
production of research and information regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g. 
Amnesty International and HRW reports on companies such as Caterpillar mentioned 
in chapter one of this thesis). In the following sections, I outline the similarities 
(frames, tactics, targets, and organizational dynamics) among justice-oriented 
movements to analyze how the BDS movement broadens its base of support among 
amenable activists working on other causes.   
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Frames  
 
 
The theoretical concept of collective action frames within the social movement 
literature is useful for understanding how social movements work as they are 
mobilized partly through the ideas they advocate. With respect to movements working 
on global justice related issues, Della Porta says: 
 
“Transnational campaigns against multinational corporations such as De 
Beers, Microsoft, Monsanto, and Nike favored transnational networking 
and the building of global frames of action. The underlying logic of 
many movement campaigns is the ‘naming and shaming,’ which 
especially when targeting multinationals, aims at increasing public 
awareness of especially glaring cases of ignoring human rights – 
spreading detailed information and often asking people to punish the 
companies involved by boycotting their products.”332 
 
 
Similar to other social movements, BDS activists frame their campaigns around 
particular themes to construct an alternative way of seeing and thinking about 
Israel/Palestine. Reorienting the conceptual focus of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
around specific ideas such as Palestinian rights or corporate complicity in Israel’s 
occupation challenges dominant and existing frames of the conflict that stress Israel’s 
securitization. Framing the movement through these lenses is important in 
constructing a way of thinking of Israel/Palestine that challenges the status quo while 
also indicating how the movement understands itself. By setting a conceptual program 
for collective action, strategic framing provides a bridge between the BDS movement 
and other movements working on justice related issues.  
In analyzing similar frames between the BDS movement and other movements 
it is useful to begin with one of the main themes underlying these movements – 
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justice. With respect to the global justice movement Della Ports says, “…the main 
aim of the movement(s) is the struggle for justice – a general term that encompasses 
more specific domains of intervention such as human rights, citizens’ rights, social 
rights, peace, the environment, and similar concerns.”333 In their mapping of “core 
ideological concepts” of actors within the global justice movement, Manfred Steger 
and Erin Wilson find that justice applies to range of entities such as governments, 
international financial institutions, and multinational corporations, and encompass 
broad themes such as poverty and climate change.334 With respect to rights, the 
authors note that this refers to universal rights – concepts that actors associate as 
being inherent and involve a range of rights that include human rights, women’s 
rights, workers’ rights, etc. According to the authors, 
 
“An emphasis on rights often informs the organization’s view of justice 
and how justice is to be pursued or realized in practice. Justice may be 
understood as the recognition and realization of rights – human, 
political, civil, economic, social and cultural, workers’ rights, and the 
many other types of rights that are talked about among the 
organizations.”335     
 
  
Justice for Palestinians is an underlying concept in the BDS movement. In the 
“Introducing the BDS Movement” on the movement’s website, it states, “BDS is a 
strategy that allows people of conscience to play an effective role in the Palestinian 
struggle for justice.”336 The global call for BDS made by Palestinian organizations in 
2005 mentions injustice twice and justice once in the short text, and the strategic 
position paper that the BNC adopted in 2008 that was mentioned in the previous 
chapter has “Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People” as its subtitle. Although 
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the 2005 call for BDS does not prescribe any particular political solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clearly the three demands suggest a common foundation 
among Palestinians for a just remedy to violations of their rights.  
In addition to the prominent theme of justice, Jeffrey Ayres argues that from 
approximately the 1980s onward, activists started to develop a transnational “anti-
neoliberal” globalization master frame. Though grievances to neoliberal policies had 
started to take shape in national and regional contexts in previous decades (what some 
scholars refer to as the “new social movements”), these ideas needed to be coalesced 
together to form a master frame that could carry the very diverse and pressing 
concerns of a range of people and issues around the world. According to Della Porta 
et. al., the process of developing a master frame was negotiated and led to a broad and 
generalizable frame – one that could include the wide diversity of struggles around 
the world. 337 Ayres says this master frame carried “…such various concerns as the 
degradation of the environment, emerging democratic deficits and the decline of 
popular sovereignty, human rights abuses under sweatshop conditions, or even 
opposition to the US war in Iraq or the rights or Palestinian refugees…”338 
While the anti-neoliberal globalization frame of anti-globalization and global 
justice movements is not a central frame of the BDS movement, a related concept – 
that of corporate complicity – in Israel’s policies and practices that violate Palestinian 
rights is. This can be seen in numerous local BDS campaigns, and was specifically 
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evidenced in the case study chapters on the We Divest campaign and product boycotts 
against Ahava. Similar to the idea of justice, the BDS movement sees not just the state 
of Israel, but also all those who are connected to the state’s violations of international 
law and Palestinians rights, as complicit and a potential target of the movement. In 
particular, there is a close connection between the BDS movement and other 
movements working on justice related issues in an underlying critique of the 
increasing power of corporations, particularly those that blatantly put profit making 
before human rights or environmental concerns.   
In a similar vein, ideas relating to corporate social responsibility and socially 
responsible investment have risen in importance for a variety of activists and 
movements. Specifically activism from the 1960s-70s, in which social movements 
surrounding civil rights, the Vietnam war, women’s issues, and nuclear energy all 
contributed to a growing discourse of socially responsible investment. This set a 
foundation for pressuring the ruling South African apartheid regime through 
investment-related activism in the 1980s, and continued to gain traction as major 
events such as Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Exxon Valdez illuminated environmental 
considerations. According to Gay Seidamn, “By the late 1990s, in part because of the 
experiences with transnational campaigns with the anti-apartheid movement and the 
Nestle campaign, business leaders were much more likely to accept some level of 
social responsibility in the communities where they did business.”339 More recently, 
activists have used SRI to address issues of human rights, work place conditions, and 
climate change.  
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In addition to ideas of corporate social responsibility and socially responsible 
investment, activists in the past decades have increasingly relied on the discourse of 
international law, specifically human rights, to press for change. Smith, who has 
extensively researched transnational social movements, particularly anti-globalization 
and global justice movements notes,  
 
“An important element…is to expose the hypocrisy of governments, 
which often sign international human rights treaties to enhance their 
image in the eyes of the international community while continuing to 
violate international norms. Activists appeal to international law, and the 
gaps between a government’s words and deeds, as a source of political 
leverage in their struggles against national governments…they seek to 
raise the legitimacy costs to government’s wishing to preserve 
autonomy in ways that go against international norms.”340 
 
 
Jean Quataert argues that with respect to human rights the interplay between 
numerous struggles and mobilizations for rights on the ground and the development of 
institutional mechanisms for monitoring and protection mainly through the United 
Nations has led to the rise of a human rights discourse among a range of activists and 
social movements. In addition, the spread of the discourse can be found in the 
increase of NGOs dedicated to human rights, especially since the 1960s-70s. This 
includes a vast array of organizations including NGOs that monitor and lobby for 
human rights, transnational professional organizations (e.g. Doctors without Borders), 
and transnational advocacy organizations (e.g. Amnesty International and HRW). 341 
According to Quataert, “By the last third of the twentieth century, the language of 
human rights has become an increasingly effective medium by which to press a moral 
claim.”342 
                                                 
340 Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy, 159.  
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In her study of the BDS movement, Carter Hallward says the movement is 
“Operating from a justice-oriented framework that seeks to ensure human rights and 
the application of international law…” and that Palestinians attempt to appeal to 
people across the world in the 2005 global call to “demonstrate their legitimacy 
through international law…”343 Likewise, Palestinian legal scholar Noura Erakat 
states that the BDS call is based “within the universal frame of international law and 
human rights norms…”344 Furthermore she says that in contradistinction to the 
discourse of terrorism and securitization that is proffered by Israel, “Human rights 
discourse, together with growing popular movements, has steadily exposed the 
bankruptcy of this security framework and helped reframe the Palestinian question as 
an indigenous struggle against colonial domination in the global north.”345 In this 
way, the BDS movement frames the Palestinian struggle through themes and ideas 
that can resonate with activists not specific to the Palestinian cause.  
The continuity between the collective action frames (justice, anti-neoliberal 
globalization/corporate complicity, socially responsible investment, international law, 
human rights) that are utilized in the BDS movement and other movements working 
on global justice causes suggest shared ideas and values among activists seeking to 
create a more just and equitable world. Framing the BDS movement in this way 
positions it among a range of movements, in which activists interpret other problems 
and solutions in the world in common ways. For many activists working on anti-
globalization or causes connected to global justice the discourse of justice, rights, 
corporate complicity, etc. is the parlance of our times. By portraying the Palestinian 
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struggle through these common lenses, the BDS movement unleashes an underlying 
potential to mobilize new participants and garner bystander support for the movement 
and the Palestinian cause more generally.  
 
Targets  
 
 
Targets of divestment initiatives, consumer boycott, and other boycotts are selected 
because they are connected in some way with the state of Israel’s policies and 
practices toward Palestinians. Many targets within the BDS movement, especially 
corporate targets, are legitimate to activists not specific to the Palestinian cause. Some 
of these targets have been mentioned throughout this thesis such as: Ahava, 
SodaStream, Eden Springs, Caterpillar, G4S, HP, Hadiklaim, Carmel Agrexco, 
Veolia, Alstom, and Elbit. Corporate targets of BDS campaigns always have a clear 
connection to the state of Israel, which forms the basis for boycott or divestment and 
is used as the foundation for initiating and developing any campaign. The targets are 
important because they are used to illustrate Israel’s policies and practices that violate 
international law and Palestinian rights. In addition to their specific problematic 
connection with the state of Israel via its relationship with Palestinians, corporate 
targets within the BDS movement are also problematic in ways not necessarily 
specific to Israel/Palestine. For instance, Eden Spring and Ahava raise issues of 
resource privatization, G4S and Elbit are part of a global military and security 
industry, and Carmel Agrexo and Hadiklaim bring up the theft of natural resources 
and food sovereignty.  
Corporate targets, such as those named above, are justifiable not just within 
the BDS movement but to activists that have concerns with neoliberal globalization 
and corporate complicity in violations of the rights of an indigenous population. In 
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this regard, Israel’s insertion into the global economy has been well documented. 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler’s, The Global Political Economy of Israel, 
remains the most extensive investigation into the subject. They demonstrate through 
different periods of capitalist development how Israel has transformed over decades to 
a globally integrated economy. In addition to academic studies, Israel’s economy, and 
its dominant industries (e.g. technology, security, etc.), are the subject of much 
journalistic inquiry. For example, Israel plays a major role in weapons exports around 
the world. According to the British defense publication Janes, Israel was the sixth 
largest arms exporter in 2012, more than doubling its exports from 2001-2012.346 One 
of the industry’s largest selling points is that its technologies are “combat proven,” 
indicating that technologies battle-tested (in occupied territories) are marketable in the 
global arms industry. Canadian journalist Naomi Klein, who has extensively covered 
issues such as the anti-globalization movement, Israel/Palestine, and climate change, 
stated, “Israel has learned to turn endless war into a brand asset, pitching its 
uprooting, occupation, and containment of the Palestinian people as a half-century 
head start in the ‘global war on terror.’”347  
It is no surprise that in 2011, the BNC officially called for a comprehensive 
military embargo on Israel. According to the call, 
 
“A comprehensive military embargo on Israel is long overdue. It forms 
a crucial step towards ending Israel’s unlawful and criminal use of force 
against the Palestinian people and other peoples and states in the region, 
and it constitutes an effective, non-violent measure to pressure Israel to 
comply with its obligations under international law.”348  
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In addition to the call, the BNC produced a background paper supporting the call. The 
paper “examines the legal framework in which the call is made,” highlighting the 
lawful and unlawful use of armed force by states in international law, Israel’s record 
of unlawful use of armed force, Israel’s military industry, the role of the Israeli 
academy in supporting violations of international law, and the international 
community’s responsibility to act.  
In addition to academic studies, journalistic coverage, the movement’s own 
analyses on BDS targets, numerous activist-produced resources abound with data and 
information regarding Israel’s economy that BDS activists utilize in forming 
campaigns against specific targets. According to South African professor and activist 
Salim Vally, “…careful research played an important role in exposing the economic, 
cultural, and armament trade links with South Africa to make our actions more 
effective as well as to ‘name and shame’ those who benefited from the apartheid 
regime.”349 Some of these resources and research for BDS activism has already been 
mentioned in this thesis such as Who Profits, the Israeli research center that 
investigates Israeli and international corporations that are involved in Israel’s 
occupation of Palestinian and Syrian lands. The center publishes reports and case 
studies (e.g. Ahava, SodaStream, and G4S) and has one of the most extensive online 
databases of corporations engaged in occupation-related activities.  
Corporate Watch, another example, is a UK-based research group that 
provides information and analysis on the impacts of corporations to activists. While 
the group compiles research on a range of topics, Palestine in one of their main 
research areas, and the group seeks to specifically compile relevant research for the 
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BDS movement. According to the group, “Since 2009 our Corporate Occupation 
research project has been providing information-for-action and analysis to the 
growing global BDS movement.”350 The group has published reports such as 
“Imprisoned voices: Corporate complicity in the Israeli prison system” (specifically 
addressing the role of G4S and HP), “Gaza: Life Beneath the Drones” (Elbit and 
Israel Aerospace Industries specifically highlighted) and the expansive Targeting 
Israeli Apartheid: A BDS Handbook. The near 400-page compendium (including 20 
chapters on sector specific industries) contains detailed information on corporations 
and suggestions for BDS targets of campaigns. These resources help inform activists 
about Israel’s political economy, specifically as it relates to policies and practices 
oppressing Palestinians, and directs activists towards potential targets for BDS 
campaigns.  
 
Tactics  
 
 
As indicated in the review of boycott literature in the introduction to this thesis, the 
tactic has been used as least since the concept was named after Captain Charles 
Boycott in the 19th century when laborers refused to harvest crops on the estate for 
which he was a land agent. Since that time, it has become a repertoire for 
understanding the concept of withdrawing support in some way. Many groups and 
social movements have utilized the tactic of boycott such as labor unions, animal 
rights groups, environmental organizations, faith-based groups, and consumer 
organizations. In the introduction to this thesis I listed several famous historical 
boycotts. More recent boycotts include those against Nike for its use of child labor in 
sweatshop factories, Coca-Cola for human rights abuses in Latin America and India, 
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Nestle for its promotion of baby formula in developing countries, Shell for its 
environmental degradation of the Niger Delta, and Chick-fil-A for its position on 
same-sex marriage.   
Divestment is most notably associated with the movement against apartheid in 
South Africa. Divestment initiatives were brewing for decades, although in the 1980s 
campaigns were greatly expanded and comprehensively enacted. More recently, 
divestment has been a popular tactic used to pressure the Sudanese government for its 
role in human rights abuses and among activists that seek to hold the fossil fuels 
industry accountable for its involvement in climate change. Similar to the BDS 
movement, activists use the tactic to pressure universities, municipalities, faith-based 
groups, and retirement funds to divest from companies complicit in activities that 
activists have identified as problematic.   
Any discussion of the movement’s tactics would be somewhat remiss if 
sanctions were not addressed in some fashion. This thesis has mainly examined the 
tactics of boycott and divestment as these are currently employed by BDS activists. 
The level of sanctions, largely the domain of states and international institutions, has 
not been covered for the most obvious reason that sanctions against Israel have not yet 
been exercised in any notable way for purposes of this thesis. There have been minor 
diplomatic and economic actions that could potentially be considered a sanction, 
though these are largely isolated incidences that often have little connection to the 
current BDS movement. It is possible that as boycott and divestment campaigns 
expand, new campaigns could be organized that specifically target governments or 
international bodies to sanction Israel. Though not currently engaged in any major 
way in the movement, the tactic itself is similar to boycott and divestment in that it is 
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familiar. It has been historically used in a number of instances, with the South African 
example as a key identifier for BDS and many other activists.  
In addition to the widely known tactics of BDS, the sub-tactics that many of 
the campaigns utilize are familiar forms of action. Some of these sub-tactics have 
been mentioned throughout this thesis, particularly in the case study chapters. With 
respect to the academic boycott in Britain, these sub-tactics include debating and 
passing boycott-related motions in unions, signing petitions, and making public 
statements regarding BDS by academics and cultural figures. The We Divest 
campaign has employed shareholder activism, protests, and flashmobs to 
operationalize its campaign across the US. Likewise, boycotts against Ahava have 
used protests (those in the US, UK, South Africa, and the Netherlands have been 
mentioned in this thesis), and have utilized creative tactics such as “guerilla theater” 
in their use of spa attire and other props to bring attention to the activities of the 
skincare company. As with the broad political tactics of the movement (BDS), the 
sub-tactics used by activists in their individual campaigns are familiar and legitimate 
ways to achieve campaign objectives.  
 
Organizational Structures and Processes  
 
 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the organizational structure and processes of the 
BDS movement. I showed how the movement is decentralized and in which ways 
specifically the movement is Palestinian-led. The movement is flexible in that there is 
a significant amount of autonomy in local campaigns. As demonstrated in the chapter, 
context sensitivity and the role of local organizing are critical components of a 
decentralized movement organized across borders. I referenced the case studies 
examined in this thesis (the academic boycott in Britain, the We Divest campaign, and 
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product boycotts against Ahava) throughout the preceding chapter, illustrating how 
context-specific campaigns are organized in the transnational movement. The 
movement has an undefined and fluid organizational structure that is comprised 
largely of networks of Palestinians and solidarity activists in their BDS campaigns, in 
which coordination through these networks is informal and at the will of those 
involved.    
Similar to frames, tactics, and targets, the organizational structure and 
processes of the BDS movement are similar to that of other movements working on 
global justice related issues across borders. In discussing Via Campesina and other 
groups and organizations in the book Food Security Governance, Nora McKeon 
notes, “Organizational modes that are able to operate effectively globally while 
respecting egalitarian horizontal exchanges and the autonomy of locally rooted action 
are the much quested-after holy grail of social movements generally, including the 
food sovereignty movement.”351 On its website, Via Campesina states that it “is a 
grassroots mass movement whose vitality and legitimacy comes from farmers’ 
organizations at local and national level. The movement is based on the 
decentralization of power between nine regions.”352 Similarly, in discussing the 
Occupy movement Alyssa Figueroa and Sarah Jaffe state, “What started as a couple 
hundred people in a park with no plan has turned into a decentralized, distributed 
network of activists, affinity groups, organizations and organizers, working on 
everything from free education to fracking.”353 While these movements work on a 
range of issues that are not directly connected to the Palestinian struggle, the BDS 
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movement, as a contemporary transnational social movement parallels the 
organizational dynamics of other current social movements working on global justice 
related issues.  
In all the ways elaborated above (frames, targets, tactics, and organizational 
dynamics), the BDS movement corresponds and shares connections with other 
contemporary social movements, particularly those organizing around causes 
associated with global justice. These are points of intersection between the BDS 
movement and other movements, which benefits the BDS movement for widening its 
base of support across borders. In identifying these connective linkages and their 
value to the BDS movement, activists will likely continue to strengthen these bonds 
with like-minded activists to interweave the Palestinian struggle into a larger global 
justice discourse. In doing so, the BDS movement not only positions itself to be more 
successful in meeting its objectives (the three demands of the call), but also playing a 
role in contributing to a more just world overall.     
 
6.2  Movement Challenges and Limitations    
 
 
As with all forms of collective action, and social movements specially, there are 
challenges and limitations of the BDS movement. Certainly, opponents of the 
movement are quick to locate areas of contention, some of which has been evidenced 
in the sub-sections “Dynamics between BDS Campaigners and Opponents” in the 
case study chapters. In line with conducting and crafting movement-relevant research, 
I will present areas that appear to be the most pressing challenges and limitations for 
the movement’s further development. In the following section, I outline three main 
challenges and limitations of the movement. The first is that the BDS movement alone 
cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The second is that the movement’s 
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structure and processes can leave it vulnerable to attack by opponents of the 
movement; and finally, not all targets of the movement are familiar or legitimate to 
activists working outside the Palestinian cause. For each of these limitations, I analyze 
why this aspect of the movement may be a challenge and then proffer how the 
movement might manage these impediments to minimize their impact on campaign 
and movement objectives.  
As indicated throughout this thesis, boycott, divestment, and sanctions are 
political tactics used for the strategic purpose of pressuring Israel to abide by 
international law and respect Palestinian rights. That said, the BDS movement does 
not comprise the entire Palestinian struggle; rather is a component of this process that 
exists alongside other tactics and forms of resistance against Israel. PACBI member 
al-Botmeh notes, “BDS should be looked at as part and parcel of the resistance 
movement – the popular committees, the BDS movement, stop the wall campaign, 
etc. All of these are closely linked by trying to think outside the box...”354 Similarly, 
Nidal Abu Zuluf of the YMCA and YWCA-Joint Advocacy Initiative states, 
 
“For all the signatories [to the BDS call] it is not the only strategy, but 
one. If you go to any of the organizations [in Palestine] that work on 
BDS, you see this is only part of the strategy that they developed, 
believing that it should accompany other strategies. To actually work on 
ending injustice here means that you also need to tackle the causes 
related to this.”355  
 
 
Clearly, the BDS movement has a role to play in the Palestinian struggle, particularly 
across borders, but for all its campaign achievements and its innovative new form of 
transnational activism in the struggle, the BDS movement alone cannot resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Erakat,  
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“…the three rights-based demands enshrined in the BDS call are 
necessary but not sufficient for the achievement of national self-
determination. In addition, they do not correspond to a particular 
political program among Palestinians…[thus] BDS’s major successes 
can only expand the call for rights….”356      
 
 
Given Erakat’s statement above, it is important to note again that the BDS movement 
takes no political position on a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This has 
been a critique of the movement from numerous scholars and activists alike, though 
arguably the call’s demands have acted as a common denominator and unifying force 
for gaining support and mobilizing participants.  
It is important that the BDS movement (part of the means) not be confused 
with the ends, whatever this may be. Political tactics alone, despite strategically 
forming a larger transnational movement, are but one piece of a much larger puzzle 
for resolving the decades-long colonial conflict. Here the lessons of the South African 
experience are all too apt. BDS campaigns were part of a broader movement to bring 
down apartheid, and although crucially important in that struggle, there was much 
work done on numerous other fronts to bring formal apartheid to an end in that 
country.  
Clearly the BDS movement is a critical element, among others, of the wider 
Palestinian struggle for justice and legal scholars such as Erakat are correct that the 
movement’s scope is insufficient for solving the Palestinian problem. It can, however, 
create conditions towards that end, which is important for understanding the value and 
power of the movement. According to BRICUP Secretary Robert Boyce,   
 
“As with all great events in modern history, it won’t be BDS movement 
alone that brings change, but as the crisis unfolds in the region, BDS 
offers another way of understanding it and giving it coherence for 
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people. This enables people to put what they read on the front page of 
the newspaper and the television news into a different context.”357  
 
  
Thus, the BDS movement has an important role to play in bringing the Palestinian 
struggle to many sites around the world, and provides a way for people to think (and 
potentially act) towards Palestine. I have argued throughout this thesis that the BDS 
movement embodies a new form of transnational activism in the Palestinian struggle, 
and thus a novel way to challenge Israel. It does this in various ways (e.g. its well-
known collective action frames and organizational dynamics), which should be 
appreciated and contextualized within the broader Palestinian struggle.  
The next challenge for the movement is in regards to its organizational 
dynamics. The organizational structures and processes of the BDS movement were 
analyzed in depth in the previous chapter, and I argued in the previous section that 
these dynamics are comparable to other contemporary social movements working on 
causes associated with global justice. In part, the movement’s organizational 
dynamics contribute to it being a new way of challenging Israel in the Palestinian 
struggle. Not only novel, but also a great strength as the movement can be 
operationalized practically anywhere in the world through its emphasis on context-
sensitivity and the important role of local organizing. Nevertheless, the movement’s 
structure is also a potential weakness. With respect to networks, Collins says, “a 
system built on networks also leaves itself vulnerable to attack from virtually 
anywhere.”358 This has occurred in the BDS movement, some of which has been 
documented and analyzed in the case study chapters in the subsection on “Dynamics 
between BDS Campaigners and Opponents.” However, this only represents a 
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modicum of what opponents of the BDS movement have and intend to do in terms of 
disrupting BDS activism and attempting to debilitate the movement. As the BDS 
movements grows and expands, so too will anti-BDS endeavors.     
In addition to the ability to attack the movement on numerous fronts due to its 
decentralized and networked form, a number of scholars and activists have argued 
that the movement’s form also lacks coherence, which limits the movement’s ability 
to stave off attack. Carter Hallward says, “While decentralization and diversity allow 
campaigns to be rooted in local realities, the lack of coherence across campaigns – 
particularly the lack of a common set of aims, goals, and discipline – has 
limitations.”359 Similar to Collins, Carter Hallward believes that the movement’s 
structure can leave it vulnerable to attack by opponents. Because the movement is 
comprised of local campaigns across borders, Carter Hallward says the decisions and 
actions of any local BDS campaign can have repercussions for the broader movement. 
Opponents can rally fear around a local campaign and then make the claim that a 
particular campaign is “illustrative of the ‘movement.’”360  
The foregoing analysis is in no way meant to imply that the BDS movement 
could or should become more centralized to prevent attack on its constituent 
campaigns. As I have argued, the organizational structure and processes of the 
movement are part of what makes the movement in its current form viable and an 
innovative, new way to resist Israel. At first glance, centralizing the movement may 
seem a solution to persistent attack on local BDS campaigns; however, centralization 
would create other, new sets of challenges and limitations for the movement. Assaults 
on the movement would continue by opponents but would be directed in different 
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directions, namely to the center of the movement. For example, if the movement were 
centralized, opponents could launch a lawfare campaign (as was the case with the 
academic boycott in Britain evidenced in chapter two and the We Divest campaign 
discussed in chapter three) directed at the core and potentially do substantial damage 
to the movement’s principal infrastructure. While a decentralized structure leaves the 
movement vulnerable to attack from any direction, it also prevents the entire 
movement from being taken down with a lone offensive.  
Rather than centralizing the movement and compromising not only its 
infrastructure, but also its character, the BDS movement will need to manage the 
damage that opponents seek to wrack on local campaigns. Without bestowing power 
to a central leadership, the movement could try to coordinate better in this regard 
across borders. Knowledge sharing is key as more and more campaigns come under 
attack, some with serious financial and labor costs (as was the case with the Fraser 
case in the academic boycott of Britain that was discussed in chapter two). More 
coordinated support in various forms such a fundraising or legal support from other 
BDS campaigns would also be helpful to campaigns under attack. While context-
sensitivity and local campaigns are key components of the broader movement’s 
structure and processes, this does not mean that local campaigns need to survive these 
difficulties on their own.  
The last challenge and limitation of the movement presented here regards the 
acceptability of some of the movement’s targets. In the previous section on “BDS in a 
Global Justice Framework,” I argued that targets of the BDS movement, particularly 
corporate targets, would likely be seen as legitimate to a range of activists working on 
various issues related to anti-globalization and global justice. A critique of the 
increasing political power of corporations has always been a central tenant of these 
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movements, which corresponds to corporate targets of the BDS movement that are 
chosen for their complicity in violations of international law and Palestinian rights. 
Framed in this way, BDS corporate targets can resonate with activists not specific to 
Palestine. This is a point of intersection that the BDS movement has with other 
movements, again thereby positioning itself with the possibility to gain greater 
support for the Palestinian cause.  
Though many targets of the BDS movement are legitimate and easily 
identifiable to other activists, this may not be the case with all targets of the 
movement overall. Targets of the academic and cultural boycotts may be harder to 
legitimize to activists not specific to Palestine because these areas of activism are not 
high priorities to those working in the global justice movement, except as they relate 
to privatization of education or other aspects of neoliberal restructuring. Unlike 
product boycotts or divestment campaigns, the academic and cultural boycotts of 
Israel are more sector specific and do not necessarily appeal or apply to activists 
outside these fields, even to those that support the Palestinian struggle or are BDS 
activists. An activist that is not an academic can generally support the academic 
boycott, but will have few outlets for operationalizing this activism. For this reason, 
the academic boycott, for example, is largely taken up by those in the academic 
profession. Therefore, the academic and cultural boycotts do not provide as many 
points of intersection with activists working on other issues.  
Targets of the academic and cultural boycotts are institutions, events, and 
other activities that are used for nefarious purposes of the state. For example, to 
implement the cultural boycott, artists that are scheduled to perform in Israel are often 
asked not to do so by BDS activists. While the cultural boycott addresses the global 
entertainment industry, and particularly Israel’s entertainment industry, more 
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importantly it attempts to challenge Israel in a largely symbolic way – by bringing the 
boycott to the realm of culture it is designed to confront Israel’s international public 
relations apparatus, specifically those in the service of reproducing state-based 
narratives. The academic and cultural boycotts attempt to confront Israel on terrain 
that the state not only prides itself on, but also calls upon for the state’s maintenance 
and reproduction of its narrative. Until the BDS movement, these sectors have largely 
been spared confrontation with widespread Palestinian or solidarity resistance 
activism. For this reason, the academic and cultural boycotts are critical to the BDS 
movement as they are part of the larger strategic framework to bring the Palestinian 
struggle to a range of sectors, venues, etc. and challenge Israel on a numerous fronts. 
     One way to deal with this limitation of the movement is to continually try to 
popularize the issues and make them relevant to activists outside these fields. For 
example, thus far the BDS movement has been most successful in utilizing the tactic 
of cultural boycott when strategically deployed at cultural workers that are 
recognizable and popular to a variety of activists working on a range of causes. A 
recent example was the cancellation of a concert in Tel Aviv by the American artist 
Lauryn Hill. Known for her conscientious song writing of personal and political 
issues, Hill’s cancellation of her show in Israel reverberated far beyond activists in the 
BDS movement. Similarly, the academic boycott travels far beyond the confines of 
the academy when scholarly icons such as Stephen Hawking boycott academic 
conferences in Israel, as was the case in 2013. While not every campaign within the 
academic and cultural boycotts will resonate with activists outside these fields or the 
BDS movement, the movement seeks to make great strides whenever possible to 
make connections with a broader audience.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
In this chapter, I have considered how the BDS movement might strategize outcomes, 
specifically by conceptualizing the movement is a global justice framework and by 
addressing challenges and limitations of the movement. With respect to a global 
justice framework, I have outlined four points of intersection between the BDS 
movement and other contemporary transnational social movements organizing around 
issues related to global justice. These connections can be found in the movement’s 
frames, targets, tactics, and organizational dynamics. The movement’s frames of 
justice, corporate complicity, socially responsible investment, international law, and 
human rights are advantageous for positioning the movement within a wider discourse 
available to activists around the world working on a variety of justice-oriented causes. 
Targets of the movement, particularly corporate targets, are another link between the 
BDS movement and other movements as the role of corporations in violations of 
international law and (Palestinian) human rights are unacceptable to global justice 
activists. Similarly, the tactical repertoires of the movement (boycott, divestment, 
sanctions) are prominent, and often successful, forms of action that activists use to 
pressure for change from a range of entities. Finally, the organizational structure and 
processes of the BDS movement parallel how other social movements seeking to 
create a more just world organize campaigns across borders. Located in this 
framework, the movement has the potential to mobilize new participants and broaden 
its base of support, thereby positioning itself towards positive outcomes in the form of 
continuing campaign achievements and eventual movement goals.  
While every social movement encounters difficulties, the challenges and 
limitations of the BDS movement outlined in this chapter are not a fait accompli for 
the movement. In particular, I have addressed three constraints and how the 
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movement might deal with each to overcome any major setback for the movement. 
The first is that the movement alone cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
BDS exists alongside other tactics and strategies for challenging Israel, and the 
movement does not have the full capacity to bring justice to Palestinians. The 
movement does, however, play a critical role in bringing the Palestinian struggle to a 
variety of fronts across borders and provides a new way for people to understand the 
conflict. The second challenge for the movement is that its structure and processes 
could be a weakness as opponents are able to attack constituent campaigns of the 
movement from virtually any direction. In this regard, local campaigns (including the 
BNC) that comprise the movement could coordinate better across borders, especially 
in times of adversity to prevent local campaigns from shouldering the burden of a 
particular attack. Finally, I argued that not all targets of the movement, particularly 
those in the academic and cultural boycotts, are legitimate to activists outside the 
Palestinian cause. While these campaigns are vital to the larger BDS movement, 
especially as they target specific sectors essential to the state’s narrative, the targets 
that can resonate with activists beyond these specific fields are very beneficial for the 
movement. Taken together, if drawbacks of the movement are acknowledged and 
managed appropriately there is no reason to suggest that opponents would be able to 
use any single weakness to incapacitate the movement entirely.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
In pursuing initial research for this thesis on Palestinian resistance, it became clear 
that the BDS movement played a role in current activism, though because of its 
newness, there were few scholarly forays into the topic. Thus, this study set out to 
explore the relatively un-researched BDS movement, at the very least to conduct a 
pioneering full-scale investigation on the movement. The research began with the 
questions, what are the causal conditions that led to the movement’s emergence, what 
mobilizing dynamics helped the movement develop, and how can the movement 
strategically conceptualize moving toward outcomes? I was specifically interested in 
understanding how the movement is organized and operationalized across borders to 
determine the place of such transnational activism in the Palestinian struggle and 
within a broader global justice framework.  
To conduct this study, secondary questions guided the research process and 
facilitated the structuring of the thesis. To answer the questions I first considered the 
historical background to the movement, comparing the movement to other forms of 
challenging Israel and the rise of the BDS movement through both structural factors 
of political opportunities and constraints and agentic factors of early mobilizing 
dynamics. I then examined in-depth three BDS campaign case studies to illuminate 
aspects of the larger movement, particularly how the movement is operationalized 
across borders through its constituent campaigns. Lastly, I analyzed organizing 
dynamics of the BDS movement through the movement’s organizational structure and 
processes along with strategizing movement outcomes.  
In this concluding chapter, I first synthesize the evidence from the study with 
respect to the research questions. This section integrates arguments made throughout 
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the thesis body chapters to demonstrate how the information and data presented in 
each chapter answers the research questions. In general, the presentation of analyses 
throughout the thesis relates to the movement’s causal emergence, mobilizing 
dynamics, and outcomes. The section thereafter considers the implications and 
contributions of the study to the scholarly literature and the BDS movement itself. In 
this regard, this thesis adds to the literature on the BDS movement, Palestinian 
resistance, and social movement theory. I finish the chapter by considering the 
limitations of the study and corresponding areas for further research such as internal 
divisions in the BDS movement, pre-existing networks that assisted in the 
organizational development of the movement, and a comparative study of the BDS 
movement with other contemporary transnational movements.   
 
Synthesizing the Evidence and Arguments  
 
 
With respect to the question about the movement’s similarities or dissimilarities with 
other forms of challenging Israel, as analyzed in chapter one, the BDS movement 
draws on a long historical use of the tactical repertoire of boycott in the Palestinian 
struggle and border-crossing solidarity activism. In particular, the experience of 
boycotts, non-cooperation, and anti-normalization along with solidarity activism, 
especially that developed during the second intifada, accounts for a specific 
Palestinian context for the development of the BDS movement. That said, the 
movement differs dramatically from other historical forms of challenging Israel, such 
as the long-standing use of armed resistance in the Palestinian struggle and the Arab 
League boycott of Israel. Armed resistance is not part of the official Palestinian call 
for BDS made in 2005, nor are arms part of the BDS campaigns that are organized 
across borders. In addition, the Arab League boycott is a state-based initiative, 
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whereas the current BDS movement is initiated by non-state actors in grassroots 
organizing efforts.  
While the BDS movement builds on the historical use of boycott and solidarity 
activism in the Palestinian struggle, it fuses these strategies and tactics, and transcends 
their isolated use in a specific place such as Israel/Palestine. The current BDS 
movement has a wide scope geographically as the movement can be organized 
anywhere and applies to a variety of sectors (academic, culture, sports, etc.). This 
difference in scope, tactical repertoire, and organizational structure partially accounts 
for the movement being a new and different form of transnational activism in the 
Palestinian struggle.  
In terms of why the BDS movement emerged at this particular historical 
juncture, the evidence suggests that a number of structural and agency-related factors 
led to the creation of the BDS movement. Utilizing the political processes approach 
within social movement theory, I examined the political constraints and opportunities 
that led to a context for the development of the BDS movement. In this respect, the 
counterproductive Oslo process acted as a constraint in the Palestinian political 
system because it failed to deliver meaningful change to Palestinians, and in many 
instances made matters worse. The political environment created by the Oslo process 
and its fallout revealed that negotiations were a failed strategy for establishing 
Palestinian justice. At the same time, initial mobilizing efforts around a tactical 
repertoire of boycott started to emerge, which created mobilizing dynamics that 
developed more after the official Palestinian call for BDS was made. These early 
initiatives included the call for a moratorium on joint research funding between 
Europe and Israel, and divestment campaigns on US university campuses and in 
Christian Churches. Shortly thereafter, the ICJ declared in its Advisory Opinion that 
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Israel’s wall is illegal under international law. Activists seized the moment and 
interpreted the Opinion as a political opportunity for showcasing Israel’s violations of 
international law, citing it in most BDS activities afterwards, including the official 
Palestinian call in 2005. In this way, the ICJ Advisory Opinion helped international 
law become a collective action frame of the movement.  
While these initial mobilizing activities helped set in motion a transnational 
movement, it was the Palestinian call for BDS in 2005 that became a major turning 
point in the movement, and this responds to the research question about when a 
movement can be discerned. Palestinians made an official call to action that provided 
a rationale and formulated demands based on the historical experiences of the three 
disconnected segments of the Palestinian population. Much of what was written in the 
call had been previously articulated in early boycott and divestment activities, and 
thus represented a culmination of these initiatives. Because the call is broadly based in 
terms of Palestinian representation and endorsement, it is widely supported among 
Palestinians and solidarity activists. Thus, the official Palestinian call gave focus to 
ongoing BDS activities and helped solidify disconnected boycott and divestment 
initiatives into a border-crossing movement. 
I then investigated three BDS campaign case studies to answer the question 
about how local campaigns within the movement are operationalized. In this regard, 
the academic boycott in Britain and the We Divest campaign illustrate how the 
movement is decentralized, and uses vertical and horizontal forms of organizing. The 
dynamics between academic boycott campaigners and opponents, as indicated by the 
Fraser case, and to a lesser extent the attempts by Shurat HaDin against the We Divest 
campaign, indicate that lawfare is an important strategy for those against BDS in 
attempting to silence BDS activists and debilitate the movement. In addition, the We 
238 
 
 
Divest campaign and consumer boycott campaigns against Ahava show the use of 
collective action frames such as human rights and other international laws, corporate 
complicity, etc. that activists use to gain support for the movement by blaming targets 
and providing a justification for boycott. These frames parallel those of other 
contemporary transnational movements, and as I argued later in the thesis, are a point 
of intersection between the BDS movement and other movements organizing around 
issues related to global justice. Therefore, the evidence showcased in the three case 
study chapters demonstrates aspects of the movement’s scope, organizational 
structure, and collective action frames, which contributes to my overall claim that the 
movement is a novel approach for resisting Israel.  
  Following the case study chapters, I set out to answer the research question 
relating to how the movement is organized across borders. To do this, I first 
considered the role of the Palestinian BNC in the transnational movement and 
addressed the question of leadership, specifically how the movement is Palestinian-
led. I argued that the principles and goals of the movement, the historical use of the 
tactical repertoire of boycott in the Palestinian struggle, many of the foundational 
efforts for organizing a transnational movement, and BDS activities organized in the 
Palestinian territories are all Palestinian-led. Outside these areas, as indicated in the 
case study chapters and in the early BDS activities discussed in chapter one, groups 
and organizations in the BDS movement decide for themselves how to operationalize 
the movement in their locale. Context sensitivity is a critical feature of the 
movement’s structure as it makes possible a decentralized BDS movement across 
borders. The organizational structure of the movement allows activists to challenge 
Israel in different places around the world and bring the Palestinian struggle to a range 
of venues such as union meetings, academic conferences, church assemblies, 
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storefronts, etc. Finally, I analyzed how the BDS movement is comprised of a dense 
web of connections among groups. The movement consists of networks upon 
networks and through informal, loose coordination via participant websites, social 
networking sites, email lists, and frequent in-person gatherings such as conferences 
and IAW.  
The next research question asked how the BDS movement fits within a larger 
global justice framework. To respond to this, I analyzed four points of intersection 
between the BDS movement and other contemporary transnational movements, which 
included movement frames, targets, tactics, and organizational structure and 
processes. The movement’s frames (human rights and other forms of international 
law, corporate complicity, justice, etc.), targets (especially corporate targets), its 
tactical repertoire of boycott, and its decentralized structure and processes, parallels 
other movements working on justice related causes across borders. I argued that this 
provides the movement with critical connective linkages that are used to expand its 
support.  
To answer the final research question on the movement’s challenges and 
limitations, I outlined three areas that are important for the movement’s development. 
The first is that the movement alone cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
is an important contributing component to the broader Palestinian struggle, yet 
insufficient alone in its capacity to create a political solution to the conflict. The 
movement can create conditions towards that end in the form of weakening Israel’s 
institutional capacity to oppress Palestinians, but another mechanism is needed for 
moving beyond this to create a just solution. The second challenge of the movement 
relates to its organizational structure and processes. Due to the movement’s 
decentralized and networked form, opponents of the movement have the power to 
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attack the movement on many fronts. As the movement is comprised of many local, 
community-based campaigns, those that seek to weaken the movement can attempt 
significant damage by exhausting the physical and fiscal resources of local 
campaigns. Finally, I argued that while some targets of the movement, particularly 
corporate targets, are legitimate and resonate with activists not specific to Palestine, 
other targets, such as some in the academic and cultural boycott might not have the 
connective linkages with other movements. If these challenges within the movement 
are acknowledged and managed, organizing dynamics in the movement can be 
strengthened.  
Thus, taken together and in comparison with other forms of resisting Israel, 
these findings show that based on the movement’s geographic and multi-sector scope, 
its decentralized organizational structure that uses vertical and horizontal forms of 
organizing through networks of Palestinians and solidarity activists, and its collective 
action frames of international law, corporate complicity, justice, etc., it represents a 
new and different approach to challenging Israel in  the Palestinian struggle.   
 
Implications and Contributions of the Study  
 
 
This study is one of the first to analyze the BDS movement, and as such has unique 
implications and contributions to the scholarly literature and movement alike. As 
indicated in the review of BDS literature in the introduction to this thesis, the texts 
included in this area are small, but growing. This thesis adds to this corpus, and is one 
of the only studies to analyze the movement’s operationalization across borders. As 
part of an expanding literature on the movement, this research has specifically 
proffered insight into the causes for the movement’s emergence and how the border-
crossing movement is organized. This is important not only because studies on the 
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movement are few, but also for coherently presenting information and data on the 
movement that can be utilized in future studies. While this thesis sets a solid 
foundation for a preliminary analysis of the movement, it is hoped that this study 
introduces new questions for further research, some of which I discuss in the section 
below.  
This study also contributes to the literature on Palestinian resistance as BDS 
activism is a contemporary form of challenging Israel. In particular, this study has 
demonstrated how the movement draws on the historical use of a boycott repertoire 
and related practices along with border-crossing solidarity activism in the Palestinian 
struggle. This was essential for establishing a specific Palestinian context in the rise of 
the transnational movement. Yet, the movement differs considerably from other forms 
of confronting Israel such as the armed resistance and the state-based Arab League 
boycott. In this way, this thesis has supplemented the broader literature on Palestinian 
resistance by situating the movement is a historical trajectory, and analyzing the ways 
the movement is similar to or dissimilar from other forms of challenging Israel. As 
one of the main forms of resisting Israel at the present time, research on the BDS 
movement plays an important role in deepening analyses on strategies and tactics used 
in the Palestinian struggle for justice.  
In constructing a theoretical framework for researching the BDS movement, I 
utilized theoretical concepts from the literature to create a tool-kit for analyzing the 
BDS movement. This included political constraints and opportunities, mobilizing 
dynamics, collective action frames, and (tactical) repertoire. These concepts were the 
best suited for investigating the movement as they provided a framework for 
answering the thesis research questions. Specifically, these concepts provided a way 
for analyzing the structural and agentic factors that led to the movement’s emergence, 
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and how the movement is organized across borders. The framework that I formed for 
investigating the movement represents a synthesis of approaches available in social 
movement theory, and thus contributes to the literature by providing an integrative 
analysis that is based in a contemporary example.  
In addition to established concepts available in the social movement literature, 
I have also sought to include the notion of crafting movement-relevant research where 
possible. My aim in including this in my theoretical framework for researching the 
BDS movement was to critically engage in the social movement literature and 
produce research that would be practically relevant for activists. While Bevington and 
Dixon’s call for producing movement-relevant theory might slowly be gaining 
traction, there is still very little available in the literature. In part, this study 
contributes to a movement-relevant analysis by acknowledging the importance of 
such considerations in researching social movements, and particularly does so in this 
thesis with respect to the BDS movement’s challenges and limitations. In addition to 
contributing to the scholarly literature on social movements, it is hoped that aspects of 
this thesis are relevant and practical for the BDS movement. As already noted the 
section on the movement’s challenges and limitations in particular is important for 
addressing how the movement can manage impediments and further expand.  
 
Limitations of the Study and Further Research  
 
 
Because this is one of the first major studies on the BDS movement, it advances a 
number of areas that could be researched further to contribute to studies on the 
movement, transnational activism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and border-
crossing social movements. While this study considered the dynamic interactions 
between BDS campaigners and opponents, this thesis did not investigate internal 
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divisions within the movement itself. In developing initial research questions for 
studying the BDS movement this aspect did not seem significant, as it is not a topic 
extensively covered in the existing social movement literature. Only when 
considering the nexus between the BDS movement’s limitations and crafting 
movement-relevant research did it become clear that pursuing this line of 
interrogation would be greatly beneficial to the movement and fill a gap in the 
literature. Starting points might include addressing what issues divide activists in the 
BDS movement and investigating where internal divisions are occurring most (i.e. 
within campaigns, between campaigns, between the Palestinian BNC and BDS 
campaigns, etc.). Additional questions might include how the movement deals with its 
internal divisions, and what effects (negative and positive) have been the result of 
such disagreements? Research in this area can help the movement understand what 
kinds of divisions there are, where they are most prominent, and how to best deal with 
them as opportunities for strengthening and advancing the movement.   
Further research could also be pursed on the pre-existing networks that 
assisted in the development of the BDS movement. Social movements are often built 
on the organizational infrastructure of previous movements and investigating these 
networks in the case of the BDS movement would deepen and expand an analysis of 
the movement’s emergence, particularly at an operational level. What is the 
organizational groundwork that the movement builds on – prior solidarity networks, 
diaspora networks, the anti-war movement, anti-globalization/global justice activism? 
In this thesis, I have argued that a number of causal conditions led to the emergence 
of the movement, but investigating the networks that existed prior to the formation of 
the movement would answer other questions about how the movement could 
organizationally take off, especially across borders. It would be helpful to examine the 
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organizational capacity that the BDS movement draws on and how the movement has 
utilized these underpinnings in creating a movement. This line of questioning would 
contribute to greater understanding on the organizational origins of the movement and 
would add to the literature on movement building in social movement theory.  
Finally, a comparative analysis of the BDS movement with other 
contemporary transnational social movements would be very useful. This kind of 
study would inform an analysis of organizational features of the BDS movement that 
are unique and aspects that are generalizable to transnational activism. In this thesis, I 
briefly analyzed four points of intersection that the BDS movement has with other 
border-crossing movements that work on justice related causes. These 
interconnections, and others, could be more fully developed to create an analytical 
framework for comparing the BDS movement and other transnational movements. 
For example, how has the human rights frame developed in various movements, how 
is it deployed, and is it effective in creating the desired social and political change 
these movements wish to see? Another area might consider what global and domestic 
mechanisms have led to the development of decentralized movements and horizontal 
organizing practices in transnational movements. A comparative approach would 
illuminate organizational dynamics of the BDS movement that are specific to 
Palestine activism and those that apply to organizing transnational activism more 
broadly.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
I began this thesis by investigating Palestinian resistance in general to understand a 
dimension of Palestinian politics that related to my previous research, though was a 
topic I had spent little time formally analyzing. During that time, questions about the 
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BDS movement arose, but due to the movement being relatively new there were few 
scholarly texts available from which to seek answers. To fill a gap in the literature and 
answer these research questions, I then began one of the first major studies on the 
movement. In this thesis, I have illustrated that he movement is a novel and distinctive 
approach to challenging Israel in the Palestinian struggle. It confronts Israel across the 
globe in a wide range of venues, and in a variety of sectors. The movement does this 
through a decentralized structure, with horizontal and vertical forms of organizing that 
occurs through extensive networks of Palestinians and solidarity activists. The 
movement thematically focuses on Israel’s violations of international law and 
Palestinian human rights, showing how corporations are complicit in these violations, 
thereby strategically framing the movement in a way that resonates with other 
activists working on justice related causes across borders. While the BDS movement 
does not guarantee an elimination of Palestinian oppression, it has the potential to 
affect future dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and create conditions 
conducive to achieving Palestinian justice.    
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Appendix I: Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS 
 
Palestinian Civil Society Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel 
Until it Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights  
9 July 2005 
One year after the historic Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) which found Israel’s Wall built on occupied Palestinian territory to be illegal; 
Israel continues its construction of the colonial Wall with total disregard to the 
Court’s decision. Thirty eight years into Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel 
continues to expand Jewish colonies. It has unilaterally annexed occupied East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and is now de facto annexing large parts of the West 
Bank by means of the Wall. Israel is also preparing – in the shadow of its planned 
redeployment from the Gaza Strip – to build and expand colonies in the West Bank. 
Fifty seven years after the state of Israel was built mainly on land ethnically cleansed 
of its Palestinian owners, a majority of Palestinians are refugees, most of whom are 
stateless. Moreover, Israel’s entrenched system of racial discrimination against its 
own Arab-Palestinian citizens remains intact. 
In light of Israel’s persistent violations of international law; and 
Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel’s colonial 
and discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective 
remedies; and 
Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now 
failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect 
fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of 
Palestine; and 
In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have 
historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the 
struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott, 
divestment and sanctions; and 
Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of 
international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression; 
We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society 
organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts 
and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South 
Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to 
impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis 
to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace. 
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These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its 
obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination 
and fully complies with the precepts of international law by: 
1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall 
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full 
equality; and 
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to 
their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194. 
Endorsed by: 
The Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and organizations 
below represent the three integral parts of the people of Palestine: Palestinian 
refugees, Palestinians under occupation and Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
 Unions, Associations, Campaigns 
Council of National and Islamic Forces in Palestine (Coordinating body for the major 
political parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen’s Rights (PICCR) 
Union of Arab Community Based Associations (ITTIJAH), Haifa 
Forum of Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon 
Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU) 
General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) 
General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT) 
Federation of Unions of Palestinian Universities’ Professors and Employees 
Consortium of Professional Associations 
Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) 
Health Work Committees – West Bank 
Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) 
Union of Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) 
Union of Health Work Committees – Gaza (UHWC) 
Union of Palestinian Farmers 
Occupied Palestine and Syrian Golan Heights Advocacy Initiative (OPGAI) 
General Union of Disabled Palestinians 
Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees (PFWAC) 
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) 
Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign 
Union of Teachers of Private Schools 
Union of Women’s Work Committees, Tulkarem (UWWC) 
Dentists’ Association – Jerusalem Center 
Palestinian Engineers Association 
Lawyers’ Association 
Network for the Eradication of Illiteracy and Adult Education, Ramallah 
Coordinating Committee of Rehabilitation Centers – West Bank 
Coalition of Lebanese Civil Society Organizations (150 organizations) 
Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights (SPHR), Network of Student-based Canadian 
University Associations 
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Refugee Rights Associations/Organizations 
Al-Ard Committees for the Defense of the Right of Return, Syria 
Al-Awda Charitable Society, Beit Jala 
Al Awda – Palestine Right-to-Return Coalition, U.S.A 
Al-Awda Toronto 
Aidun Group – Lebanon 
Aidun Group – Syria 
Alrowwad Cultural and Theatre Training Center, Aida refugee camp 
Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced (ADRID), 
Nazareth 
BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem 
Committee for Definite Return, Syria 
Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Refugee Rights, Nablus 
Consortium of the Displaced Inhabitants of Destroyed Palestinian Villages and Towns 
Filastinuna – Commission for the Defense of the Right of Return, Syria 
Handala Center, ‘Azza (Beit Jibreen) refugee camp, Bethlehem 
High Committee for the Defense of the Right of Return, Jordan 
(including personal endorsement of 71 members of parliament, political parties and 
unions in Jordan) 
High National Committee for the Defense of the Right of Return , Ramallah 
International Right of Return Congress (RORC) 
Jermana Youth Forum for the Defense of the Right of Return, Syria 
Laji Center, Aida camp, Bethlehem 
Local Committee for Rehabilitation, Qalandia refugee camp, Jerusalem 
Local Committee for Rehabilitation of the Disabled, Deheishe refugee camp, 
Bethlehem 
Palestinian National Committee for the Defense of the Right of Return, Syria 
Palestinian Return Association, Syria 
Palestinian Return Forum, Syria 
Palestine Right-of-Return Coalition (Palestine, Arab host countries, Europe, North 
America) 
Palestine Right-of-Return Confederation-Europe (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden) 
Palestinian Youth Forum for the Right of Return, Syria 
PLO Popular Committees – West Bank refugee camps 
PLO Popular Committees – Gaza Strip refugee camps 
Popular Committee – al-’Azza (Beit Jibreen) refugee camp, Bethlehem 
Popular Committee – Deheishe refugee camp, Bethlehem 
Shaml – Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Center, Ramallah 
Union of Women’s Activity Centers – West Bank Refugee Camps 
Union of Youth Activity Centers – Palestine Refugee Camps, West Bank and Gaza 
Women’s Activity Center – Deheishe refugee camp, Bethlehem 
Yafa Cultural Center, Balata refugee camp, Nablus 
Organizations 
Abna’ al-Balad Society, Nablus 
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Addameer Center for Human Rights, Gaza 
Addameer Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, Ramallah 
Alanqa’ Cultural Association, Hebron 
Al-Awda Palestinian Folklore Society, Hebron 
Al-Doha Children’s Cultural Center, Bethlehem 
Al-Huda Islamic Center, Bethlehem 
Al-Jeel al-Jadid Society, Haifa 
Al-Karameh Cultural Society, Um al-Fahm 
Al-Maghazi Cultural Center, Gaza 
Al-Marsad Al-Arabi, occupied Syrian Golan Heights 
Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, Gaza 
Al-Nahda Cultural Forum, Hebron 
Al-Taghrid Society for Culture and Arts, Gaza 
Alternative Tourism Group, Beit Sahour (ATG) 
Al-Wafa’ Charitable Society, Gaza 
Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 
Arab Association for Human Rights, Nazareth (HRA) 
Arab Center for Agricultural Development (ACAD) 
Arab Center for Agricultural Development-Gaza 
Arab Educational Institute – Open Windows (affiliated with Pax Christie 
International) 
Arab Orthodox Charitable Society – Beit Sahour 
Arab Orthodox Charity – Beit Jala 
Arab Orthodox Club – Beit Jala 
Arab Orthodox Club – Beit Sahour 
Arab Students’ Collective, University of Toronto 
Arab Thought Forum, Jerusalem (AFT) 
Association for Cultural Exchange Hebron – France 
Association Najdeh, Lebanon 
Authority for Environmental Quality, Jenin 
Bader Society for Development and Reconstruction, Gaza 
Canadian Palestine Foundation of Quebec, Montreal 
Center for the Defense of Freedoms, Ramallah 
Center for Science and Culture, Gaza 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ramallah- Al-Bireh District 
Child Development and Entertainment Center, Tulkarem 
Committee for Popular Participation, Tulkarem 
Defense for Children International-Palestine Section, Ramallah (DCI/PS) 
El-Funoun Palestinian Popular Dance Troupe 
Ensan Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Bethlehem 
Environmental Education Center, Bethlehem 
FARAH – Palestinian Center for Children, Syria 
Ghassan Kanafani Society for Development, Gaza 
Ghassan Kanafani Forum, Syria 
Gaza Community Mental Health Program, Gaza (GCMHP) 
Golan for Development, occupied Syrian Golan Heights 
Halhoul Cultural Forum, Hebron 
Himayeh Society for Human Rights, Um al-Fahm 
Holy Land Trust – Bethlehem 
Home of Saint Nicholas for Old Ages – Beit Jala 
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Human Rights Protection Center, Lebanon 
In’ash al-Usrah Society, Ramallah 
International Center of Bethlehem (Dar An-Nadweh) 
Islah Charitable Society-Bethlehem 
Jafra Youth Center, Syria 
Jander Center, al-Azza (Beit Jibreen) refugee camp, Bethlehem 
Jerusalem Center for Women, Jerusalem (JCW) 
Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center (JLAC ) 
Khalil Al Sakakini Cultural Center, Ramallah 
Land Research Center, Jerusalem (LRC) 
Liberated Prisoners’ Society, Palestine 
Local Committee for Social Development, Nablus 
Local Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled, Nablus 
MA’AN TV Network, Bethlehem 
Medical Aid for Palestine, Canada 
MIFTAH-Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, 
Ramallah 
Muwatin-The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy 
National Forum of Martyr’s Families, Palestine 
Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work – Gaza Area 
Network of Christian Organizations – Bethlehem (NCOB) 
Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, Jerusalem 
Palestinian Counseling Center, Jerusalem (PCC) 
Palestinian Democratic Youth Union, Lebanon 
Palestinian Farmers’ Society, Gaza 
Palestinian Hydrology Group for Water and Environment Resources Development 
Gaza 
Palestinian Prisoners’ Society-West Bank 
Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection, Gaza 
Palestinian University Students’ Forum for Peace and Democracy, Hebron 
Palestinian Women’s Struggle Committees 
Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD) 
Popular Art Centre, Al-Bireh 
Prisoner’s Friends Association – Ansar Al-Sajeen, Majd al-Krum 
Public Aid Association, Gaza 
Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies 
Saint Afram Association – Bethlehem 
Saint Vincent De Paule – Beit Jala 
Senior Citizen Society – Beit Jala 
Social Development Center, Nablus 
Society for Self-Development, Hebron 
Society for Social Work, Tulkarem 
Society for Voluntary Work and Culture, Um al-Fahm 
Society of Friends of Prisoners and Detainees, Um al-Fahm 
Sumoud-Political Prisoners Solidarity Group, Toronto 
Tamer Institute for Community Education, Ramallah 
TCC – Teacher’s Creativity Center, Ramallah 
Wi’am Center, Bethlehem 
Women’s Affairs Technical Committee, Ramallah and Gaza (WATC) 
Women’s Studies Center, Jerusalem (WSC) 
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Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, Jerusalem (WCLAC) 
Yafa for Education and Culture, Nablus 
Yazour Charitable Society, Nablus 
YMCA-East Jerusalem 
Youth Cooperation Forum, Hebron 
YWCA-Palestine 
Zakat Committee-al-Khader, Bethlehen 
Zakat Committee-Deheishe camp, Bethlehem 
The Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between People (PCR)  
Alternative Voice in the Galilee (AVIG)  
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Appendix II: BDS Survey 
  
1. What is the name of your organization or group? 
2. Where is your group located? 
City/Town: 
Country: 
Email Address: 
3. When was your group established? 
4. When did your group start supporting BDS? 
5. It is important to support the BDS movement because the principles and ideas 
are Palestinian-led. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
6.  BDS campaigns are the most important way solidarity activists can contribute 
to the Palestinian struggle. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
7.  BDS worked in South Africa so it could work in Israel/Palestine. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
8.  My group supports BDS because it is flexible. It allows activists to decide 
their own targets for BDS campaigns and strategies for confronting those 
targets. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
9. One reason my group supports BDS is because campaigns can be done 
anywhere in the world. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
10.  BDS campaigns are the most effective way to pressure Israel to comply with 
international law and human rights. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
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Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
11.  BDS campaigns are the most effective way to raise awareness about Israel's 
violations of international law and human rights. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
12.  BDS campaigns can change the discourse on Israel/Palestine. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
13.  If there are any other reasons that your group supports BDS that have not been 
mentioned in this survey, please include these reasons. 
14.  My group primarily works on BDS campaigns. 
Yes 
No 
Other (please specify) 
15.  My group has worked on other Palestine solidarity activities in the past, but 
now we mainly focus on BDS. 
Yes 
No 
Other (please specify) 
16.  BDS campaigns must be combined with other solidarity activities (e.g. 
sending medical supplies, planting olive trees, participating in demonstrations 
against the wall, etc.) to obtain justice and rights for Palestinians. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
17.  What kind of BDS campaigns does your group work on? (check all that apply) 
Academic Boycott 
Cultural Boycott 
Product Boycott - any products from Israel 
Product Boycott - only products from Israeli settlements 
Sports Boycott 
Divestment - from Israeli or foreign companies that are connected to 
the state of Israel 
Divestment - from companies that are involved in Israel's occupation 
of the Palestinian territories 
Sanctions 
Other (please specify) 
18.  My group coordinates with the Palestinian Boycott National Committee 
(BNC). 
Frequently 
As Needed 
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Never 
19.  My group coordinates with other Palestine solidarity groups on BDS 
campaigns. 
Frequently 
As Needed 
Never 
20.  Coordination between Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns 
and the BNC should increase. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
21.  Coordination between Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns 
should increase. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
22.  Please feel free to add any additional information to this survey in the space 
below. 
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Appendix III: Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel 
 
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI)  
6 July 2004 
 
Whereas Israel's colonial oppression of the Palestinian people, which is based on 
Zionist ideology, comprises the following: 
 
 Denial of its responsibility for the Nakba -- in particular the waves of ethnic 
cleansing and dispossession that created the Palestinian refugee problem -- and 
therefore refusal to accept the inalienable rights of the refugees and displaced 
stipulated in and protected by international law; 
 Military occupation and colonization of the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem) and Gaza since 1967, in violation of international law and UN 
resolutions; 
 The entrenched system of racial discrimination and segregation against the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, which resembles the defunct apartheid system in 
South Africa; 
 
Since Israeli academic institutions (mostly state controlled) and the vast majority of 
Israeli intellectuals and academics have either contributed directly to maintaining, 
defending or otherwise justifying the above forms of oppression, or have been 
complicit in them through their silence, 
 
Given that all forms of international intervention have until now failed to force Israel 
to comply with international law or to end its repression of the Palestinians, which has 
manifested itself in many forms, including siege, indiscriminate killing, wanton 
destruction and the racist colonial wall, 
 
In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community of 
scholars and intellectuals have historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight 
injustice, as exemplified in their struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through 
diverse forms of boycott, 
 
Recognizing that the growing international boycott movement against Israel has 
expressed the need for a Palestinian frame of reference outlining guiding principles, 
 
In the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice 
and oppression, 
 
We, Palestinian academics and intellectuals, call upon our colleagues in the 
international community to comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli 
academic and cultural institutions as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's 
occupation, colonization and system of apartheid, by applying the following: 
 
1. Refrain from participation in any form of academic and cultural cooperation, 
collaboration or joint projects with Israeli institutions;   
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2. Advocate a comprehensive boycott of Israeli institutions at the national and 
international levels, including suspension of all forms of funding and subsidies 
to these institutions; 
3. Promote divestment and disinvestment from Israel by international academic 
institutions;  
4. Work toward the condemnation of Israeli policies by pressing for resolutions 
to be adopted by academic, professional and cultural associations and 
organizations; 
5. Support Palestinian academic and cultural institutions directly without 
requiring them to partner with Israeli counterparts as an explicit or implicit 
condition for such support. 
 
Endorsed by: 
 
Palestinian Federation of Unions of University Professors and Employees; Palestinian 
General Federation of Trade Unions; Palestinian NGO Network, West Bank; 
Teachers' Federation; Palestinian Writers' Federation; Palestinian League of Artists; 
Palestinian Journalists' Federation; General Union of Palestinian Women; Palestinian 
Lawyers' Association; and tens of other Palestinian federations, associations, and civil 
society organizations. 
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